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Since Minnesota passed the first charter school law in 1991, charter schools have 
become one of the most prominent school reforms in the U.S.  While charter schools 
educate a small portion of public school enrollments, their existence has prompted 
various responses from traditional public school districts.  For example, districts may 
change expenditure patterns or work to increase test scores in an effort to retain 
enrollments.  In this sense, a charter school’s most significant impact on public school 
students may work indirectly through the traditional public school reactions they invoke.   
 
This dissertation explores education finance implications for charter schools and 
their encompassing public school districts.  Using a dataset comprised of U.S. public 
school districts over sixteen years, I examine the local school district’s revenue response 
to the establishment of a charter school.  Following a description of the multi-level policy 
environment in which charter schools operate, this dissertation includes a summary of the 
literature examining student achievement and expenditure responses of public school 
districts to the presence of charter schools.  Next, I develop a conceptual model outlining 
the reasons that a school district may experience a change in revenue when charter 
schools locate within or nearby.   
 
Before testing the public school district response to charter schools, I had to 
accurately measure charter school locations across the U.S.  To do this, I used geographic 
information system (GIS) software to improve upon alternative charter location databases 
maintained by the federal government and national charter school organizations.  With 
charter school locations accurately mapped, I estimated the traditional public school 
district revenue response to the various measures of charter school presence.  Findings 
from this estimation suggest that, on average traditional public school districts 
experienced changes in per-pupil revenues when charter schools located closer to the 
district.  Specifically, revenues from local sources decreased as charter schools moved 
nearer, but revenues from federal sources increased.  This relationship changed over time, 
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however.  As charter schools were authorized in more districts and states, per-pupil 
revenues began increasing as charter schools moved closer to school districts. 
 
KEYWORDS: charter schools, school choice, K-12 education, school finance, public 
finance 
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Chapter One 
Overview of dissertation 
Introduction 
Charter school reform has been cited as the most significant development in 
public education over the last few decades (Finn, Manno et al. 2001).  A decade after 
their inception, charter schools increased exponentially in number and influence.  In 
response to their expanded importance, education researchers initiated the examination of 
charter school growth and their impact on the public education system.   
Within this vein of research, earlier studies examined charter school efficacy, 
comparing charter students and schools to their traditional public school counterparts 
(Buddin and Zimmer 2005, Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Hill, Angel et al. 2006).  The 
comparisons between outcomes led other researchers to examine the mechanisms by 
which charter schools differed from traditional public schools.  These mechanisms 
included juxtapositions of the student body and faculty composition, curriculum design 
and grade configuration (Dee and Fu 2004, Zimmer, Gill et al. 2011, Carruthers 2012). 
The varying nature of charter schools across and within states prevented 
researchers from reaching clear, consistent conclusions, but two findings have emerged 
over the past decade of research.  First, charter schools vary depending on the policy and 
educational environments of states.  Second, charter schools remain a small portion of the 
public school system, relative to traditional public schools, in both the number of students 
they educate and the number of operating schools.  While charter schools continue to be 
small in number, their influence on the public school system has not remained so.  
Researchers contend that traditional public schools and districts respond to the presence 
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of a charter school as charter schools siphon students and funding (Dee and Fu 2004).  
Most often, the relationship between charter schools and traditional public schools is 
modeled as a competitive one.   
The relationship between charter schools and traditional public schools may not 
be competitive, as the nature of the relationship depends on the policy and educational 
environment of the locality and state.  This dissertation aims to examine whether the 
relationship between charter schools and their encompassing or neighboring districts is 
supportive instead of competitive.  If charter schools lead to additional resources, for 
example, districts may cooperate with charter school operators, instead of compete as the 
previous literature has suggested.  This is especially important considering that charter 
schools are authorized and monitored most often by their encompassing local school 
districts.  
This chapter will provide the motivation for this dissertation topic, the specific 
research questions investigated and an overview of the dissertation’s organization. 
Motivation  
The efficacy of charter schools has been the focus of much education research 
over the past decade; evidence is mixed, however, on whether charter schools enhance 
student achievement and provide K-12 education more efficiently (Gill 2001, Bifulco and 
Ladd 2006, Hill, Angel et al. 2006, Zimmer and Buddin 2006, Zimmer, Gill et al. 2012).  
Findings vary across states studied, the unit of observation and the empirical specification 
used.  Generally, studies that examined student-level data and exploited randomization 
provided by charter school lotteries found positive effects of charter schools (Toma and 
Zimmer 2012), and charter schools tended to improve over time (Carruthers 2012). 
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Charter schools represent a small portion of the total number of public schools 
and educate a fraction of the public school enrollments.  Their most significant impact on 
the public school students, then, may operate indirectly through the responses they invoke 
from traditional public schools.  Alternatively stated, while charter schools focus on 
improving outcomes for their own student body, they may also create externalities, both 
positive and negative.  These externalities are a result of the traditional public school’s 
response to the presence of a charter school within or close to a district.  Researchers 
suggest this response is a reaction to the competition that charter schools create through a 
new market for students and traditional public schools must respond to this new market in 
order to retain enrollment (Hoxby 2004, Hoxby and Rockoff 2005, Zimmer and Buddin 
2009).   
Charter school competition has been explored in the literature by examining 
changes in student test scores at traditional public schools when a charter school opens 
nearby.  Evidence is mixed on whether charter schools induce competition (Booker, 
Gilpatric et al. 2008, Zimmer and Buddin 2009), and the district’s response may not be 
best measured with student test scores.  Instead, the district may change inputs as a way 
to attract or retain students, to increase efficiency or to improve test scores.  The few 
studies that have considered alternative ways to examine the effects of charter school 
competition did so by examining expenditure patterns, positing that districts and schools 
would shift resources to inputs that directly related to student outcomes (e.g. instruction 
expenditures) (Ni 2009, Arsen and Ni 2011, Welsch 2011).   
Given the short time researchers have examined the influence of charter schools 
on traditional public schools, it is evident that the charter school competition literature is 
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in its infancy, and the mechanisms by which traditional public schools respond to charter 
school competition have not been considered fully.  Moreover, researchers examining 
charter school competition have relied on the assumption that traditional public schools 
operate inefficiently and can increase efficiency when faced with additional competition 
(additional in that most traditional public schools already compete with private schools to 
some degree).   
While the first assumption may hold (Gronberg, Jansen et al. 2012), traditional 
public schools may not have the capacity to increase efficiency when charter schools 
compete for their students.  For example, traditional public school districts do not have 
the ability to contract and expand easily when enrollments change from year to year.  In 
the case that a school district can contract, shrinkage may not be in its best interest.  
Because charter schools have a limited life, traditional public school districts must retain 
some institutional slack in case charter students return.  Lastly, traditional public schools 
may not have the optimal level of resources for the given number of students because 
they are over-subscribed.  New school buildings require financing, bond approval and 
extra funding.  In this case, districts would welcome a charter school and any increase in 
efficiency would be credited to cooperation, not competition. 
As discussed above, the relationship between charter schools and traditional 
public schools may not be a competitive one; instead, traditional public school districts 
may view a charter school as a collaborative partner.  Depending on the policy and 
educational environment, charter schools may assist traditional public school districts in 
meeting the demand of certain segments of the district’s population (e.g. a Spanish 
immersion program).  Additionally, charter schools often market themselves to certain 
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segments of the district’s population (e.g. low-income or special education), and by 
catering to those students, the charter school may help the district in allocating students 
more efficiently. 
It is important to remember that charter schools receive public funds, most often 
channeled through the traditional public school district.  Additionally, traditional public 
schools often contract services to charter schools.  Lastly, the charter school competition 
literature has only examined part of the story in considering responses of public schools.  
If the charter school induced a traditional public school to lower spending but the 
traditional public school’s test scores did not change, the charter school would still have 
prompted an efficiency gain for the traditional public school.  It is these facts, coupled 
with the reasoning outlined in previous paragraphs that motivate this dissertation.  By 
increasing per-pupil funding to the district, charter schools may serve as a collaborative 
partner to traditional public school districts, not a competitor like the previous research 
has suggested.    
Research question 
This dissertation aims to examine the traditional public school district revenue 
response to the presence of a charter within or nearby the district.1  Specifically, I address 
the question of “how do per-pupil revenues of traditional public school districts change as 
charter schools become more prevalent within or near said district?” 
The main dependent variable for this study is per-pupil revenue from federal, state 
and local sources.  I examine changes in per-pupil revenues from each specific source.  
The main explanatory variable in this study is the presence of a charter school, which I 
                                                          
1 In the infrequent case that a student from district A attends a charter school in district B, the funding 
follows the student from district A, but for reasons discussed in the fourth chapter, this will still increase 
per-pupil revenues for district A. 
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measure in the following ways: distance to the nearest charter school from the traditional 
public school district central office, number of charter schools within certain distance 
radii, number of charter schools within a district and the percentage of charter schools as 
a proportion of total public schools.  As will be discussed in Chapter Three, these 
measures are consistent with the literature on charter school competition 
Organization of dissertation 
Following this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of charter schools in 
an institutional chapter.  This second chapter gives a definition of a charter school and 
outlines the process of charter school formations.  I also include a discussion of state 
charter laws, which address charter authorizing bodies and funding mechanisms for 
charter schools.  In the third chapter I review the pertinent literature on charter school 
efficacy and charter school competition.  The studies included in this review examined 
how traditional public schools responded to the presence of charter schools.  In response 
to these studies, I offer an alternative view of this response. 
In the fourth chapter, I develop a conceptual model that provides insight into why 
revenues may change when a charter school forms within or close to a district.  Before I 
test these theoretical predictions, I had to count charter schools within districts across the 
U.S., which I discuss in Chapter Five.  In the sixth chapter, I test the theoretical 
predictions from Chapter Four with an empirical estimation that accounts for the non-
randomness of charter locations.  Finally, I include a concluding chapter to discuss the 
potential policy ramifications for this.  
Copyright © Peter A. Jones 2014 
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Chapter Two 
Institutional description of charter schools 
Introduction 
Charter schools form a public-private hybrid, making them a unique facet of the 
public school system in the U.S.  The policy environments in which charter schools 
operate include all levels of government to varying degrees.  As such, these policy 
environments differ across and within states, and their differences influence the 
relationship between charter schools and their encompassing districts.  For example, a 
state charter law dictates how a school district transfers funds to the charter schools, or by 
its construct, the law may limit funding to charter schools for transportation, making 
those schools more reliant on the local school districts.   
Because the interactions among various levels of government influence charter 
schools and local school districts, it is necessary to overview the institutions associated 
with charter schools.  In this chapter I provide an explanation of the charter school 
concept and describe various public institutions that influence the formation and 
operation of charter schools.  Second, I provide a historical perspective on how charter 
schools came to fruition and how they have increased in number.  Third, I overview 
aspects of state charter laws and explain the differences in charter authorizers.  Fourth, I 
detail funding mechanisms for charter schools, providing context in how they differ from 
their public counterparts.  Altogether, this chapter provides a depiction of the various 
government levels that affect both charter school creation and continuing operation, as 
well as an explanation of how the mechanisms through which charter schools are created, 
funded and maintained differ greatly across states.    
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Charter schools defined 
Charter schools are public schools that are established through a contract or 
“charter,” which is granted through a governing body known as an authorizer or sponsor 
(U.S. Department of Education 2013).  Before authorizers may grant charters, a state 
legislature must pass a law allowing charter schools within its state.  Once a state law is 
passed and authorizers determined, potential charter operators submit an application, and 
upon approval, create a charter school. 
Charter schools embody many of the attributes of public schools while retaining 
the independence and competitive nature of private schools.  In this sense, charter schools 
serve as a public-private hybrid option for the provision of K-12 education.  Like 
traditional public schools, charter schools are publicly funded, nonsectarian schools that 
anyone can attend without paying fees.  When demand exceeds the space in a charter 
school, operators must select students with a neutral method, most often a lottery.  
Charter schools mirror private schools in that both are independent from many 
government regulations.  Also like private schools, charter schools must be chosen by 
students and parents, and attendance is not defined on assigned jurisdictional boundaries.  
Charter schools differ from traditional public schools in a number of ways.   As 
one example, charter schools face fewer of the regulations that typically govern 
traditional public schools, and as a tradeoff for less oversight, charter schools are highly 
accountable for their performance and may be closed if they fail to meet certain 
benchmarks. Unlike private and public schools, charter schools are established with an 
expiration date that may only be extended if the school meets student achievement 
targets.  For the same reasons, charter schools may be closed before the end of their 
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charter, regardless of the student or parent demand to attend the school (Finn, Manno et 
al. 2001). 
In addition to determine establishing charter lengths, state laws vary in 
determining what organizations can serve as authorizers.  Most commonly, state boards 
of education and district school boards act as authorizers, but public universities, 
nonprofits and mayors can act as authorizers under certain state charter law provisions.  
In a few states, legislatures create a unique state charter board to authorize charter 
schools.  Although every state charter law includes provisions regarding what 
organizations can act as authorizers, most state charter school laws do not include 
guidelines concerning charter operators, nor do many set guidelines as to how a charter 
school will operate (Sugarman and Kuboyama 2001).  
With few regulations regarding operators, nearly anyone may apply for a charter.  
Operators range from groups of parents to teams of teachers to private firms.  All of these 
groups must apply for a charter through the authorizer, and the application process 
requires submittal of a school plan.  The plan sets forth grade levels, thematic focus of 
school, subject emphasis and whether a special population will be served (bilingual, 
disadvantaged, gifted).  It includes a statement of the particular instructional model to be 
used (franchise or one that is being developed by operator), anticipated enrollment, 
physical facilities to be occupied and financial plan.  Lastly, operators must outline 
student achievement outcome goals and how to measure those outcomes (Finn, Manno et 
al. 2001, Epple, Ferreyra et al. 2011).  The authorizing body agrees to charter the school 
and assumes responsibility for holding that school accountable.  In doing so, the 
authorizing body may close the school if standards are not met.   
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Background on charter schools 
In 1955, Milton Friedman introduced the idea of school choice in his essay “The 
Role of Government in Education.”  Friedman’s idea of systematic reform has been 
overshadowed by within-system reform strategies like accountability systems, site-based 
management and class-size reduction (Gill 2001).  Over the last two decades, school 
choice has reemerged as a viable reform option, and states have widely adopted 
legislation supporting charter schools, open enrollment or vouchers in various forms.   
In 1974 Ray Budde presented a paper suggesting that local school boards grant 
“charters” to teachers who could work on creating new teaching tools in exchange for 
less regulation from the school board (Chi and Welner 2008).  His idea resurfaced over a 
decade later when he published “Education by Charters,” which grabbed the attention of 
Albert Shanker, then president of the American Federation of Teachers (Budde 1988, 
Finn, Manno et al. 2001).  He urged developing a new model of schooling that allowed 
parents to choose where they sent their children and teachers to choose where they 
taught.  Furthermore, he suggested a limited life for these schools, which could only be 
renewed after evaluation (Shanker 1988).  
The idea evolved into a movement in the early 1990s and was fostered by the 
union of two political forces.  First, the anti-big government political climate of the 
Reagan administration gave way to the “end of big government” message of President 
Clinton.  For the K-12 education system, this translated into a focus on cutting 
bureaucratic waste.  At the same time, legislators were placing an emphasis on creating 
education standards and assessment tools to ensure those standards were met.  Led by 
Kentucky, among other states, and supported by the federal government, states developed 
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accountability systems.2  As a tradeoff for increased accountability, schools were relieved 
of regulations and given more flexibility in operating decisions and management (Wells 
2002).   
At their inception, charter schools not only offered an alternative with less 
bureaucratic overhead, they also challenged the common school model that had 
functioned since the mid-19th century (Gill 2001).  Less regulation for more 
accountability was a cornerstone of the charter school model, and given a receptive 
political climate, Minnesota enacted the first charter school law in 1991.  Thirty-four 
states and Washington, D.C. followed that decade, and currently, all but eight states have 
enacted charter school legislation.  Table 2.1 shows the year in which each state adopted 
its charter legislation.  
Although the majority of states passed charter school legislation in the 1990s, the 
number of charter schools remained relatively low until the following decade.  Since 
school year 2000-2001, the numbers of charter schools and the student population have 
grown substantially, increasing in number from 1,500 in school year 2000-2001 to over 
6,400 in school year 2013-2014.  The student population has quadrupled from 300,000 to 
over 2.57 million over the same time period (CER 2011, NAPCS 2012, NAPCS 2014).  
Growth rates are also increasing, as approximately 250 schools were created for school 
year 2000-2001.  For school year 2011-2012, nearly 518 new charters were granted (CER 
2012).   
  Figure 2.1 provides yearly snapshots of charter school locations across the U.S. 
from 1995 to 2012 (not all years are shown for brevity). 
                                                          
2 While Kentucky was a leader in accountability reform, it remains one of nine states yet to enact charter 
school legislation 
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Current state of charter schools 
Since Minnesota adopted the nation’s first charter school law in 1991, nearly 
8,000 charter schools have opened in the U.S. as of the school year 2013-2014 (CER 
2009, CER 2012, NAPCS 2012, CER 2013, NAPCS 2014).  Currently, forty-three states 
and DC have passed some type of charter school legislation.  Within these states, 6,400 
charter schools are currently open and serving 2.57 million students, which is four 
percent of the nation’s 48 million school-aged children.  Charter schools have not spread 
evenly across the states, however, as California, Arizona, Florida and Wisconsin contain 
over forty percent of all charter schools.  There are also large concentrations in New 
York, Michigan and Louisiana, specifically, New Orleans.  Figure 2.2 depicts the 
concentration of charter school within each state.  Larger green circles represent areas 
where charter schools account for a greater market share of public schools and larger blue 
circles represent areas where charter schools have a higher share of public school 
enrollments.   
State charter school laws 
Through much of the research on charter schools, the focus has been at the 
school-level, particularly, in how charter schools have performed.  Before any charter 
school was established, however, a state legislature first had to enact a charter school law.  
These laws are complex and vary greatly across states in a multitude of characteristics, 
and the structure of a charter law depends on the state’s political environment, including 
lobbying efforts, advocacy and political compromises (Shen and Wong 2006).  Charter 
laws influence how charter schools are formed as well as the policy environment in 
 
13 
 
which they operate, and the variation in charter laws means that charter reform represents 
different things in different states (Wells, Grutzik et al. 1999). 
The state’s charter legislation establishes a policy environment on which the 
creation and subsistence of charter schools depends.  The Center for Education Reform 
(CER), an advocacy organization, has developed a grading system that ranks state charter 
school laws based on their “permissiveness” of charter schools.  Other organizations have 
documented charter laws and their subsequent changes, including the Education 
Commission of the States and the U.S. Charter Schools website 
(www.uscharterschools.org).   
Compared to the other datasets, the CER’s collection and subsequent ranking 
provide the most exhaustive dataset on charter school laws.  According to the CER, these 
grades are: 
“Based on consistent numerical analyses that hold every 
state to the same standard against which a charter school 
law should be measured—does the actual written 
law…consist of components that yield high numbers of high 
quality charter schools, which have the freedom and 
flexibility in operations, equity in funding, and 
accountability in outcomes?” (p. 4, CER Charter School 
Laws Across States, 2008) 
 
Clearly, the CER advocates for a state policy environment that not only allows but 
encourages charter schools.  States with fewer constraints on the formation or 
authorization of charter schools receive higher grades, as do states with less regulation 
pertaining to charter school operations.  The CER gives higher grades to states that 
provide charter schools with full funding or access to capital financing. 
As discussed above, a state’s charter law provides the foundation for charter 
authorization.  In the empirical chapters of this dissertation, it will be necessary to 
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estimate charter school locations across the U.S., and a state’s charter law is one of the 
key variables that influences where and how often charter schools locate.  While several 
researchers and policy think tanks have developed criteria on which to grade a state’s 
charter law, the CER’s grading system focuses on the degree of openness in a state 
charter law and, therefore, serves as a direct measure for how a state’s law influences the 
number of charter schools.  In other words, the CER’s grading criteria best measures the 
quantity of charter schools where other grading systems focus on the quality of a state’s 
charter schools, for example. 
A few studies have employed the CER rankings in empirical estimations.  Palmer 
and Gau (2003) used the CER rankings to select states for inclusion in their study on the 
effectiveness of charter authorizers.  Kuscova (2004) used CER rankings as an 
independent variable in estimating the charter school market share within a state.  Results 
from the estimation indicated that state laws which received higher grades concerning 
charter school funding and the number of authorizers were associated with higher charter 
school market shares.  Kirst (2006) referenced these rankings in his discussion the multi-
level political dimensions that affect the charter school policy environment, but he did not 
use these grades empirically.   
In contrast, Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) developed a political economy model 
to explore demand for charter schools across the states.  The authors examined how 
demographic, financial and school-related factors were associated with charter law 
strength, measured using the CER rankings.  Lastly, Holyoke et al. (2009) tested whether 
laws borne out of a punctuation (as discussed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993)) 
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experienced changes after the first enactment.  They used CER rankings to examine how 
much state charter laws changed after the legislation was first established.   
CER grading criteria 
CER rankings are based on ten criteria that pertain to both charter creation and 
charter operation.  These criteria are listed in Table 2.2.  The multiple criteria on which 
charter laws were graded also suggest that “permissiveness” varies within the state’s 
charter law as well (Mauhs-Pugh 1995, Shen and Wong 2006).  As discussed previously, 
charter schools were envisioned to be free from regulation in exchange for increased 
accountability.  As evident from the variety in charter school laws, state political 
processes have influenced the implementation of charter schools and prevented much of 
what was envisioned from being put into practice.   
The first five criteria listed in Table 2.2—placing a cap on number of schools, 
allowing multiple chartering authorities and a variety of applicants, permitting new starts 
and not requiring formal evidence of support—represent the charter creation process, and 
as mentioned before, higher grades from the CER reflect a policy environment with few 
barriers to starting a charter school.   
With no cap, a state can allow an unlimited amount of charter schools, and if there 
are no restrictions on chartering authorities, those who wish to operate a charter school 
have a choice as to with which organization they choose to apply for a charter.  States 
that do not restrict the type of applicant also create a more accommodating policy 
environment, as previous experience in public education is not a requirement.  Lastly, 
some states require formal evidence that the locality in which a charter will be located 
supports the introduction of a charter school, thereby verifying some demand for a tax-
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funded, public school alternative.  While some charter advocates support this measure 
because it confirms that the charter schools will be established in areas of high demand, 
this aspect of the law represents a limitation for potential charter operators. 
The second five criteria listed in Table 2.2—providing an automatic waiver from 
laws and regulations, ensuring legal and operational autonomy, guaranteeing full funding, 
affording complete fiscal autonomy, and exempting charter school from collective 
bargaining agreements or district work rules—represent the charter operation process, 
and as mentioned before, higher grades from the CER reflect a less restrictive policy 
environment for operating a charter school.   
States that provided an automatic waiver from laws and regulations allowed 
charter schools the freedom to establish any type of school design and to locate wherever 
the operators feel best or can afford.  For many start-up charter schools, this meant 
locating in a church basement or leasing an office building.  Second, states that provided 
legal and operational autonomy granted charter school operators complete authority in 
deciding how their school would run, which would include decisions like curriculum 
design and faculty composition.  As discussed previously, nearly half of all charter 
closures were due to financial issues, but states that guaranteed full funding mitigated 
these issues (at least partially); additionally, potential charter operators would be more 
likely to submit an application if they knew funding would be guaranteed.  Full control 
over budget decisions may also entice more charter school operators, and the freedom 
from submitting a budget to a state education agency would permit funds to be used 
elsewhere, thereby increasing the chance a charter school stayed open.  Lastly, a state that 
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exempted charter schools from collective bargaining agreements or district work rules 
cleared charter operators from faculty hiring constraints.   
Alternatives and critiques of the CER grading system 
In addition to the CER rankings, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 
developed a set of grading criteria on which state charter laws were evaluated, but the 
relative state rankings between the two systems were influenced by the respective group’s 
position on charter school (AFT 1996, AFT 2002).  As stated previously, the CER has 
been and continues to be an advocate for charter schools while the AFT holds an opposite 
position (Scott and Barber 2002). 
A few other studies have also provided critiques to the CER system, and many of 
these authors proposed an alternative grading system.  Witte et al. (2003) asserted that the 
CER’s rankings do not accurately judge the value of certain law provisions.  Where the 
CER may rank a state highly if it does not limit the number of schools, Witte et al. (2003) 
suggested that this may lead to an over-supply of charter schools; therefore, that state 
should be graded poorly.  The authors offered an alternative grading system based on five 
dimensions instead of the CER’s ten, but they did not rank the states as the CER did.   
Likewise, Wong and Shen (2004) examined the variation in state laws concerning 
the funding of charter schools.  Again, the author asserted that the CER rankings did not 
capture the multi-dimensional policy environment through which the law was 
established; instead, Wong and Shen (2004) used dichotomous variables to represent the 
existence of certain funding provisions within a state law.  Unlike the previous authors, 
Miron (2005) argued that a charter school law should be graded on the outcomes of 
charter schools within a state.  He performed a meta-analysis examining outcomes from 
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different states and related those outcomes to the provisions in charter reform laws.  
Unlike the CER, he did not rank states, as he restricted his analysis to those states in 
which charter school outcomes had been analyzed.     
Shen and Wong (2006) synthesized charter laws and coded individual provisions, 
specifically examining provisions of charter laws governing the hiring of teachers.  Chi 
and Welner (2008) discussed the shortcomings of the CER rankings and analyzed the 
grading systems of the AFT, Scott and Barber (2002), Witte et al. (2003) and Miron 
(2005).  Like the other authors, they also provided an alternative grading system, but 
unlike previous authors, Chi and Weltner (2008) included state grades in their analysis.   
Charter school authorizers 
Although charter school authorizers are a key component in the chartering 
process, they receive little attention in the literature.  One of the defining characteristics 
of charter schools—increased accountability—is the main function of an authorizer 
(Sugarman and Kuboyama 2001).  The National Association of Charter School 
Authorizers (NACSA) collects survey data on the 974 authorizing agencies across the 
U.S. (NACSA 2008).  From this survey, the NACSA classifies authorizers into six 
different types.  These include Local Education Agencies (LEAs); Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs); Independent Chartering Boards (ICBs); State Education Agencies 
(SEAs); Not-For-Profit organizations (NFPs); and Non-Educational Government entities 
(NEGs) (Gau 2006).    
The type of authorizer may influence how a charter school affects a district’s 
revenues.  For example, a district acting as an authorizer would have a better idea of the 
local demand for charter schools (e.g. the parents want a charter school that focuses on 
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public service careers).  In this case, parents may increase support to the school district 
because the district has better satisfied their particular demands for education, something 
a state education agency might not have had the capacity for.  Likewise, if a state 
education agency were to authorize a charter school, it may have a better ability to write 
grant applications, causing whichever district in which it authorizes the charter school to 
experience an increase in grant revenues.   
Considering these potential effects, I include the type of authorizer within the 
district in the empirical models of Chapters Five and Six.  The following paragraphs, 
then, provide an overview to the authorization process and how prevalent certain 
authorizers are compared to others.   
As charter schools have increased in number over the last decade, so have charter 
school authorizers.  Table 2.3 shows the number of authorizer types by year since school 
year 2007-2008.  While state laws may allow multiple/all types of authorizers, one or two 
authorizing types tend to dominate within a state.  LEAs, or local school districts, 
accounted for nearly ninety percent of all authorizers.  Most LEAs, however, authorize a 
small number of schools.  Table 2.4 shows the variability in authorizing portfolio sizes 
for the different types of authorizers.  From Table 2.4, it is evident that LEAs were most 
likely to have a small portfolio where SEAs were most likely to authorize more than ten 
schools (NACSA 2012).  As such, LEAs represent the majority of charter school 
authorizers, and they only authorize half of the nation’s charter schools.  ICBs and SEAs, 
both of which are statewide agencies, authorize over one-third of all charter schools.  The 
last fifteen percent of charter schools were authorized by HEIs (nine percent), NFPs (five 
percent) and NEGs (one percent).  
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 LEAs differ from the other types of authorizers in more than just portfolio size.  
For LEAs, a charter school creates direct competition for students.  This is not the case 
for the other authorizers, so the incentive for authorizing differs between LEAs and non-
LEAs.  In this sense, it is necessary to compare LEAs with non-LEAs as they differ in 
various authorizing practices, including approval rates, support to charter schools and the 
agency structure.   
Charter advocates have often suggested that LEA (district) authorizers would not 
allow charter schools because of the competition they create (Finn, Manno et al. 2001, 
Gill 2001); however, the number of LEAs and the number of charter schools they have 
authorized discount this assertion, but researchers have yet to adequately explain why 
LEAs are so active in charter authorizing.  By comparing LEAs to non-LEAs, it may 
become clearer as to why LEAs would authorize a charter school to compete for students 
within its own domain.  
As discussed previously, an authorizing agency requires that potential operators 
apply for a charter.  On average, LEAs receive fewer applications than non-LEAs, and 
this may be due to recruitment practices of non-LEAs.  However, LEAs have a much 
higher approval rate, approving forty percent of applications compared to only twenty 
percent for non-LEAs.  Once a charter is granted, it may be surrendered by the charter 
operator, revoked by the authorizer or granted renewal by the authorizer.  These can 
happen before the charter comes up for renewal or during the renewal process itself.  
Although LEAs authorize charter schools at a higher rate, the closure rates between LEAs 
and non-LEAs are identical, each closing three percent of charter schools (NACSA 
2012). 
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Again, most charter school advocates assumed district authorizers would be less 
likely to authorize, let alone offer support to charter schools, as these schools would 
directly compete for students.  It was not the case that LEAs were less likely to authorize, 
and it is also not the case that they provided less support.  From the NACSA’s annual 
survey, LEAs were more likely than their non-LEA counterparts to offer services.  A 
higher percentage of LEAs offered a wider variety of services, including transportation, 
financial services and data analysis.  As for facilities, district authorizers provided much 
more support to charter schools than non-LEA authorizers.3   
LEAs and non-LEAs also differed in how their agency is structured.  Many of 
these agencies dealt with more than just charter schools.  SEAs, for example, were in 
charge of the state’s entire public school system, so authorizing charter schools was only 
a portion of their management portfolio.  On average, LEAs assigned fewer employees to 
work exclusively on authorizing than non-LEAs.  LEAs also had different funding 
structures, relying more heavily on oversight fees deducted from district revenues that 
were transferred to charter schools.  In fact, LEAs deducted the highest percentage for 
authorizing fees, a full percentage point higher than non-LEAs (NACSA 2012).   
Funding of charter schools 
In the previous section, I noted that authorizers deducted fees from charter 
schools to cover their expenses.  The fees come from charter school funds, provided by 
different public sources.  Because charter schools cannot levy taxes to pay for operating 
or capital expenses, they receive public funding from school districts, state legislatures 
and the federal government.  For-profit entities offer assistance, and charter schools may 
                                                          
3 It should be noted here, however, that the additional support may indicate a lack of autonomy for charter 
schools, as LEAs were more involved in the operations of charter schools. 
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receive grants from non-profit organizations and philanthropists (Vergari 2004).  The 
funding source typically depends on the authorizer.  When the charter school is 
authorized by a state entity, the state generally sends per-pupil funding to the charter 
school; likewise, if a district school board approves the charter, district funding is 
redirected to the charter school.  Again, whether a state or district authorizing body 
approves a charter, the authorizer receives a portion of the per-pupil funding for its own 
operating costs.  This “cut” ranges from 1-5 percent depending on the authorizer (Nelson, 
Muir et al. 2000).   
For the majority of charter schools authorized by an LEA (district), funding 
follows one of three basic formulas: the per-pupil revenues of a district, per-pupil 
expenditures of a district, or an alternative per-pupil district budget formula.  When a 
student moves from a traditional public school to a charter school, the funding that would 
have gone to the traditional public school for that student goes to the charter school 
instead.  While schools receive operating expenses, per-pupil revenues are reported at the 
district level because certain expenditures are spread across multiple schools.  In general 
for charter school funding, per-pupil funding levels cover operating expenses only, not 
capital project expenses (Nelson, Muir et al. 2000).   
When a state entity authorizes a charter school, state formulas for per-pupil 
funding follow one of two methods.  First, the state may use the public school district’s 
formula to establish funding levels allowing the state agency to account for the grade 
level, special needs and low-income status of the student.  Second, the state transfers 
funding based on a school district’s average per-pupil funding level, thereby assuming 
that the charter school will enroll a representative sample of a district’s students.   
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Revenue inequalities between traditional public schools and charter schools 
Compared to public school districts, charter schools receive less public funds per 
pupil.  Batdorff et al. (2010) collected revenue data from twenty-five states and compared 
charter schools to traditional public schools.  The authors controlled for heavy 
concentrations of charter schools and district variations in per-pupil revenues.  In doing 
so, the analysis indicated the disparity in funding a charter school received compared to a 
traditional public school within the same district.  The average state gap is $2,247 (19.2 
percent) per pupil, and while there is variation across states in how charter schools are 
funded, eighty-five percent of the disparity in funding was due to access for local funding 
sources.  Although districts deducted a small percentage for their own operating costs, 
this did not cause the huge incongruence in funding levels.  The authors cited the lack of 
access to local and capital funding as an explanation for the gap.  In most states, the per-
pupil funding transferred from the public school district to the charter school only 
covered instructional costs (Batdorf, Maloney et al. 2010).   
Nearly half of charter schools were authorized through local school boards (Nelson 
2000), and funding for those charter schools was funneled through the district.  From the 
district’s standpoint, this created a difficult situation in that the district had to fund a 
charter school that directly competed for its students.  District leaders often made strong 
efforts to keep district funds from leaving traditional public schools (Finn, Manno et al. 
2001).  Because of these attempts, what should be a straightforward transfer based on a 
formula set by state legislation became a contest between charter school operators and 
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district administrators.4  Those charter school operators who were better connected within 
the district or know the system had an advantage.  This competition added to the disparity 
between charter school and public school revenue levels.   
In addition to district or state transfers, federal grants were another source of revenue 
for charter schools.  Like traditional public schools, charter schools must apply and 
compete for these federal grants.  The application process required additional 
administrative knowledge and was time consuming, especially for categorical grants.  
Because of the additional information and time costs, charter schools often avoided 
categorical grant funding.  As a result, charter schools received less categorical grant (and 
federal) funding than traditional public schools (Krop and Zimmer 2005).  
Most of the work exploring charter school finances has relied on survey data.  Even 
for individual traditional public schools, school level finance data has not been readily 
available.  Miron et al. (2011) used federal tax returns from one network of twenty-five 
charter schools.  They compared school revenues to their local district and national 
average.  Interestingly, these twenty-five schools received more per pupil in combined 
revenue ($12,731 per student) than the national average for all schools ($11,937), the 
national charter average ($9,579), or the average for local school districts ($11,960).  The 
funding disparities existed at each level of funding (federal, state and local) (Miron, 
Urschel et al. 2011).    
Some charter schools also received substantial private revenues.  When surveyed, 
these schools reported receiving no private funding, but a separate analysis of the federal 
tax forms revealed an average of $5,760 of private funding per pupil.  Krop and Zimmer 
                                                          
4 Atlanta’s charter schools took their encompassing district to Georgia’s Supreme Court in a fight for 
funding.  The school district had stated it would not authorize new charter schools if they did not agree to 
use their funding to help fund the pension school system (Niesse 2013). 
 
25 
 
(2005) found similar results in the underreporting of private donations.  Combining 
public and private sources of revenue, the charter schools in this study received, on 
average, $18,491 per pupil in school year 2007-08, which is $6,500 more per pupil than 
what the local school districts received in revenues (Miron, Urschel et al. 2011).  The 
analysis did not consider debt levels for public school districts, so the additional per-pupil 
revenue the charter school received may be offsetting their capital financing.     
Compared to the robust Batdorff et al. (2010) study, Miron et al. (2011) found that the 
funding inequality favored charter schools.  The discrepancy reflects the competition at 
the district levels.  If charter operators are knowledgeable and can play the system, they 
will receive more public funding than traditional public schools.  Likewise, private 
donations are often underreported, so the total revenue disparity may not be as large as 
has been reported.  The juxtaposition of findings reflects one of the main issues in charter 
school financing—administrative capability. 
Charter school expenditures 
Revenues between charter schools and traditional public schools are only one side of 
the issue.  On average, charter schools spent approximately $1,500 less per-pupil than 
traditional public schools (Miron, Urschel et al. 2011).  Not only did they spend less, 
charter schools also faced a different set of expenses than public school districts.  With 
less restriction in hiring practices, charter schools in many states avoided union labor.  
Perhaps as a result, charter schools paid lower salaries, per-pupil, than public school 
districts; still, personnel expenses were the single-largest category for expenses for 
charter schools (often 50-70 percent).  Curriculum materials, books, computers, 
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equipment and supplies comprised 5-15 percent of the budget, and charter schools 
contracted for financial and operational needs (5-20 percent of budget). 
Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools spent nearly double per-pupil 
on school administration, more on support services but far less on transportation than 
public school districts (Prince 1999, Miron, Urschel et al. 2011).  Charter schools 
typically had smaller enrollments, so these types of services were spread over fewer 
students, thereby increasing per-pupil expenditure levels. Overall, charter schools spent 
less on instruction and more on operations (Harper 2008, Miron, Urschel et al. 2011).  
Interestingly, early studies suggested that as a charter school ages, it shifted more 
resources away from instructional services (Prince 1999).   
With more autonomy, charter schools have more flexibility in addressing the cost 
structures of different school levels.  While charter schools must have an open 
enrollment, they can effectively recruit different types of students.  Some charter schools 
created a curriculum that catered to advantaged populations where others located in 
chronically low-income areas to attract those students.  By marketing to only a select 
group of students, the charter school decreased variation in both revenues and 
expenditures, something that traditional public schools were unable to do.  
Summary 
The policy environment associated with charter schools integrates multiple levels 
of government.  State legislatures must first pass legislation, and then local and state 
education agencies must monitor the progress and administration of charter schools.  
Recently, the federal government has increased involvement, providing additional grants 
to states that pass charter legislation.   
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These environments differ greatly across states in that a charter school in Arizona 
is governed by a less restrictive law than a charter school in Maryland.  That same charter 
school in Arizona may be authorized by a completely different organization than the one 
in Maryland.  Finally, the type of school, its funding and several other aspects are 
probably different as well.  Before one compares the school in Arizona to the one in 
Maryland, he or she must understand the different policy settings in which these two 
schools reside.  Given this, Chapter Two has served as an institutional guide for the 
different facets of the charter school environment.    
 
28 
 
Table 2.1 State charter school law enactment years 
State Law year  State Law year  State Law year 
Alabama N/A  Louisiana 1995  Ohio 1997 
Alaska 1995  Maine 2011  Oklahoma 1999 
Arizona 1994  Maryland 2003  Oregon 1999 
Arkansas 1995  Massachusetts 1993  Pennsylvania 1997 
California 1992  Michigan 1993  Rhode Island 1995 
Colorado 1993  Minnesota 1991  South Carolina 1996 
Connecticut 1997  Mississippi 2010  South Dakota N/A 
Delaware 1995  Missouri 1998  Tennessee 2002 
Florida 1996  Montana N/A  Texas 1995 
Georgia 1994  Nebraska N/A  Utah 1998 
Hawaii 1994  Nevada 1997  Vermont N/A 
Idaho 1996  New Hampshire 1996  Virginia 1998 
Illinois 1996  New Jersey 1995  Washington 2012 
Indiana 2001  New Mexico 1993  West Virginia N/A 
Iowa 2002  New York 1998  Wisconsin 1993 
Kansas 1994  North Carolina 1996  Wyoming 1995 
Kentucky N/A  North Dakota N/A  Washington, D.C. 1996 
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Table 2.2: Center for Education Reform (CER) ranking criteria 
Ranking criteria Description 
Number of schools 
(CAPS) 
States that permit an unlimited or substantial number of 
autonomous charter schools encourage more activity than 
states that either limit the number of autonomous schools. 
Multiple chartering 
authorities / binding 
appeals process 
States that permit a number of entities in addition to or instead 
of local school boards to authorize charter schools, or that 
provide applicants with a binding appeals process, encourage 
more activity.  
Variety of applicants States that permit a variety of individuals and groups both 
inside and outside the existing public school system to start 
charter schools encourage more activity than states that limit 
eligible applicants to public schools or public school 
personnel. 
New starts States that permit new schools to start up encourage more 
activity than those that permit only public school conversions. 
Formal evidence of local 
support 
States that permit charter schools to form without proving 
specified levels of local support encourage more activity than. 
Automatic waiver from 
laws and regulations 
States that provide automatic blanket waivers from most or all 
state and district education laws, regulations, and policies 
encourage more activity than states that provide no waivers or 
require charter schools to negotiate waivers on an issue-by-
issue basis. 
Legal / operational 
autonomy 
States that allow charter schools to be independent legal 
entities that can own property, sue and be sued, incur debt, 
control budget and personnel, and contract for services, 
encourage more activity than states in which charter schools 
remain under district jurisdiction. In addition, legal autonomy 
refers to the ability of charter schools to control their own 
enrollment numbers. 
Guaranteed full funding States where 100 percent of per-pupil funding automatically 
follows students enrolled in charter schools encourage more 
activity than states where the amount is automatically lower or 
negotiated with the district. 
Fiscal Autonomy States that give charter schools full control over their own 
budgets, without the district holding the funds, encourage 
more activity than states that do not. 
Exemption from 
collective bargaining 
agreements / district 
work rules 
States that give charter schools complete control over 
personnel decisions encourage more activity than states where 
charter school teachers must remain subject to the terms of 
district collective bargaining agreements or work rules. 
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Table 2.3 Number of active authorizers by agency type 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Local Education Agencies 624 726 776 857 859 
State Education Agencies 23 21 20 19 20 
Non-Profit Organizations 20 21 20 20 20 
Higher Education Institutions 38 42 47 49 46 
Independent Chartering Boards 5 7 7 8 10 
Non-Educational Government 2 2 2 2 2 
 
 
Table 2.4 Authorizer portfolio size by authorizer type 
 
 
1-5 schools 6-9 schools 10+ 
Local Education Agencies 776 38 45 
State Education Agencies 5 0 15 
Non-Profit Organizations 8 3 9 
Higher Education Institutions 28 6 12 
Independent Chartering Boards 2 0 8 
Non-Educational Government 0 1 1 
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Figure 2.1 Charter schools within the U.S., school year 1995-1996 to school year 
2012-2013
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Figure 2.1, continued. 
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 Figure 2.1, continued. 
  
 
34 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Concentration of charter schools across the U.S.
 
*Map altered by author; original created by the National Alliance for Public 
Charter Schools 
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Figure 2.3 Growth of charter schools, school year 1992-1993 through school year 
2009-2010 
 
 
*Graph created by the Center for Education Reform 
 
 
 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Palmer and Gau 2003, Witte, Shober et al. 2003, Kuscova 
and Buckley 2004, Wong and Shen 2004, Miron 2005, Kirst 2006, Stoddard and 
Corcoran 2007, Chi and Welner 2008, Holyoke 2009, CER 2012) 
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Chapter Three 
Review of literature on the traditional public school response to charter school 
competition 
Introduction 
Seminal studies examined charter school efficacy, comparing charter students and 
schools to their traditional public school counterparts (Buddin and Zimmer 2005, Bifulco 
and Ladd 2006, Hill, Angel et al. 2006).  The comparisons between outcomes led other 
researchers to examine the mechanisms by which charter schools differed from 
traditional public schools.  Because the policy environment in which charter schools 
operate depends on local, state and federal influences, charter schools in one state looked 
very different from other states.  Thus, the nature of charter schools prevented researchers 
from reaching clear, consistent conclusions. 
While charter schools continue to be small in number, their influence on the 
public school system has not remained so.  Researchers contend that traditional public 
schools and districts have responded to the presence of a charter school, as charter 
schools siphoned students and funding.  Most often, the relationship between charter 
schools and traditional public schools is modeled as a competitive one.  This may not be 
the case, however, as the nature of the relationship depends on the policy and educational 
environment of the locale and state.   
To examine whether charter schools play a cooperative or competitive role, I must 
first measure the charter school’s influence within a local school district.  Since previous 
researchers measured this influence to test whether charter schools compete with 
traditional public schools, the review of the literature focuses on competition studies.   
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Charter school effectiveness and the competition they induce 
After charter schools were introduced, researchers focused on whether charter 
schools were more effective than traditional public schools in increasing achievement 
outcomes for their respective student bodies.  Many researchers took advantage of charter 
school lotteries, which were the result of oversubscription to charter schools.  When there 
are more students than spots available in a charter school, all state laws prescribe a lottery 
to determine which students are admitted.  These lotteries address any potential selection 
bias and aid in mimicking a natural experiment.  Researchers compared outcomes of 
those students who were admitted to charter schools with those students who applied but 
were not admitted (and then attended a traditional public school).5   
Evidence is mixed from studies comparing the effectiveness of charter schools 
and traditional public schools in improving outcomes for their respective students.  
However, a few studies have found charter schools enhance student achievement and 
provide K-12 education more efficiently than their traditional public school counterparts 
(Gill 2001, Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Hill, Angel et al. 2006, Zimmer and Buddin 2006, 
Zimmer, Gill et al. 2012).  Generally, studies that examined student-level data and 
exploited the randomization of charter school lotteries found positive effects of charter 
schools (Toma and Zimmer 2012), and charter schools tended to improve over time 
(Carruthers 2012).     
While charter schools increased in prevalence over the last decade, they remained 
a very small part of the public school system, educating only four percent of the school-
aged population in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Education 2013, NAPCS 2014).  Even 
                                                          
5 Admittance to charter schools was only contingent on winning the lottery.  All state laws require a neutral 
process for selection of students when charter schools are oversubscribed. 
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though charter schools accounted for such a small portion of the system, they may have 
created pressure for traditional public schools (which account for the largest portion of 
the U.S. school-aged population) if they attracted students away from the traditional 
public school option. 
Considering the potential pressure charter schools exerted on the public school 
system, a smaller literature emerged that examined the traditional public school response 
to charter school pressure or competition.  Traditional public school districts are defined 
by geographic boundaries that serve as a mechanism for assigning students to districts 
and schools based on where they live.  Even within districts, students are assigned to 
different schools based on intra-district geographic boundaries.  If a student wants to 
switch schools or districts, his or her family must move or enroll in a private school.  
Because of the geographic constraints and the additional cost of private school tuition, 
traditional public schools have faced little direct competition before charter schools. 
Now, with the authorization of a charter within or near a district’s boundaries, 
students have a low-cost (cost of transportation) alternative to traditional public schools.  
The introduction of charter schools created a more competitive education “market,” in 
which traditional public schools would have to compete for students.  Charter proponents 
offered this idea as a second justification for expansion of charter schools, as they would 
not only improve outcomes for those students who chose to attend them but also those 
who did not.  Again, because charter schools educated such a small portion of the school-
aged population in the U.S., the increased competition charter schools created for 
traditional public schools may account for much larger system-wide benefits than the 
efficiency and effectiveness increases they may induce for their own student populations.   
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It was not a new idea to consider the effect of increased competition within 
markets previously dominated or completely controlled by the public sector.  Hoxby 
(2003) compared the introduction of charter schools to the education market to increased 
competition in the parcel and mail delivery market.  She likened claims that the United 
States Postal Service (USPS) would be unable to compete with private providers to 
contentions of charter school opponents voicing concerns that the students left behind 
would drastically suffer.  Arguably, the USPS’s increased efficiency and survival within 
the market was proof that charter school induced competition could be beneficial for 
traditional public schools as well (Hoxby 2003).   
Additionally, competition within the education market had been explored 
previously, but only within the context of private school competition.  Dee (1998) 
examined private school competition across eighteen different states and found that 
increased private school attendance was positively related to high school graduation rates 
of neighboring public schools.  While charter and private schools share similarities, the 
competition the two create differs because charter schools are open-access and cannot 
charge tuition, so many of the barriers that exist for many parents to choose private 
education are removed with charter schools.  
In this sense, charter schools represent a direct form of competition, especially 
considering that funding mechanisms for charter schools in most states shift funds from a 
traditional public school to a charter school when the student transfers.  Ultimately, this 
direct competition would mean a loss in revenue for traditional public schools if their 
enrollments decreased because of charter schools.  This competition has been explored in 
the literature by examining changes in student test scores at traditional public schools 
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when a charter school opens nearby.  This subset of the literature is relatively small 
compared to the number of studies examining achievement of charter school students.  
Results have been similar, though, as evidence is mixed in supporting the idea that 
charter schools induce competition (Zimmer and Buddin 2009, Booker, Sass et al. 2011).  
However, better specified models that examined student-level data tended to yield 
positive relationships between charter school competition and student achievement 
(Zimmer, Gill et al. 2011).   Examining student-level data allowed researchers to capture 
unobservable differences between those households and students who choose charter 
schools and those that stay in traditional public schools (Betts 2009).   
Charter schools, however, may elicit another response from their encompassing or 
neighboring traditional public school districts, one that extends beyond the control of 
district officials.  District revenues are a function, among other things, of the public’s 
demand for public schooling.  Charter schools draw from both public and private 
enrollments, and as a result, the public typically increases their support for public school 
options when a charter school opens within or nearby a district’s boundaries (charter 
schools are unlikely to open in districts where the public disapproves of charter schools).  
As a result, like the externalities created with student test scores, district revenues may 
also increase because a charter has located near or within the district and the public is 
willing to provide additional funds for public schools.   
Unlike previous studies that considered the district’s response through 
expenditures, this paper models the district’s response to charter school competition by 
considering changes in the public’s demand for public schooling and any ensuing change 
in revenues.  Likewise, this study employs a nationwide panel spanning sixteen years to 
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test the theoretical predictions.  Few studies examining charter schools explore more than 
a handful of states over a small span of years.   
Academic achievement response to charter school competition 
The studies reviewed differ in four aspects.  First, the unit of analysis varied 
across studies, ranging from the district level to the student level.  Second, competition 
was measured in different ways.  Hoxby’s (2001) initial article measured competition as a 
dummy variable where a district faced competition once the charter’s share of district 
enrollment exceeded a six percent threshold.  Other researchers used continuous 
measures of a charter’s enrollment share, distance measurements between districts and 
traditional public schools with charter schools, and counts of charter schools within a 
district or pre-determined radius around a school or district.   
Third, studies differed in the number and selection of states, which matters greatly 
given the context of charter school legislation.  Charter laws fluctuate across state in 
regards to the restrictiveness of charter authorization.  Some states impose caps, while 
others limit the type and number of authorizers.  This affects the competitive abilities of 
charter schools within a state.   
Lastly, the following studies contrasted in their approaches to address the 
endogeneity of charter school locations.  Charter school operators make a non-random 
decision to open a charter school in a particular location.  In this sense, any effect of 
competition may be biased if charter operators locate in districts where it is easier to 
compete for students.  Some studies failed to address this, while others employed 
difference in differences or an instrumental variable approach.   
 
42 
 
Bettinger’s (1999) seminal work employed a school-level analysis measuring the 
traditional public school response to charter school competition.  Competition, as 
Bettinger measured it, was the number of charter schools within a 5 mile radius.  Using 
both difference in differences and fixed effects models, Bettinger found small, negative 
achievement responses to increased charter school competition. 
Following Bettinger’s work, Hoxby (2001) outlines the mechanisms by which a 
traditional public school’s average test score may change.  When a charter competes with 
a traditional public school, the traditional public school may lose its better students, 
thereby lowering its average test score.  On the other hand, the traditional public school 
may lose its lower performing students, which would increase its average test score.  
These changes do not reflect a public school response, however, just a modification of the 
student body composition.  If the public school does react to the presence of a charter 
school, Hoxby posits that this response should be encapsulated in increased achievement 
scores (Hoxby 2001). 
To test these predictions, Hoxby (2001) examined schools within Michigan and 
Arizona.  For her study, a traditional public school experienced charter school 
competition when charter schools within the public school district accounted for at least 
six percent of the district’s total enrollment.  To account for endogeneity, Hoxby used 
school fixed effects, and she found that traditional public schools responded positively to 
charter school competition.  However, the effect size was small, as charter school 
competition only raised traditional public school test scores by a 1.25 to 2.5 percent, on 
average. 
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Greene and Forster (2002) followed by examining charter school competition in 
Milwaukee.  They improved upon Hoxby’s (2001) initial study by including an 
alternative competition measurement.  The authors created an index for charter school 
competition, which included the distance from a traditional public school to the nearest 
charter school and the nearest three charter schools.  When a charter was within one 
kilometer of a traditional public school, that school raised its average test score by ten 
points, on average.  The effect diminished as charter schools moved farther away from 
the traditional public school, as a charter within five kilometers only raised that school’s 
average score by 3.5 points, on average (Greene and Forster 2002). 
  Holmes et al. (2003) studied charter school competition in North Carolina, again 
measuring charter school competition as the distance from a traditional public school to 
the nearest charter school.  The study was unique, though, as the authors attempted to 
address the endogeneity of charter locations by including county-level factors as 
instrumental variables.  Results indicated that charter school competition increased 
traditional public school performance by one percent.  These findings conflicted with 
Bettinger’s initial work, but the authors make note that North Carolina school districts 
were much larger, so parents had previously experienced less competition, relative to 
Michigan (Holmes, DeSimone et al. 2003). 
Holmes et al. (2003) had a companion study that employed student-level data.  
Like the previous study, he used distance as a measure for competition, finding a positive 
traditional public school response in math when the charter was located within six miles 
and no response in reading.  Interestingly, the authors found a response in reading when 
the charter was located within twelve miles, but the response disappeared for math in this 
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estimation.  When the authors measured competition as just the presence of at least one 
charter school, both math and reading increased, on average.  
Bohte (2004) explored charter school competition in Texas.  The author measured 
competition as the presence of a charter within the county, arguing that presence alone 
should elicit some response.  He also used the total number of charter school students as a 
proportion of the county’s total enrollment, which is a continuous measurement of 
Hoxby’s initial metric.  Findings from this study mirrored previous results, as the 
presence of a charter was associated with a 1.69 percent increase in passing rates on the 
state test.  Likewise, a one percent increase in charter enrollment was associated with a 
.10 percent increase in passing rates on the state exam (Bohte 2004).  
To this point in the literature, the majority of studies had disputed Bettinger’s 
(1999) initial study of charter school competition, finding small but significant positive 
responses from traditional public schools.  Bettinger (2005) followed his initial study 
with a more expansive study of charter school competition in Michigan.  He examined 
school-level responses to charter school competition and addressed possible endogeneity 
with an instrumental variable approach.  Michigan is unique in that many of its charter 
schools had been authorized by universities, so Bettinger (2005) used the distance to the 
nearest university as an instrumental variable to capture the location decisions of charter 
school operators.  After showing that charter schools had drawn away lower-performing 
students, Bettinger (2005) found  no effect of charter school competition, measured with 
the number of charter schools near a traditional public school (Bettinger 2005). 
Also, the authors evaluated charter school competition by observing changes in 
achievement mainly at the district or school level.  Bifulco and Ladd (2006) employed a 
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unique student-level dataset from North Carolina.  Like previous studies, these authors 
used distance to the nearest charter school as their metric for competition, noting that 
ninety percent of all transfers from a traditional public school to a charter school occurred 
within ten miles.  They accounted for endogeneity by using school and student fixed 
effects and ultimately found no effect of charter school competition on traditional public 
schools.   
Sass (2006) also used student-level data from Florida to test the effect of charter 
school competition on traditional public schools.  To account for endogeneity, Sass 
(2006) employed school fixed effects, and he measured competition with a count of 
charter schools within a distance radius of the traditional public school.  Ultimately, the 
author found that the introduction of charter school competition resulted in math score 
improvements, although these gains were modest.   
  Carr and Ritter (2007) added to the existing literature by analyzing charter 
schools in Ohio.  They employed various measures of charter school competition—a 
dummy variable representing existence of charter school within district , the number of 
charter schools within district, and the percentage of students attending charter schools 
within district.  The authors found that across competition measurements, traditional 
public schools had lower passing rates on state exams when charter school competition 
increased.  These authors, however, did not address the endogeneity of charter school 
location (Carr and Ritter 2007).   
The expansion of charter schools allowed for longer longitudinal data to be 
examined.  Booker et al. (2008) used an eight year student-level panel from Texas to 
examine the effect of charter school competition, finding substantial positive effects 
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across both math and reading scores.  The authors argued that charter school competition 
was often captured at the district level since funding is most often affected when students 
move.  They measured both school-level and district-level enrollment loss as a metric for 
competition to account for the multi-level competitive pressures.  Like previous studies, 
the authors also used counts of charter schools within distance radii.   
Zimmer and Buddin (2009) echoed the Booker et al. (2008) discussion pertaining 
to the multi-level competition pressures.  Competition may manifest at any or all levels of 
education production, and these levels often interact.  Zimmer and Buddin (2009) 
contended that school level analyses may be misleading when considering the various 
mechanisms.  In their study, the authors used a combination of metrics used in previous 
studies—distance to nearest charter or other traditional public school, presence of charter 
within 2.5 miles, number of charter or other alternatives within 2.5 miles, share of charter 
and other traditional public schools within 2.5 miles, and the number of students lost to 
other schools with 2.5 miles.  They used student-level data from California as well as 
surveys from principals.  The analysis revealed little evidence of positive competitive 
effects with very few significant results in either math or reading. Additionally, the 
majority of principals saw no effect of charter school competition (Zimmer and Buddin 
2009). 
 Lastly, Winters (2012) exploited a student-level data set from New York City.  
With this, he added to the literature by providing a unique measure of charter school 
competition.  Winters was able to track students from traditional public schools to charter 
schools, so his measure was the percentage of students lost by the traditional public 
school to the charter school.  Arguably, this could be considered the most direct measure 
 
47 
 
of charter school competition.  He used student fixed effects to account for endogeneity 
of charter schools, and he found small but positive effects of charter school competition 
(Winters 2012).   
The studies outlined above measured the traditional public school response with 
some form of student achievement data.  Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) argued, however, that 
competition should induce increased efficiency.  In this sense, a traditional public school 
may not increase its test scores, but it may still respond to charter school competition if it 
spends less money per student to achieve the same level.  Ultimately, if researchers want 
to measure whether the traditional public school has increased its efficiency in the face of 
competition, then productivity, not output, should be the metric used.   
Even fewer studies considered this productivity proxy to measure the competitive 
effects of charter school competition.  Hoxby (2003a) was the first to do so, examining 
charter school competition in Arizona and Michigan.  In these studies, she considered 
productivity as an achievement outcome per dollar spent on each student.  She found that  
increased charter school competition, measured by a dummy variable representing a 
district with at least six percent charter enrollment, increased productivity by a modest 
one to two percentage points, on average.   
Following Hoxby (2003a, 2003b), Ni (2009) controlled for spending per student 
in the estimation of charter school competition.  Like previous studies, Ni (2009) used 
both the percentage of charter enrollment within a district and a district dummy, but the 
author added to the previous literature by including time effects.  If a district sustains 
high charter enrollments over time, competition may manifest itself differently.  
Examining charter and traditional public schools in Michigan over an eleven year panel, 
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Ni (2009) found charter school competition had a negative impact on student 
achievement.  This effect was negligible in short-term but bigger in long-term. 
Finally, Gronberg et al. (2012) used a cost frontier approach to examine the 
efficiency ramifications of charter schools.  The authors did not examine the competitive 
effects of charter schools but compared the efficiency of traditional public schools to 
charter school.  Results from this study suggested that some charter schools were more 
efficient but not systematically so.  Additionally, charter schools faced fewer regulations, 
so they seemed to be further away from their cost frontiers.   
It is evident from the review above that there has been no clear consensus to 
whether traditional public schools respond to charter school competition.  This may be a 
result of the different units of analysis—district, school or student.  The various studies 
employed different empirical techniques, and of those authors who addressed the non-
randomness of charter location, there existed variation in specifying instrumental 
variables or other econometric techniques that would adequately account for endogeneity.  
Likewise, the state or city being analyzed and the length of time varied across studies.  
Responses to charter school competition measured with alternative outputs  
Although the studies above differed in many ways, the achievement outcome was 
the one consistency among them.  All of the authors used some form of academic 
achievement, whether it was state assessment scores, graduation rates or proficiency 
estimates.  Some authors have considered alternative responses from charter school 
competition, not captured by measuring changes in achievement scores (Betts 2009, 
Bifulco and Reback Working paper).  This was often an explanation in studies that found 
either negligible or negative effects of charter school competition.   
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While it deserves further discussion, it should be noted here that charter schools 
often serve different purposes, depending on the community or district in which they 
serve.  In some districts, charter schools open to serve underprivileged populations, 
where in other districts, they may cater to the gifted and talented.  In either case, the 
traditional public school should respond by increasing achievement scores to retain 
students who fit in these target groups.  Alternatively, charter schools may open with the 
purpose of language immersion, or the school may cater to more artistic students.  In such 
a situation, the traditional public school’s response may not be captured in test scores.  
Instead, an alternative outcome may be best suited as the dependent variable.     
Imberman (2008) considered such alternative outcomes in addition to student test 
scores.  He measured the traditional public school’s response with discipline and 
attendance records from an anonymous, large, urban school district in the southwest U.S.  
Imberman (2008) argued that student fixed effects probably correct for endogeneity of 
student selection, but they did not address charter location decisions.  Instead, he used 
characteristics of the building stock near a traditional public school as instruments for 
charter location, arguing that the availability of “school space” would affect location 
decision but traditional public school responses.  He interacted building stock values with 
various measures of competition previously used in the literature.  Imberman (2008) 
found that charter schools generated negative and statistically significant impacts on 
traditional public schools in math and language.  As with previous studies, the effect was 
small.  Notable from this study, the author found that charter schools did induce 
significant drops in disciplinary infractions, but they had no effect on attendance. 
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In response to this lack of a consistent significant relationship, a few authors have 
examined the specific mechanisms of traditional public school reactions.  Specifically, 
authors assessed how faculty and student bodies change in response to charter school 
competition.  These changes may help explain how or why traditional public schools 
change when faced with charter school competition. 
Hoxby (2000) examined faculty changes in Michigan, suggesting that charter 
school competition may change the type of teacher a traditional public school will hire, 
retain or fire.  Using the School and Staffing Survey (SASS), complemented with surveys 
from charter schools teachers, she found evidence that charter schools had a higher 
demand for teachers with higher quality college education, math and science skills, and 
those that make the extra effort and assume responsibility.  However, there was no 
evidence that charter school competition drastically changed composition of public 
school sector, measured by experience, wage, and education. 
Carruthers (2009) examined teacher quality of those teachers that move to charter 
schools and those that stay.  Traditional public schools are often constrained by tenure 
rules or a compensation system, so charter schools may have an advantage with higher 
quality teachers since they are less regulated.  The author found that teachers who moved 
to charter schools were less experienced, less likely to be regularly licensed, had lower 
licensing test scores, and were less likely to have graduate degrees.  Carruthers used 
teacher fixed effects as a measure of teacher quality and found that charter schools were 
drawing below average teachers from traditional public school faculties. 
Lastly, Jackson (2012) used a value-added estimation to measure teacher quality.  
The author compared traditional public schools that faced competition to those that did 
 
51 
 
not.  Results indicated that those facing competition were losing lower quality teachers to 
charter schools.  Also, traditional public schools that faced competition decreased the 
number of new hires and increased compensation, on average, for existing staff (Jackson 
2012). 
Another mechanism through which a traditional public school may respond is by 
changing the quality of students.  As discussed previously, traditional public schools may 
raise scores in response to charter school competition because charter schools drew away 
low-performing students, or vice versa.  Dee and Fu (2004) tested how the introduction of 
a charter school within a district in Arizona changed the makeup of the traditional public 
school student body.  The authors found that an introduction of a charter school led to 
reduction of white, non-Hispanic students in traditional public schools, on average.  
Because white, non-Hispanic students were, on average, higher performing students, a 
one percentage point reduction in white non-Hispanic population led to a reduction in  
reading scores by 0.32 points, on average.   
As argued previously by Zimmer (2009), charter school competition may happen 
at various levels of the public school structure.  If competition is sensed by district 
officials, the response may be financial.  In short, district expenditures may change to 
retain enrollments.  As a measurement, expenditure changes would be a more direct 
response to charter school competition since student outcomes are often affected by other 
explanatory variables.  Only a few studies have considered this type of response 
mechanism. 
Arsen and Ni (2011) explicitly examined the allocation of expenditures in 
response to this charter school competition.  Ideally, charter schools should offer a better 
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education, measured through higher test scores.  In response to this, the authors 
suggested, then, that traditional public school will spend more on instructional activities, 
and as a result, spend less on other activities.  Again, this response is based on the 
premise that a charter school induces prolonged competition.  Using the percentage of 
students who attended charter schools within the district as a measure of competition, the 
authors found no significant or consistent impact of competition on traditional public 
schools in Michigan (Arsen and Ni 2011). 
Welsch (2011) also examined the response of Michigan districts to increased 
charter school competition.  He found that districts spent a larger percentage on 
instructors and a smaller percentage on support staff when faced with charter school 
competition.  His analysis included instrumental variable correction and a lagged 
dependent variable to correct for any state influence in these expenditure decisions 
(Welsch 2011).     
Finally, Linkow, Streich and Jacob (2011) also examined Michigan district 
responses to charter school competition.  Their measure of competition was a continuous 
variable of charter enrollment as a proportion of district enrollment.  They studied the 
following categories: instructional expenditures, student support services, instructional 
services, capital improvements, athletics programs and advertising.  The authors found 
that a one percent increase in charter enrollment proportion equates to a $9.50 in student 
support services, a $5 increase in instructional support services and a $37 increase in 
capital outlays.6 
 
 
                                                          
6 These were all measured in per-pupil dollars. 
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Summary 
 The efficacy of charter schools has received much attention over the last decade.  
Scholars have begun considering the relationship between charter schools and the local 
public school districts in which they are located, but the focus, again, has been on student 
achievement scores.  As detailed in Chapter Three, few studies have considered financial 
responses of the local school district, and most researchers have modeled the relationship 
between charter schools and their encompassing districts as a competitive one.   
Of the studies considering the financial response to charter schools, the authors 
have only considered expenditure changes.  None measured the local public school 
district’s response with revenues, which is the focus of this dissertation.  While revenues 
and expenditures must often match one another, I study the different revenue sources, or 
where the money comes from.  This is different than those studies examining 
expenditures, where they cared about how the money was spent. 
The sources of revenues and how they are influenced have potential policy 
implications.  In the media and across various policy environments, the charter debate 
centers on how student test scores change, but it is also important to consider the 
financial ramifications of charter schools.  For example, if a charter school induced no 
change in a district’s academic achievement scores but did cause the district to spend less 
money on instruction, the district would experience an efficiency gain.  Likewise, if a 
charter school caused district revenues to increase because more federal money was 
available, the district could choose to spend more or lower the tax burden for its citizens.  
This efficiency gain or potential tax change would not be evident without studies that 
considered the financial impact of charter schools. 
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Therefore, this dissertation extends the literature just reviewed in the following 
ways.  I examine changes in revenue from three separate sources, and I am one of the few 
to consider the potential cooperative relationship between charter schools and public 
school districts.  Likewise, I employ a nationwide panel that spans sixteen years; 
comparatively, few other researchers have looked at charter schools in more than two or 
three states and in more than five to six years. 
  
Copyright © Peter A. Jones 2014 
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Chapter Four 
Conceptual model considering the district revenue response after the authorization 
of a charter school 
Introduction 
To address the effects of the presence of a charter school on the revenues of a 
local school district, I begin with a framework similar to that of Sonstelie and Portney 
(1978), which expanded on Tiebout (1956) by developing a model where efficiency was 
attained when communities maximized profits.  In doing this, Sonstelie and Portney 
(1978) derived a demand function for households that I shall use as the basis for the 
forthcoming conceptual model.  The work of Sonstelie and Portney (1978) has been 
expanded upon by scholars in more recent years (Hilber and Mayer 2009, Hilber 2010, 
Hoyt, Coomes et al. 2011).   
A number of assumptions are made to simplify the complexities of household 
decisions and focus on the issue of interest, demand for public education.  This model 
only considers demand determinants of public school revenues.  While the level and 
changes of revenues are also effected by supply or cost components,7 the public’s 
demand for public education influences their willingness to pay taxes that support the 
public education system, and that is the focus of this paper. 
The following conceptual model is based on one simple economic concept in that 
increasing the number of consumers to a market will increase demand for that good.  
When demand increases for that good, then price should rise, ceteris paribus.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1.  When a charter is created within a local school district, the 
                                                          
7 For example, the number of teachers per student reflects the supply of public education and directly 
influences the revenues per-pupil required. 
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charter draws from the existing enrollment of the local school district.  Additionally, 
Toma et al. (2006) and Buddin (2012) found that charter schools also draw from private 
schools within the local school district.   
Because charter schools receive public funds, they are considered a part of the 
public education system.  When charter schools attract private school students into the 
public education sector, they have induced an increase in the number of consumers in the 
public education market.  Figure 4.2 illustrates this point.   
Demand for schooling 
There exists a state divided into separate communities, which are divided into 
separate school districts, j. For each household, i, state, community and district locations 
are considered exogenous.  Households are distributed randomly among districts and 
communities based on their income and preferences for education, and once distributed, 
households are immobile.  It is assumed that every household receives a stock of housing, 
hi, with value Ph.  Within each district, hj and Phj are identical across households. 
Every household has one school-age child for whom the household must decide to 
enroll in either public school, zi, or private school, si.8  Thus, individual households face a 
discreet choice regarding which school to send its child.  The household also consumes a 
private good, Xi.  Therefore, the household’s utility depends on their choice of school and 
the private goods that they consume.  The household may choose only one type of 
schooling, and it does not have the choice to homeschool.     
The price of housing in district j, Phj, is a function of the public school quality 
while the price of private schooling, Ps, is equal to the tuition charged by the private 
school.  Last, the charter school price, Pc(d), where d is the distance to the charter school.  
                                                          
8 It is assumed that no household homeschools its child. 
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The household also consumes a private good, xi, which is a numeraire good with its price 
normalized to unity. 
 
More formally the choice of type of schooling is determined by 
 Max (Uzi*, Usi*,Uci*) 
where Uzi = Ui(hz*, xiz*,zi)  where hiz* and xiz* solve 
max
𝑥𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖)
  
 
 
s.t. Ph(1+tj) hij + Pxxij = wij 
where Uci = Ui(hic*, xic*,ci)  where hic* and xic* solve 
max
𝑥𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑐𝑖)
  
 
 
s.t. Ph(1+tj) hij + Pxxij = wij –d(ci) 
and where Usi = Ui(hic*, xis*,si*)  where hic*, sis* and xic* solve 
max
𝑥𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑠𝑖)
  
 
 
s.t. Ph(1+tj) hij + Pxxij + Pssi = wij . 
 
It should be noted here that if the household chooses a charter school, ci, for 
which there may exist a lottery, the household may not win admittance to the charter 
school.  Those households who enter the lottery but do not win revert back to their 
second preference, either private or public schooling.   Ultimately, the household chooses 
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the type of schooling which maximizes utility, subject to the household’s budget 
constraints.  
Each individual household has a probability of choosing one of the three choices.  
If households share common characteristics, the individual households may be grouped.  
Each group of households, gi, assumed to be homogenous in income, now makes a 
continuous choice regarding which school to send its children.  Because the choice is 
now continuous, each group maximizes its utility over continuous choices.  It should be 
noted here that income is heterogeneous across groups and homogenous within groups.   
The group’s wealth, housing stock and consumption of private goods is a sum of 
all individual’s wealth.  
More formally, 
 Σ(Phhij + Pzzij + Pccij + Ps sij + Pxxij) = Σ (wij) (2) 
Now, consider that each household, and subsequently, each group, only has two 
choices for schooling, private and public.  The group maximizes its utility by distributing 
its children between private and public schools based on the individual probability of 
choosing either type of school.  By maximizing utility, the marginal utility of private 
schooling is equal to that of public school, as no net gain may be made by transferring 
one student from public to private.  
 ∂Us𝑔𝑗=∂Uz𝑔𝑗 or  
∂Us𝑔𝑗
∂Uz𝑔𝑗
= 1 (3) 
Assume now that the state passes legislation for charter schools.  The group now 
maximizes utility by distributing children among public, charter and private schools 
based on the individual probabilities.  Again, when utility is maximized, the marginal 
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utility of each type of schooling is equal in that no net gain may be achieved by any 
student transferring. 
 ∂Uz𝑔𝑗 = ∂Us𝑔𝑗 = ∂Uc𝑔𝑗 (4) 
Assume at least a portion of each group attends the charter school.9  Compared to 
the previous situation where each group only had two choices, the three-choice option 
means that households substitute away from public and private schools to the new charter 
school.  These proportional changes depend on relative prices. 
   
∂Us𝑔𝑗
∂Uc𝑔𝑗
= 𝑃𝑠
𝑃𝑐
= ti(Phhi) + k(si)
ti(Phhi) + d(ci)
 
∂Uz𝑔𝑗
∂Uc𝑔𝑗
= 𝑃𝑧
𝑃𝑐
= ti(Phhi)
ti(Phhi) + d(ci)
 
(5) 
Otherwise stated, the households that formerly chose private schools stay in 
private school only when the marginal benefit of attending the private school is greater 
than or equal to the marginal cost of tuition.10  Distance costs are assumed to be 
negligible for those who formerly attended private schools.  Likewise, households who 
formerly chose public schools switch to charter schools when the marginal benefit of 
attending charter schools is greater than the marginal cost of the added distance and time 
of transporting their child to the new charter school.  This is not to suggest that 
households will only choose charter schools that are closer than public schools; instead, 
households may choose a charter at the expense of travel costs because it provides a 
better product than the traditional public school. 
Based on the marginal rates of substitution outlined above, one can separate 
households into four types: 1) Those who switch from public to charter; 2) those who 
                                                          
9 Charter school revenues are related to their enrollment levels. 
10 This would hold with or without charter schools. 
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stay in public; 3) those who stay in private; 4) those who switch from private to charter.  
For the group, this means that proportions of students choosing private vs. public would 
change pre-implementation to post-implementation.  With the implementation of a 
charter school, proportional changes would reflect substitutions away from private and 
public to the charter school.   
Of the four types of households listed above, three will still choose some form of 
public schooling.  Although it is not stated explicitly, it should be noted here that no 
household switches from public to private after a charter school is implemented.  
Therefore, within each group of households, the proportion that chooses private 
schooling can only stay constant (no household chooses charter) or decreases (one or 
more households choose charter).  As a result, the proportion of those choosing some 
form of public schooling increases or remains constant.11   
Of the four types of households listed above, two had previously chosen public 
schools.  With the implementation of a charter school, these households choose to switch 
if and only if their preferences are better satisfied by the charter school.  If they do not 
switch, that means they prefer traditional public school to the charter school.  If they 
refrain from switching, their demand for public education remains constant.  If they 
choose to switch, their demand should increase, as their preferences are better satisfied.   
Likewise, the households who switch from private to charter did so because the 
charter better satisfied their preferences.  Again, this would reflect an increase in the 
demand for public schooling.  Combined, this would suggest an overall increase in the 
demand for public education within each group of households if any student attends the 
                                                          
11 Data reflect an decrease in private school enrollment, as charters are drawing a portion of their 
population from private school students. 
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charter school.  Assuming that the income of households is constant and that households 
are only consuming a private good and schooling, increased demand for schooling would 
result in a higher willingness to pay for public schooling, ceteris paribus.  
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Figure 4.1 Demand increase for public education 
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Figure 4.2 Enrollment before and after charter school authorization 
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Chapter Five 
Charter school locations across the U.S.  
Introduction  
As outlined in Chapter Three, the response of local public school districts to 
charter schools has been characterized as competition and measured with changes in 
student test scores or, in a few studies, changes in school spending.  The opposite may be 
true in that charter schools and districts cooperate, especially if increased revenues are 
consequence of this cooperation, as considered in Chapter Four.  Extending the current 
literature, this dissertation will estimate the public school district response—measured by 
changes in local, state and federal revenues—to the presence charter schools.  
Before any model may be specified, however, I must consider how to measure the 
presence of charter schools within a district.  The previous literature measured the 
presence of charter schools—often referred to as charter school competition—in several 
ways.  Most often, these metrics relied on the location of charter schools within a county 
or public school district, and the authors employed data from the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES), state education agencies, charter school think tanks or the 
public school districts themselves.   
Inherently, the task of aggregating the data from school districts grows with the 
number of school districts reporting the data.  State agencies may count charter schools 
differently in that some consider charter schools their own district and others count the 
schools within their encompassing public school district.  Lastly, the varied state policy 
environments make it difficult for the NCES to maintain a robust and consistent database 
of charter locations since states report the number of charter schools differently. 
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To address this issue of accuracy, I employ GIS software to account for charter 
schools within school district boundaries.  Using latitude and longitude codes from the 
NCES and the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS), I plot charter 
schools within school district boundaries determined by using U.S. Census Bureau 
TIGER/Line® Shapefiles.  Instead of relying on the local school districts to report the 
number of charter schools within their boundaries, I can more accurately count the 
number of charter schools within a district with this method. 
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of my empirical strategy, followed by a 
description of the data.  I address how my effort to count charter schools within districts 
improves upon alternative measures.  If charter schools invoke a response—either 
competitive or cooperative—from the school district, we must first understand where 
charter schools are located within the districts they may influence.   
Empirical Strategy  
The purpose of this dissertation is to model the response of school district 
revenues to the presence of a charter school.  Because I examine the response through the 
three separate revenue sources, I estimate the following models empirically as: 
(1) Local Revenueit =   α1Charterit + α2Ait +α3Sit + α4Yit  + α5Li + α6State Revenueit + 
α7LocalRevenueit-1 +γt  + ϕ i + εit 
(2) State Revenueit =   α1Charterit + α2Ait +α3Sit + α4Yit  + α5Li + α6Local Revenueit + 
α7State Revenue it-1 + γt  + ϕ i + εit 
(3) Federal Revenueit =   α1Charterit + α2Ait +α3Sit + α4Yit  + α5Li + α6Federal 
Revenueit-1 +  γt  + ϕ i + εit 
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where the dependent variables, Local Revenue, State Revenue and Federal Revenue, 
represent the various source of school district revenues.  All revenues are measured in 
2014 dollars for district i in year t.   
In Equation 1, the α’s are estimated coefficients; Charter is a vector of 
coefficients that represent the various charter presence variables12 for district i in year t.  I 
also include a dummy variable for those states that had not enacted a charter law or had 
enacted a charter law but had yet to authorize any charter schools.  A represents a 
categorical variable for the type of authorizer within the district; S is a vector of 
coefficients that represent district i’s total enrollment, student-to-teacher ratio and student 
composition in year t; Y is a vector of coefficients that represent district i’s median 
household income and the percentage of individuals in poverty; L represents district i’s 
locale, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau; State Revenue represents district i’s 
revenues from state sources in year t; lastly, I include the district’s Local Revenue from 
the previous year to capture any incremental changes.  The variable, γ, is a variable 
indicating the school year, ϕ d represents a set of unique (fixed) effects common to each 
individual district,13 and εit represents the model error term. 
For Equation 1, two things should be noted.  First, Local Revenue and State 
Revenue are expected to exhibit an endogenous relationship.  A discussion will follow 
detailing reasons for this.  Second, state funding formulas should influence local revenues 
(Craig 1986).  For example, local school districts will respond differently if a state bases 
its level of per-pupil funding on a flat-grant basis compared to a state that offers a 
                                                          
12 These are not correlated theoretically or statistically.  Because a district has one charter does not make it 
more or less likely that there will be more or that charters will represent a larger portion of the public 
school system.  Rather, these factors depend on the state and district. 
13 And, since districts do not switch between states, ϕ d also represents a set of unique effects common to 
the state. 
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matching grant.  Verstegen (2009; 2011) categorized state funding systems into five 
categories: (1) Foundation program; (2) District power equalizing; (3) Full state funding; 
(4) Flat grants; (5) Combination/tiered system grants.  Within states and over time, there 
exists little variation in the type of state funding system for the majority of states, so 
district fixed effects should capture any differences across states that may influence local 
revenue changes.14 
Equation 2 includes the same explanatory variables as Equation 1 with two 
exceptions.  In Equation 2, Local Revenue, which represents district i’s revenues from 
local sources in year t, is included, but this relationship is expected to be endogenous.  
Second, I include the district’s State Revenue for the previous year to capture any 
incremental changes.  Equation 3 has neither Local nor State revenue but includes all 
other control variables, as well as the district’s Federal Revenue from the previous year.   
It should also be noted here that federal revenues were influenced by the No Child 
Left Behind and Race to the Top federal legislations.  These legislations were enacted in 
2006 and 2009, respectively, and they influenced the amount of federal revenues that 
districts received.  Differences existed among states, but quantifying these differences 
would be beyond the scope of this dissertation.  As such, year fixed effects, γt, should 
capture the effects of those legislations on federal revenues.   
Data description  
The data used for the study consist of district level characteristics collected by the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).15  Over the time span of the data, the 
NCES collected financial information from 21,911 districts in the U.S. through the F-33 
                                                          
14 From her analysis of these formulas, only two states changed funding formulas from 2006 to 2010. 
15 The NCES stores and distributes in both its “Build a Table” and “Elementary/Secondary Information 
School system” software.  The author used both of these in the collection of data. 
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survey.  The NCES gathered other school district information through the Local 
Education Agency Universe Survey and the Public Elementary/Secondary School 
Universe Survey.  Not every district existed or reported suitable data for every year, so 
the dataset is an unbalanced panel from school year 1995-1996 to school year 2010-2011 
(U.S. Department of Education 2011, U.S. Department of Education 2011).   
I supplement these datasets with income and poverty data from the Census Bureau 
through their Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE).16  Lastly, using Census 
Bureau TIGER/Line® Shapefiles and GIS software, I develop a unique dataset of charter 
school locations within traditional public school districts (Bureau 2010, Bureau 2014).  
Specific charter school attributes, including locations, were obtained from the National 
Alliance of Public Charter Schools (NAPCS), which maintains a database in conjunction 
with the National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA) (NAPCS 2014). 
Sample of U.S. public school districts 
Districts vary in type of education service provided and organization structure.  
The NCES distinguishes among eight different district types.  These include local school 
district, local school district component of a supervisory union, supervisory union 
administrative center, regional education services, state operated institutions, federally 
operated institutions, charter school agencies, other education agencies. 
Table 5.1 shows the number of districts for each specification over the years of 
the data.17  The number of districts categorized by type varies by year for three reasons.  
First, certain districts did not report data every year either because administrators did not 
                                                          
16 school year 1994, 1996 and 1998 were not provided in SAIPE dataset, so the next year’s value is used as 
an imputation. 
17 Numbers reported in Table 5.1 account for unique districts that appear in the data at any time over the 
panel. 
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fill out the NCES survey, the district was consolidated into another district or the district 
closed.  Second, over the years of the dataset, new districts were created.  Finally, certain 
districts may have changed in organizational structure, so administrators would have 
reported a different type code to the NCES.   
As I will discuss in the following paragraphs, I minimize any potential bias from 
the aforementioned changes by restricting the sample to local school districts and local 
school districts that were part of a supervisory union.  Local school districts that were 
part of a supervisory union shared a superintendent, and the supervisory union provided 
administrative services.  New York City’s school districts are an example of this type of 
school district.  The thirty-two school districts work under the umbrella of a central 
supervisory union with a single superintendent.  On average, both of these district types 
were the most stable in that they reported data for the majority of the years in the dataset 
and did not change from one type to another.  Of importance to this study, it does not 
appear that the presence of a charter school affected changes in district organization, data 
reporting or existence.   
The fundamental question of this research focuses on school districts that 
represent a viable portion of a community’s public education option.  Districts that served 
a small percentage or specified portion of the population were not relevant public school 
options for the majority of a community, regardless of charter school penetration.  These 
would include alternative schools or schools run by regional, state or federal agencies.  I 
disregard these types of school districts because they typically target and serve a unique 
population of students.   
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Because of their particular relevance, only districts designated as “Local School 
Districts” and “Local school district component of a supervisory union” will be included 
in the empirical specification.  As Table 5.2 displays, these districts accounted for over 
ninety percent of all public school enrollments.  Likewise, as shown in Tables 5.3 and 
5.4, these districts contained the majority of operating public schools, and of importance 
to this study, these districts received a substantial portion of the total local, state and 
federal revenues for public schools.      
Issues with current charter school counts 
The explanatory variable of interest in this study is the prevalence of charter 
schools within a school district, measured in a variety of ways consistent with the 
previous literature.18  Along with the NCES, a few non-profit organizations maintain a 
record of the number of charter schools, and these organizations attempt to link charter 
schools to their encompassing districts.  This link proves important when considering the 
charter school’s influence on the district.  Several issues exist in the current reporting of 
charter schools by district, as evidenced by the fact that there are differences within and 
across data reported by the NCES and these other non-profit organizations.   
First, the number of charter schools depends on the district type, as designated by 
the NCES.19  In some states,20 charter schools are considered their own district, as 
evident from the 2,656 charter districts over the nationwide panel shown in Table 5.1.  
These charter schools physically reside within the geographic area of a district designated 
                                                          
18 Many of these studies employed charter school enrollment as a percentage of the district’s total 
enrollment.  Charter school enrollments at the school level were not consistently recorded in every state 
over the time span of the dataset.  As such, I do not include this measure among my explanatory variables. 
19 While the first charter was established in 1992, the NCES did not start collecting data on charter schools 
until 1998. 
20 According to the NCES, these states include Alaska, California, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. 
 
71 
 
“Local School District,” but this local school district would not have reported having 
charter schools to the NCES because the charter schools are categorized as a school 
district.  As shown in Table 5.5, local school districts reported only 40-50% of all charter 
schools in each year.  The remaining charter schools were most often accounted for 
within charter districts.   
Consider Figure 5.1.  In School District 1, there exist three charter schools within 
the geographic boundaries.  The same is true for School District 2; however, in School 
District 2, the NCES considers the charter schools their own district.  When reporting the 
number of charter schools to the NCES, School District 1 will report three; School 
District 2 will report zero.  The two school districts experience the same degree of charter 
presence, and as will be discussed later, the funding mechanisms for charter schools are 
identical.  The only observable difference between the two districts is in the way charter 
numbers will be reported to the NCES. 
Second, the number of charter schools depends on the level at which the NCES 
has collected data.  Over the same time span that the NCES collected district-level data, it 
also collected data on individual schools.  Again, there exists a discrepancy in the number 
of schools designated as a charter school within the NCES’s school data set and the total 
count of charter schools in the NCES’s district dataset.  In total, the NCES collected data 
on 122,365 schools across the U.S., and over time, the NCES identified 7,491 different 
schools as a charter school.  As shown in Table 5.6, on average, the NCES counts 139 
more charter schools per year in its school-level dataset than are accounted for in their 
district-level dataset, and the discrepancy has increased over time.  
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The third reason for differences in charter school counts is that the number of 
charter schools also depends on the data collecting organization counting them.  The 
NAPCS has also collected data on charter schools, including their locations.  The NAPCS 
began counting charter schools in 1999, but their nationwide charter school count has 
matched the NCES’s nationwide count only once over the time span of collection.  The 
two organizations differed in charter school counts by an average of thirteen charter 
schools each year, and the NCES was more likely to count fewer charter schools in each 
year of the panel.   
Charter schools vary in the number of grades they serve or the number of physical 
campuses that exist under a charter organization.  A charter serving grades K-12 may be 
counted as one, two or three schools in either of the datasets (this problem exists for 
traditional public schools as well).  Additionally, charter networks or management 
organizations oversee multiple charter schools.  Certain operators may report multiple 
campuses as one school while others may report these campuses as separate schools. 
These factors contribute to the discrepancies between NAPCS and NCES reports.   
Although the number of charter schools within a district has been used in various 
studies as a measure of charter school competition (Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Betts 2009, 
Welsch 2011), the sample of school districts in most studies has come from only one or 
two states.  In these cases, differences among state charter counting practices would not 
be an issue, and typically, the sample of school districts was small enough to more 
accurately account for charter schools.21  However, with the data reporting practices of 
the NCES or NAPCS, it was not possible to maintain consistency across the states with 
                                                          
21 For example, a researcher could check address of charters that were categorized as their own district and 
count them within their encompassing public school district).   
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such a large sample of U.S. school districts and charter schools.  Moreover, there were 
too many districts and charter schools to manually check each address to match charter 
schools to districts.  Because the central research question involves charter school 
penetration across the United States, it is important to address the variation in charter 
school counts across districts.   
Alternative measure of charter school presence  
To deal with differences in charter counts, I offer a new measure of charter 
presence with a district.  The NCES and NAPCS provided information on individual 
charter schools.  Specifically, I obtained the physical location and name for individual 
charter schools across the U.S.  Because the NCES included information on charter 
schools in both their district- and school-level datasets, I was able to combine unique 
charter school observations from the NCES school-level, district-level and NAPCS 
datasets because all of the datasets used a common identifier—the NCES school id.   
While these organizations did not start counting charter schools until 1998 and 
1999, respectively, the NAPCS collected information on charter school opening dates, so 
I was able to count charter schools before school year 1998-1999.22  Many of the charter 
schools were included in all datasets, so these duplicates were only counted one time.  
Likewise, if a charter school had not been assigned a NCES school id or the location was 
not provided, I dropped it from the sample.23,24 
The next task was to match charter schools to their geographically encompassing 
districts.  As discussed previously, a charter school was accounted for in some local 
                                                          
22 This assumes that a charter school that opened in school year 1995-1996 was in the same location (or at 
least the same district) as it was during school year 1999-2000. 
23 Of all the charter school names provided, over ninety-five percent had an NCES ID. 
24 The majority of charter schools without an id in any dataset also did not have location data provided.25 
518 of the 13,000 school districts had an area overlapping. 
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school districts but not others, and this categorization depended on state and district 
classification guidelines.  I addressed this issue by mapping U.S. school districts and 
placing charter schools within these districts based on their locations.   
Specifically, I used ArcGIS software with U.S. TIGER/Line® Shapefiles, which 
were developed by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The TIGER/Line® Shapefiles included 
three types of districts—unified, secondary and elementary.  Unified districts were the 
predominant district type within these files and were districts that included all levels of 
K-12 education.  In a few states, an elementary or secondary district would occasionally 
overlap with one another (they never overlapped with a unified district).  When this 
happened, I chose the elementary district over the secondary district for the overlapping 
area.25  It should be noted here that the two NCES designated school district types 
included in the estimation—local school districts and local school districts that were part 
of a supervisory union—were predominately unified school districts, so this had little 
effect on the sample of districts.  Additionally, the counts of charter schools did not 
change, only the specific district in which a particular charter school may fall.   
Charter school locations were based on latitude and longitude codes, which were 
included in both the NCES and NAPCS datasets.  I plotted each charter school on top of 
the U.S. TIGER/Line® Shapefiles and then counted the number of plotted schools within 
each district area.  As shown in Table 5.7, this new charter school presence measurement 
doubled the number of charter school per district over time, on average.  This increase 
was not due to the discovery of new charter schools; instead, the charter schools that had 
been previously counted within charter districts were now appropriately assigned to their 
encompassing district.  Additionally, charter schools were accounted for within districts 
                                                          
25 518 of the 13,000 school districts had an area overlapping. 
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for a longer time period.  The NAPCS kept records of when charter schools opened, so 
while the organization started counting charter schools in 1999, the data when these 
schools open allowed for counts to begin before.  As such, the new measure of charter 
penetration spans school year 1995-1996 to school year 2012-2013, causing charter 
schools per district to increase, on average.  
Advantages of the alternative measure 
This alternative measure has several advantages over the charter school counts 
provided by the NCES and NAPCS.  A charter school counted by the NCES in a district 
designated “Regional Education Agency” undoubtedly influences the “Local School 
District” within which the charter is located, but with NCES’s method of counting, the 
response to this influence could not be measured because the data do not reflect this 
geographic relationship.  Again, this is especially important because the “Local School 
District” and “Local school district component of a supervisory union” enroll the 
majority of that community’s school-aged children. 
When measuring any response from the school district, it is essential to measure 
charter school presence in its entirety.  As discussed previously, the NCES charter school 
counts within districts failed to account for all charter schools.  This new measure gives a 
more robust measure of charter school presence within each public school district across 
the U.S. thereby allowing a more precise estimation of the average school district 
response.   
To show the importance of counting all charter schools, I compare mean per-pupil 
revenues for districts with and without charter schools in Table 5.8.26  The first 
                                                          
26 These are comparisons of districts in each year, so the total observations include all districts in each of 
year of the sample. 
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comparison uses the NCES counts in the comparison, and the second comparison uses 
my new measure.  In both comparisons, districts without charter schools had higher 
general per-pupil revenues, but the magnitude of the difference decreased by over $400 
per pupil when all charter schools were counted with the new measure.  Specifically, the 
difference in local revenues decreased by nearly $500 per pupil when the new measure 
was used.  This was not the case for state revenues, as using the new measure increased 
the difference in state revenues by approximately $150.  Lastly, differences in federal 
revenues were similar. From these comparisons, it is evident that accounting for all 
charter schools matters when considering per-pupil revenues.  
Descriptive statistics of variables included in the empirical model 
The dependent variable is per-pupil revenues for local school districts.  These 
revenues were broken down into three sources—federal, state and local.  Figure 5.2 is a 
quadratic fit plot that shows the average per-pupil revenues for each year from all sources 
and broken down into local, state and federal.  On average, combined per-pupil revenues 
have increased by $4,000 from school year 1995-1996 to school year 2009-2010.27  Over 
this same time span, per-pupil revenues from local and federal sources have increased 
steadily while revenues from state sources began to decreased after 2005.  Figure 5.3 
displays this same relationship for a sub-sample of U.S. states.28,29      
Figure 5.4 is a quadratic fit plot that differentiates per-pupil revenues by source 
for those districts with charter schools compared to those districts without charter 
schools.  On average, districts with charter schools experienced declining per-pupil 
                                                          
27 Again, these amounts are adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
28 States are listed in alphabetical order, except for the highest revenue states, which are included at end of 
the figure. 
29 The District of Columbia is omitted from this figure because it does not receive state funding. 
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revenues after school year 2006-2007.  As discussed previously, local school districts 
without charter schools spent more per-pupil than did local school districts with charter 
schools, on average and across all years.  This was the case when revenues were broken 
down by source.  On average, districts without charter schools received more revenue 
from both state and local sources than did districts with charter schools.   
Considering these time trends, it is necessary to mention the interdependent 
relationship between local and state revenues.  This issue has been examined in the 
education finance literature (Craig and Inman 1986, Card and Payne 2002, Baicker and 
Gordon 2006).  Following the Serrano v. Priest case in 1971 (Goldstein 1972), most 
states enacted a more equalized state finance system either voluntarily or through court 
order.  As a result of these changes, state revenues became more sensitive to local school 
district wealth.  Additionally, local school districts based their revenue decisions on how 
much state revenues they would receive and whether these were matching or flat grants.   
Following Title I legislation, federal revenues have been associated with the level 
of poverty within a school district (Cascio, Gordon et al. 2013).  This remained 
unchanged for several decades until two recent pieces of federal legislation—No Child 
Left Behind in 2006 and Race to the Top in 2009.  Both of these acts provided additional 
funding to state and school districts.  These issues must be controlled for empirically, and 
a more in depth discussion will follow. 
The estimation includes local school districts and districts that are part of a 
supervisory union, excluding charter districts.  Charter schools that are considered their 
own districts did report per-pupil revenue data to the NCES.  The estimation should not 
be affected by leaving charter districts out of the sample because I consider per-pupil 
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revenues, not total revenues.  Clearly, if a charter district that resides within a local 
school district reports X in total revenue, then the local school district’s revenue would 
not include X.  Compare this to a school district with charter schools not considered 
districts.  That district would report both revenues for the traditional public schools and 
the revenues for charter schools.  In other words, compared to a school district with 
charter schools that are not designated their own districts, a local school district with 
charter districts would report less total revenue.   This would be an issue if I were 
examining total revenues. 
With per-pupil revenues, however, this is not an issue.  Consider the following 
example.  Figure 5.5 shows two school districts with black dots representing students and 
the gray area representing the geographic area from which the district draws its 
enrollment.  Assume each school district enrolls five students, and the district receives 
$100 per student for total revenue of $500.  Now, assume two students move to a charter 
school in each district.  In School district 1, the charter school’s revenues are reported 
along with the district’s revenues, and in School district 2, the charter school’s revenues 
are reported separately.  Assume also that revenues remain unchanged.  School district 1 
will report $100 per pupil for all five students.  School district 1 will report $100 per 
pupil for its three remaining students, and the charter school will report $100 per pupil for 
its two new students.  The key here is that charter schools should receive the same per-
pupil revenue (as outlined in state charter laws) as the district, regardless of the reporting 
mechanism.  Therefore, with either reporting mechanism, district reported per-pupil 
revenues represent both charter and district per-pupil revenues.      
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The explanatory variables of interest in this study include various measures of 
charter school presence within a traditional public school district.  All of these were 
derived from the new measures discussed in the previous section.  I will not use counts 
provided by the NCES.  As discussed in the literature review, charter school presence, or 
charter school competition as it is often called, has been measured in a variety of ways—
number of charter schools, percentage of charter schools within district, distance of 
charter school to nearest traditional public school or district, and density measures of 
charter schools within certain distance radii.30  I use these same measures of charter 
school presence to test how public school district revenues change in response to the 
formation of a charter school within or near a district.  According to Table 5.9, 
approximately ten percent of all U.S. public school districts had a charter school at some 
point over the span of the dataset, but this varied greatly by state.  In fact, only ten states 
had more than twenty-five percent of their districts with a charter school. 
Charter school counts within districts 
As described above, charter school counts within districts were determined by 
ArcGIS software using latitude and longitude locational codes of both the charter school 
and district central office.  Each observation in Table 5.10 represents public school 
district i in year t, so the mean represents the mean number of charter schools within a 
local public school district.  The number of charter schools and the number of districts 
with a charter school increased at about the same rate.  However, the skewness of this 
distribution illustrates an earlier point in that charter schools have been concentrated in a 
small number of school districts across the U.S.  This concentration lessened through 
                                                          
30 Another popular measure of charter presence has been charter enrollment as a percentage of total district 
enrollments.  Charter enrollment estimates were not reported consistently for the charter schools included 
in the dataset.   
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school year 2004-2005, but it has begun increasing in the latter part of that decade, 
suggesting that districts which already have charter schools were the ones where new 
charter schools were locating. 
Figure 5.6 shows the total number of charter schools within each state during 
school year 1995-1996 through school year 2010-2011.  The red line represents the 
average number of charter schools within a state across the U.S.  In the majority of the 
states, the number of charter schools is below the average for a state in the U.S., 
indicating that certain states authorize the majority of charter schools within the U.S.  In 
fact, only the first nine states shown—Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Texas and Wisconsin—were above average over the span of the 
dataset.  Combined with the descriptive statistics in Table 5.10, Figure 5.6 further 
illustrates the point that charter schools were mainly located in a few districts within a 
few states. 
Charter schools as a percentage of the total number of public schools 
The second measure of charter penetration is the percentage of schools within a 
district that were designated as a charter school. The NCES reported the total number of 
public schools, excluding charter school counts.  To calculate the percentage of schools 
that were charter, I combined the total number of public schools reported by the NCES 
with the charter school counts obtained from the ArcGIS analysis.  The average percent 
of charter schools within a district was less than one percent across all years and states, 
and the distribution was skewed right.  Table 5.11 shows the change in this measure over 
time, both within the full sample and then restricted to a sample of districts with at least 
one charter school.   
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Distance from district to the nearest charter school 
One unique quality of charter schools is that they are not required to adhere to 
district boundaries for enrolling students.  Any student within the state may attend any 
charter school, regardless of where district lines have been drawn.  To address that issue, 
this paper offers an alternative measure of charter school presence that disregards district 
boundaries.  Distance to the nearest charter school was calculated by using the district 
and charter school locations, determined by latitude and longitude codes.  Again, these 
codes were provided by the NCES and were based on the physical address of the charter 
school and district.31  Distances were calculated between every district and every charter 
school within a state32 and the smallest was selected.  This measure of charter school 
presence accounts for inter-district transfers, which occur in some districts (Bifulco and 
Ladd 2006).  Figure 5.7 gives a pictorial representation of this distance measurement 
using two school districts in Georgia. 
Density measures 
I also use these distance measurements to create a metric for the density of charter 
school penetration.  This measure better represents the dense nature of charter school 
locations in that when a charter school was close to a district, there were often many 
other charter schools in the vicinity.   A count of charter schools within certain distance 
measurements is used to measure charter school density.  The distance categories include 
the number of charter schools within 1 mile, from 1 to 2.5 miles, 2.5 to 5 miles, 5 to 7.5 
miles, 7.5 to 10 miles, 10 to 15 miles and 15 to 20 miles.  Combined, the distance to the 
nearest charter school and a count of charter schools within certain distance 
                                                          
31 For the district, this is typically the central office, which, as its name suggests, is most often centrally 
located within the district. 
32 Inter-state transfers are extremely rare. 
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measurements provides a more complete picture of charter school competition.33  Figure 
5.7 gives a pictorial representation of this density measurement using another school 
district in Georgia.  Butler et al. (2013) employed similar measures for the distances 
between households and various school options.  Table 5.12 displays the descriptive 
statistics for both distance to the nearest charter school and the density metrics 
aforementioned.    
Authorizers by district 
I also include the type of authorizers present in each district, represented by a 
dummy variable for each type of authorizer.34  Table 5.13 presents the number of districts 
with the various types of authorizers in each year of the sample.  As covered in Chapter 
Two, the majority of local school districts authorized the charter schools within their 
boundaries.   
States became much more involved in the authorizing process after 2000, with 
state education agencies (SEA) and independent chartering boards (ICB) authorizing 
twice as many districts in 2010 as they were in 2000.  This may reflect the state’s desire 
to impact the charter school policy environment outside of its legislation, or it may 
represent the need for increased centralization as the number of charter schools increased 
within the state.  The number of districts in which universities and non-profits authorized 
increased steadily over the timespan of the sample, but non-education government 
entities—most often the mayor—remained very small. 
Multiple authorizers within a district increased over time as well.  That category 
represents any district where two or more authorizers were present, but it does not 
                                                          
33 It should be noted that these measures are not correlated statistically. 
34 I include a dummy variable for districts with multiple authorizers and those districts with a charter school 
but missing authorizer data.   
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distinguish the type of authorizers.  Lastly, the authorizer was unknown for the charter 
schools within a small sub-sample of the districts (less than ten percent).       
Additional control variables 
Table 5.14 displays descriptive statistics for the additional control variables.35 
Local, state and revenue sources are influenced by a variety of other factors, which 
depend on the attributes of the public school district and state.  Because the scope of this 
study ranges across all fifty states and spans sixteen years, data availability restricted the 
extent to which additional control variables could be included in the estimation.  For 
example, housing price valuations within each district could help control for differences 
in household wealth that are not captured by the SAIPE income data.  This would be 
especially important since the local source of school revenues historically has been 
property taxes.  Likewise, any information on the school district’s budgeting system 
would provide additional insight into the mechanisms that determine local revenue.  
Nevertheless, a less specified model is the tradeoff for a more robust estimation of the 
charter school’s influence on local, state and federal revenues.  Additionally, certain 
statistical techniques will be employed to mediate any potential issue caused by the lack 
of control variables. 
For all estimations to follow, I control for the district’s total enrollment, and in 
case this relationship is quadratic, I also include the total enrollment squared.  While the 
U.S. has a few large districts,36 the sample of districts had 3,682 students, on average.  I 
account for attributes of the student population.  These include the percentages of 
                                                          
35 Although I have provided a more in depth description of the dependent variables, I also include these in 
the table so that coefficients magnitudes may be interpreted appropriately.   
36 Los Angeles in California had over one million students in school year 2010-2011Miami-Dade in Florida 
is another large school district.  In the sample, New York City is not one of the larger school districts 
because it has 32 smaller districts that are part of a supervisory union. 
 
84 
 
different races within the district, the percentage of students who were eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch, and the percentage of students who had an individualized education 
plan.  Districts in the sample were predominately white, on average, but a few school 
districts reported having one hundred percent Hispanic or African-American populations.  
Districts reported special education students—otherwise known as individualized 
education plans (IEP)—as thirteen percent of the enrollment, on average, and thirty-eight 
percent of students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.   
I also control for district staff size with the student-to-teacher ratio.  On average, a 
school district had one teacher for every 14.64 students.  This average has decreased over 
time as more school districts have made it a priority to decrease classroom size.  While 
the percentage of students who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch captures the 
poverty of school-aged children, I also include the percent of the district’s population that 
were in poverty to characterize the adult population.  On average, 13.5 percent of a 
district’s population was in poverty, but some districts had as much as sixty-two percent 
of its population below the poverty line.  As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the 
median voter’s income is expected to influence the level of revenues, and on average, the 
median household income was $41,155.51.  Again, that figure was adjusted for inflation 
and reported in 2014 dollars. 
Lastly, I control for the district’s locale, which is based on the school district’s 
location relative to other populous areas.  The categories include large city, midsize city, 
urban fringe of large city, urban fringe of midsize city, large town, small town, rural 
(outside Census Based Statistical Area) and rural (inside Census Based Statistical Area).  
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The majority of public school districts were categorized as rural, but as expected, 
enrollment levels were concentrated in more urban areas. 
Expected relationship between dependent variables and charter school presence 
A priori, the relationship between local revenues and the presence of a charter 
school is ambiguous.  Theoretically, this is outlined in more depth in Chapter Four.  
When a charter school is created within a district, the charter school draws from both 
public schools within and outside the district as well as private schools, thereby 
potentially increasing the total number of students within the public school sector.  
Examining charter schools in Michigan, Toma et al. (2006) showed that twenty percent 
of students who enroll in charter schools had enrolled in private schools (Toma and 
Zimmer 2006).  Additionally, Buddin (2012) examined this relationship at a national 
level and with groups of large urban areas and states.  Echoing the Toma et al. (2006) 
study, Buddin (2012) found decreases in private enrollment were a consequence to the 
presence of charter schools.   
Following those studies, I estimated a basic model to represent the relationship 
between private enrollments and the presence of a charter school.  Like charter schools, 
private schools do not have a designated school district, so I employ the same method of 
mapping private schools as previously discussed with mapping charter schools.  
Approximately fifty-thousand private schools submit enrollment data to the NCES, and 
of that sample, 29,016 had a location (latitude and longitude code) identified by RAND 
researchers (Toma et al. 2006).37  I used those coordinates to determine within which 
district a private school as located.  Once a private school was assigned a district, I 
                                                          
37 I supplemented the RAND data by using private school addresses provided by the NCES for those 
schools that were not located by RAND researchers.   
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aggregated the private school enrollment to the district level and counted the number of 
private schools within each district.   
The estimation of how charter schools affected private school numbers and 
enrollment is presented in Table 5.15.  In the model, the dependent variables were the 
number of private schools within a district and the total private school enrollment in the 
district. Results indicate that, controlling for a district’s total public school enrollment, 
locale and year, the existence of a charter school within a district was associated with a 
257 pupil decrease in private school enrollment.  Likewise, the existence of a charter 
school within a district was associated with a 1.396 decrease in the total number of 
private schools.38   
Because more of the public’s school aged population has entered the public 
education market, demand for public education should increase.  This may result in a 
higher willingness to pay for public education, thereby increasing per-pupil revenues 
from local sources.  The opposite may be true, however, if the locality chooses not to 
raise revenues for the local school district.  In this case, more students have entered the 
public school system, but total revenues have not increased, thereby possibly leading to a 
decrease in per-pupil revenues from local sources.     
A priori, the relationship between state revenues for a district and the presence of 
a charter school is also ambiguous.  Certain state charter laws provide districts full to 
partial reimbursement for students the traditional public schools lose to charter schools.  
These additional funds would increase per-pupil revenues from state sources, regardless 
                                                          
38 The purpose of the preceding estimation was to show that the existence of charter schools was associated 
with private school numbers and enrollment and, therefore, should be included in the model.  This 
dissertation does not contend to model this relationship fully. 
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of whether the charter school’s revenues were reported with the district or with the 
charter school.  In this case, the presence of a charter school is expected to increase 
revenues from state sources.  On the other hand, since district revenues from local 
sources may have increased because a school district has attracted more students into the 
public education market, then state revenues would be expected to decrease to varying 
degrees depending on a state’s equalization formula.   
As stated in the previous section, district revenues from federal sources are 
associated with poverty levels within the district.  However, recent federal government 
legislation has encouraged education innovation with federal grants.  In particular, these 
federal grants provided incentives in the form of additional grant funding for the creation 
of charter schools.  Therefore, I expect federal per-pupil revenues to be positively 
associated with the presence of a charter school.   
Expected relationship between dependent variables and authorizer type 
While authorizers play a vital role in the funding of charter schools, few studies 
have considered their effect on charter school revenues, let alone their overall effect on 
public school district revenues.  A full theoretical discussion considering the authorizer’s 
effect on both charter and traditional public school revenues is warranted, but it is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  As such, the following paragraphs consider, briefly, how 
different authorizers may affect local school district revenues.  
Broadly, an authorizer can influence public school district revenues through 
increases and decreases in charter revenues.  It bears mentioning again that per-pupil 
revenues for charter schools and traditional public schools should be equal, so an increase 
in either would equate to an increase in both.  For example, if a district had an authorizer 
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that was better at acquiring additional federal grants, compared to other authorizers, the 
school district’s per-pupil revenues should increase because of the additional federal 
money.    
Authorizers may also induce increases or decreases in revenues, separate from 
any money tied directly to charter schools.  For example, if a local school district were 
more likely than a state agency to authorize a Spanish immersion charter school, that 
school district would better satisfy local demand, ceteris paribus.  Thus, the local 
revenues for that school district may increase (as discussed in Chapter Four).   
Given the two avenues of influence, the following paragraphs will outline 
expectations for how an authorizer may influence revenues.  First, I will consider 
differences among authorizers in influencing revenues affected directly by charter school 
funding mechanisms.  Second, I will consider how authorizers may influence per-pupil 
revenues not directly affected by charter school funding.   
Authorizing organizations with a greater capacity for budgeting, grant writing and 
fiscal management would be more likely to increase revenues to public school districts 
than those with less capacity, ceteris paribus.  With more staff and resources, an 
authorizer may be able to acquire more state and federal grants.  Likewise, they would be 
better equipped to monitor charter schools to ensure those schools qualify for the 
maximum revenues possible (e.g. filing paperwork to qualify more students for free or 
reduced-price lunch).   
Therefore, I expect districts with state education agencies and independent charter 
boards authorizing charter schools to have higher state and federal revenues than local 
school districts, universities, nonprofits and non-educational government entities that 
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serve as the authorizer.  This association works directly through the charter school 
funding mechanism.  I do not expect the type of authorizer to be associated with revenues 
from local sources directly through charter funding mechanisms. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, charter schools may influence the demand for 
public schooling.  In this sense, the type of authorizer may affect revenues by permitting 
charter schools that better satisfy demand.  This association does not rely on charter 
funding mechanisms; instead, public school revenues increase because the public has a 
higher willingness to pay for public schools.  Compared to state agencies, more locally 
connected authorizers—school districts, nonprofits, universities and non-educational 
government entities—could induce increases in revenues from local sources, a priori.  
These authorizers may be more likely than state officials to authorize a charter school that 
more sufficiently meets the demand of their populace, and if so, local revenues should 
increase.   
The opposite may be true, specifically for local public school districts, in that the 
officials could block potentially popular charter schools in fear of enrollment losses.  In 
this sense, revenues may decrease to reflect the public’s frustration with the public school 
system.  District officials may be more likely to authorize charter schools to deal with 
overcrowding.  In this sense, a charter school would increase economies of scale and 
decrease revenues from local sources.   
Compared to more locally connected authorizers, a state education agency or 
independent charter commission may negatively influence local revenues.  These 
agencies may authorize charter schools at the request of a charter organization or 
subgroup of the population.  In doing so, a state agency or charter board would go against 
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the demand of the public, and the public’s willingness to pay would decrease, leading to a 
decrease in local revenues.   
With the two avenues of influence considered, the type of authorizer’s effect on 
revenues from local is ambiguous.  However, I expect districts that have authorizers with 
a greater organizational capacity to experience increases in revenues from both state and 
federal sources.  
Expected relationship between dependent variables and additional control variables 
For each district, I include the total enrollment for each school year.  Because the 
relationship between revenues and enrollment may not be linear, I also include 
enrollment squared.  A priori, revenues from each source should increase as enrollments 
increase for the district, but after a point, revenues should begin to increase at a 
decreasing rate because the district capitalizes on economies of scale.  I also include the 
percentage of total enrollments represented by each minority race to capture the 
demographic heterogeneity of the district.  Increasing racial heterogeneity has been 
associated with decreasing public school spending (La Ferrara and Mele 2006), so 
increasing the percentage of minority students, relative to white students, is expected to 
be negatively associated with revenue changes. 
The relationship between revenues and the percentage of the total enrollment that 
is free and reduced-price lunch eligible depends on the revenue source.  Districts receive 
additional federal and state funds when they have more free and reduced eligible 
students, but this additional revenue may be offset by a lower income district-wide.  
Therefore, local revenues are expected to be negatively associated with the percentage of 
free and reduced-price lunch eligible students while state and federal funds will be 
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positively related.  The relationship between local, state and federal revenues and student-
to-teacher ratios is expected to be negative.  Smaller class sizes require more resources 
(labor), and districts cannot capture economies of scale as well.  Therefore, student-to-
teacher ratio is expected to be negatively associated with revenues from all sources.   
A priori, districts with a lower median household income and higher poverty rates 
are expected to have lower per-pupil revenues.  Because of past court decisions, many 
states must provide equitable financing for each district, so median household income is 
expected to be negatively associated and poverty positively associated with state per-
pupil revenues.  Lastly, there should be no relationship between median household 
income and federal revenues, but because federal dollars are tied to the free and reduced 
lunch program, poverty rates should be positively associated with federal per-pupil 
revenues.   
Districts in larger cities face higher costs to provide education, but they are more 
likely to benefit from economies of scale.  In contrast, more rural districts face lower 
costs but cannot benefit from economies of scale.  Additionally, more rural districts are 
poorer than urban districts, on average.  Combined, these assumptions suggest an 
ambiguous relationship between revenues from each of these sources and the district’s 
locale. 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined alternative measures of charter school presence within a 
district and, in doing so, has provided a robust estimate of the number of charter schools 
within districts across the U.S.  The alternative measure also maintains consistency in 
counting charter schools across different states, which is especially important given the 
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significant differences in charter school policy environments among the different states 
with charter school laws.   
While distance to the nearest charter school and the density measures discussed in 
this chapter have been used previously, they have not been employed with such a large 
sample of school districts over so many years.  These metrics, combined with the more 
accurate accounting of charter schools, should improve our understanding of the 
relationship between charter schools and their encompassing districts. 
I have also put forth an empirical model to capture the local school districts’ 
response to charter presence, measured by changes in local, state and federal per-pupil 
revenues.  However, given the non-randomness of charter school location decisions and 
the joint dependence of local and state revenues, the model proposed in this chapter will 
require a few empirical modifications.  I will explain these modifications in the next 
chapter and empirically estimate how the presence of charter schools affects district 
revenues from local, state and federal sources. 
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Table 5.1, Number of districts by NCES district type, school year 1995-1996 to 
school year 2010-2011 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1995 12,851 1,915 442 722 194 44 0 97 
1996 12,955 1,895 440 725 194 44 0 115 
1997 12,932 1,873 434 736 206 44 0 169 
1998 13,042 1,826 433 746 137 8 196 113 
1999 12,659 1,814 429 844 137 1 808 101 
2000 12,622 1,795 433 849 124 5 1,052 55 
2001 12,591 1,779 433 869 158 1 1,177 77 
2002 12,772 1,509 283 1,166 169 0 1,241 211 
2003 12,763 1,510 284 1,160 174 0 1,444 133 
2004 12,672 1,508 285 1,162 183 0 1,673 135 
2005 12,624 1,539 285 1,154 186 0 1,849 118 
2006 13,126 865 239 1,110 228 0 1,973 201 
2007 13,365 518 209 1,264 285 3 2,085 170 
2008 13,359 520 212 1,180 264 3 2,171 176 
2009 13,123 544 220 1,303 263 0 2,305 158 
2010 13,041 586 225 1,328 286 1 2,448 130 
 
1= Local school district 
2= Local school district component of supervisory union 
3=Supervisory union administrative center 
4=Regional education services 
5=State operated institution 
6=Federally operated institution 
7=Charter school agency 
8=Other education agency 
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Table 5.2, Enrollment by district type, school year 1995-1996 to school year 2010-
2011 
Year 
Total 
Enrollment 
(1,000,000s) 
Local school 
district 
(1,000,000s) 
Local school 
district 
component 
of 
supervisory 
union 
Supervisory 
union 
administrative 
center 
Regional 
education 
services 
1995 44.7 41.7 1,588,804 1,063,920 250,444 
1996 45.8 42.7 1,600,295 1,089,856 263,905 
1997 46.2 43.1 1,582,748 1,087,755 269,570 
1998 46.4 43.3 1,561,997 1,088,166 276,670 
1999 46.7 43.5 1,568,305 1,091,531 279,343 
2000 47.1 43.8 1,562,987 1,082,076 287,769 
2001 47.5 44.2 1,557,485 1,065,518 291,540 
2002 48.1 44.7 1,563,465 1,093,587 308,064 
2003 48.5 45.0 1,577,150 1,040,224 315,604 
2004 48.7 45.2 1,557,077 1,004,253 284,413 
2005 49.0 45.4 1,509,803 1,031,793 284,403 
2006 49.1 45.6 2,491,014 19,759 350,028 
2007 50.3 45.6 2,406,934 1,088,408 285,535 
2008 50.2 45.5 2,440,921 1,079,280 277,359 
2009 50.4 45.6 2,455,114 1,111,142 265,304 
2010 49.4 45.6 2,476,826 19,537 286,810 
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Table 5.2, continued. 
Year 
Total 
Enrollment 
(1,000,000s) 
State 
operated 
institution 
Federally 
operated 
institution 
Charter 
school 
agency 
Other 
education 
agency 
1995 44.7 63,900 11,232 17,096 35,588 
1996 45.8 63,578 11,586 36,808 40,790 
1997 46.2 67,109 11,511 51,113 51,998 
1998 46.4 71,862 132 93,437 54,560 
1999 46.7 71,382 0 141,126 76,145 
2000 47.1 73,119 0 183,214 78,486 
2001 47.5 78,426 0 249,684 87,766 
2002 48.1 74,532 0 292,712 130,728 
2003 48.5 73,384 0 340,526 157,960 
2004 48.7 64,474 52 396,496 170,463 
2005 49.0 65,334 0 449,567 197,846 
2006 49.1 51,042 0 519,163 160,377 
2007 50.3 51,136 0 584,667 179,468 
2008 50.2 43,212 0 665,890 170,190 
2009 50.4 41,977 0 756,558 172,756 
2010 49.4 37,088 0 838,399 162,730 
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Table 5.3, Number of schools by NCES district type designation, school year 1995-
1996 to school year 2010-2011 
 
 
 
Year Total Schools 
1 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1995 87,125 80,093 4,005 1,196 1,213 311 68 118 121 
1996 88,249 80,935 4,061 1,204 1,276 306 69 246 152 
1997 89,508 81,911 4,027 1,237 1,378 365 70 303 217 
1998 90,874 82,977 3,920 1,246 1,511 409 1 528 282 
1999 92,012 83,692 3,921 1,292 1,543 412 0 781 371 
2000 93,273 84,609 3,925 1,299 1,603 464 7 980 386 
2001 94,112 85,245 3,834 1,305 1,621 560 2 1,125 420 
2002 95,615 86,124 3,908 1,516 1,804 514 1 1,220 528 
2003 95,726 86,194 3,911 1,312 1,832 534 1 1,369 573 
2004 96,513 86,537 3,937 1,291 1,961 585 1 1,589 612 
2005 97,382 86,976 5,116 85 2,026 734 1 1,779 665 
2006 98,793 88,129 4,928 28 2,145 953 1 1,901 708 
2007 98,916 88,129 4,934 28 2,115 898 0 2,071 741 
2008 98,706 87,861 4,952 28 1,904 946 0 2,260 755 
2009 98,817 87,837 4,916 29 1,973 873 0 2,427 762 
2010 98,817 87,640 4,919 29 2,016 857 1 2,600 755 
 
1= Local school district 
2= Local school district component of supervisory union 
3=Supervisory union administrative center 
4=Regional education services 
5=State operated institution 
6=Federally operated institution 
7=Charter school agency 
8=Other education agency 
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Table 5.4, Local, state and federal revenues by NCES district type designation 
District Type 
Local 
Revenue 
 
Percent 
of total 
State 
Revenue 
 
Percent 
of total 
Federal 
Revenue 
 
Percent 
of total 
Local school district 1,190 78.85 1,220 75.97 2,090 75.79 
Local school district 
component of supervisory 
union 
223 14.78 190 11.83 17.40 6.31 
Supervisory union 
administrative center 
1.72 0.11 1.00 0.06 0.16 0.06 
Regional education services 50.60 3.35 53.30 3.32 20.90 7.58 
State operated institution 0.01 >0.01 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Federally operated institution * * * * * * 
Charter school agency 32.70 2.17 11.70 7.29 23.10 8.38 
Other education agency 11.10 0.74 24.40 1.52 5.16 1.87 
Total 1,509 
 
1,606 
 
275.7 
  *Revenue data for federally operated institutions were not provided 
**All revenues reported in millions of dollars 
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Table 5.5, Number of charter schools by NCES district type designation, school year 
1998-1999 to school year 2010-2011 
 
 
 
Year Total Charter Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1998 506 283 4 0 9 0 0 107 103 
1999 1496 534 8 0 15 0 0 735 200 
2000 1958 726 10 0 18 0 0 932 272 
2001 2313 917 13 0 21 0 0 1077 285 
2002 2539 1056 13 0 25 0 0 1168 277 
2003 2939 1215 11 0 31 0 0 1313 369 
2004 3358 1388 13 0 33 0 0 1530 396 
2005 3727 1549 14 0 38 0 0 1704 423 
2006 4072 1768 14 0 60 0 0 1824 405 
2007 4310 1848 14 0 56 0 0 1972 420 
2008 4603 1950 14 0 61 0 0 2151 427 
2009 4852 2032 14 0 69 0 0 2319 418 
2010 5177 2170 14 0 78 0 0 2496 419 
*The NCES did not collect data on charter schools before school year 1998-1999 
 
1= Local school district 
2= Local school district component of supervisory union 
3=Supervisory union administrative center 
4=Regional education services 
5=State operated institution 
6=Federally operated institution 
7=Charter school agency 
8=Other education agency 
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Table 5.6, Charter school counts by dataset sources, school year 1995-1996 to school 
year 2010-2011 
 
 
Year 
NCES total 
charter 
schools 
District-level 
NCES total 
charter 
schools 
School-level  
NAPCS Total 
charter 
schools 
 
New measure 
of total 
charter 
schools 
1995 0 0 0 176 
1996 0 0 0 279 
1997 0 0 0 451 
1998 506 507 0 814 
1999 1496 1524 1542 1388 
2000 1958 1993 1941 1715 
2001 2313 2348 2313 2095 
2002 2539 2575 2559 2459 
2003 2939 2977 2959 2850 
2004 3358 3399 3383 3382 
2005 3727 3780 3689 3821 
2006 4072 4260 3999 4207 
2007 4310 4561 4299 4506 
2008 4603 4920 4640 4836 
2009 4852 5165 4913 5066 
2010 5177 5511 5258 5340 
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Table 5.7, Average number of charter schools per district comparing NCES and 
alternative measure, full sample 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
NCES charter 
schools per district 
0.078 1.212 0 183 
ArcGIS charter 
schools per district 
0.180 1.797 0 191 
 
Table 5.8, Differences between NCES and alternative measure of charter school 
counts using comparison of revenue means between districts with and without 
charter schools 
 
NCES counts 
 N General 
revenues 
Local 
revenues 
State 
revenues 
Federal 
revenues 
Without charter 
schools 
229,943 13,036.66 5,739.06 5,920.79 949.57 
With charter 
schools 
6,206 11,971.28 4,756.97 5,993.94 1,153.34 
Combined 236,149 13,008.67 5,713.10 5,922.71 954.92 
Differences  1,065.38 982.09 -73.15 -203.77 
T-value  8.85 17.96 -1.81 -12.77 
*All revenues are in 2014 dollars 
Alternative measure’s counts 
 
 
N General 
revenues 
Local 
revenues 
State 
revenues 
Federal 
revenues 
Without charter 
schools 
222,482 13,031.29 5,748.31 5,909.51 942.10 
With charter 
schools 
13,667 12,640.35 5,143.11 6,137.21 1,163.71 
Combined 236,149 13,008.67 5,713.10 5,922.71 954.92 
Differences  390.94 605.20 -227.70 -221.61 
T-value  4.74 16.14 -8.21 -20.29 
*All revenues are in 2014 dollars 
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Table 5.9, Proportion of school districts with a charter school for each state 
State No charter Charter 
% 
Charter Total 
Alabama 141 0 0% 141 
Alaska 43 12 21.82% 55 
Arizona 178 101 36.20% 279 
Arkansas 318 23 6.74% 341 
California 758 290 27.67% 1,048 
Colorado 139 49 26.06% 188 
Connecticut 156 10 6.02% 166 
Delaware 10 9 47.37% 19 
District of Columbia 1 1 100% 1 
Florida 24 45 65.22% 69 
Georgia 151 39 20.53% 190 
Hawaii 1 1 50.00% 2 
Idaho 100 20 16.67% 120 
Illinois 1,011 15 1.46% 1,026 
Indiana 274 31 10.16% 305 
Iowa 440 11 2.44% 451 
Kansas 301 37 10.95% 338 
Kentucky 177 0 0% 177 
Louisiana 72 15 17.24% 87 
Maine 332 0 0.00% 332 
Maryland 17 7 29.17% 24 
Massachusetts 331 36 9.81% 367 
Michigan 471 127 21.24% 598 
Minnesota 512 64 11.11% 576 
Mississippi 164 0 0% 164 
Missouri 549 2 0.36% 551 
Montana 550 0 0% 550 
Nebraska 821 0 0% 821 
Nevada 11 6 35.29% 17 
New Hampshire 186 11 5.58% 197 
New Jersey 581 33 5.37% 614 
New Mexico 80 22 21.57% 102 
New York 788 0 0% 788 
North Carolina 89 54 37.76% 143 
North Dakota 306 0 0% 306 
Ohio 555 100 15.27% 655 
Oklahoma 601 2 0.33% 603 
Oregon 239 63 20.86% 302 
Pennsylvania 472 50 9.58% 522 
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Table 5.9, continued.     
State No charter Charter 
% 
Charter Total 
Rhode Island 28 7 20.00% 35 
South Carolina 81 20 19.80% 101 
South Dakota 206 0 0% 206 
Tennessee 138 3 2.13% 141 
Texas 904 158 14.88% 1,062 
Utah 34 22 39.29% 56 
Vermont 308 0 0% 308 
Virginia 135 4 2.88% 139 
Washington 298 0 0% 298 
West Virginia 55 0 0% 55 
Wisconsin 327 108 24.83% 435 
Wyoming 46 3 6.12% 49 
     Total 14,515 1,610 9.98% 16,125 
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Table 5.10, Descriptive statistics for charter schools within school districts 
Year Total Mean Max S.D. Skewness 
1995 173 0.012 11 0.167 31.628 
1996 264 0.018 12 0.221 25.805 
1997 436 0.029 14 0.306 21.928 
1998 718 0.048 22 0.465 23.110 
1999 1270 0.088 35 0.766 22.237 
2000 1598 0.111 37 0.920 20.916 
2001 1983 0.138 44 1.109 20.013 
2002 2322 0.163 44 1.283 19.154 
2003 2731 0.191 49 1.490 18.756 
2004 3266 0.230 66 1.761 19.210 
2005 3671 0.259 89 2.044 21.051 
2006 4060 0.290 111 2.344 22.763 
2007 4351 0.313 134 2.567 24.374 
2008 4712 0.340 153 2.788 25.586 
2009 4972 0.364 171 3.005 27.047 
2010 5343 0.392 191 3.246 27.467 
*Min is 0 for all years  
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Table 5.11, Average percent of schools within district that were a charter school, 
school year 1995-1996 to school year 2010-2011 
Year Full sample 
Restricted to districts with  
at least 1 charter school 
1995 0.10% 11.50% 
1996 0.13% 11.05% 
1997 0.18% 10.05% 
1998 0.29% 10.65% 
1999 0.49% 12.30% 
2000 0.59% 12.56% 
2001 0.72% 13.07% 
2002 0.83% 13.37% 
2003 0.95% 13.85% 
2004 1.15% 14.53% 
2005 1.26% 14.92% 
2006 1.35% 14.95% 
2007 1.43% 15.24% 
2008 1.54% 15.63% 
2009 1.58% 15.96% 
2010 1.67% 16.30% 
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Table 5.12, Descriptive statistics for charter school presence measures  
Variable  N=116,362 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Distance to nearest CS 43.892 58.190 0 1484.718 
Average number of charter schools within 
    1 mile 0.056 0.338 0 17 
1 to 2.5 miles 0.125 0.709 0 37 
2.5 to 5 miles 0.342 1.735 0 58 
5 to 7.5 miles 0.516 2.395 0 70 
7.5 to 10 miles 0.664 2.854 0 56 
10 to 15 miles 1.574 5.886 0 117 
15 to 20 miles 1.750 5.999 0 116 
*Distance to the nearest charter school and density metrics were computed only in states 
that had at least one charter school.   
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Table 5.13, Type of authorizer within district, full sample  
Year LEA SEA ICB 
Non-educ. 
Gov entity University Non-profit Multiple Unknown 
         1996 83 9 1 0 14 0 3 6 
1997 111 46 1 0 21 0 5 7 
1998 142 79 3 0 28 1 14 22 
1999 190 143 5 0 69 2 27 24 
2000 243 134 6 0 70 3 40 33 
2001 292 161 8 0 68 6 51 38 
2002 329 199 10 1 70 11 55 43 
2003 361 225 25 1 71 14 71 53 
2004 423 230 62 1 86 16 100 86 
2005 465 234 65 2 93 25 116 73 
2006 433 226 59 3 107 28 126 75 
2007 429 237 57 2 107 20 126 27 
2008 467 257 65 1 113 23 140 12 
2009 484 262 73 0 118 26 171 24 
2010 513 278 70 0 116 28 182 25 
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Table 5.14, Descriptive statistics for dependent variables and additional control 
variables in the model 
N=155, 373 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables     
Local revenue 5422.22 3,768.57 0 29,890.20 
State revenue 5945.52 2,650.59 0 29,913.96 
Federal revenue 1022.47 1,187.73 0 27,825.00 
District characteristics     
Total enrollment 3682.43 14,016.67 1 1075710.00 
Total enrollment (sq.) 2.1 X 107 8.4 X 108 1 1.16 X 1012 
White (%) 79.17 25.67 0 100 
African-American (%) 7.20 15.98 0 100 
Hispanic (%) 9.92 18.38 0 100 
Asian (%) 1.70 4.17 0 73.58 
IEP (%) 13.61 5.20 0 100 
FRL (%) 38.04 22.08 0 100 
Student-teacher ratio 14.64 3.55 1 39.50 
Pop in poverty (%) 13.54 5.48 1.70 62.00 
Median income 41,155.51 11,718 14,178 119,075 
*Revenues and median income reporting in 2014 dollars 
**Outlier revenues were trimmed at <$30,000  
***Outliers represented less than 1% of sample  
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Table 5.15, Private school enrollment response to charter schools 
 Total private 
enrollment 
Private schools within 
district 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
   
District w/ charter school -257.149*** -1.396*** 
 (16.624) (0.074) 
Total enrollment 0.162*** 0.001*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Urban-centric designation    
Mid-sized city -1,026.905*** -2.031*** 
 (40.188) (0.179) 
Urban fringe (large city) -1,040.737*** -2.707*** 
 (37.802) (0.169) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) -1,312.561*** -3.038*** 
 (39.758) (0.178) 
Large town -1,201.544*** -2.167*** 
 (55.753) (0.249) 
Small town -1,171.084*** -2.199*** 
 (38.999) (0.174) 
Rural, inside MSA -1,148.080*** -2.168*** 
 (39.315) (0.176) 
Rural, outside MSA -1,257.136*** -2.526*** 
 (41.157) (0.184) 
School year   
1997-1998 <0.001 <0.001 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
1998-1999 22.981 0.077 
 (26.726) (0.119) 
1999-2000 38.233 0.101 
 (26.767) (0.120) 
2000-2001 36.974 0.094 
 (26.785) (0.120) 
2001-2002 19.166 0.080 
 (26.791) (0.120) 
2002-2003 18.327 0.083 
 (26.806) (0.120) 
2003-2004 23.989 -0.001 
 (26.835) (0.120) 
2004-2005 24.302 0.005 
 (26.863) (0.120) 
2005-2006 35.732 0.108 
 (26.874) (0.120) 
2006-2007 27.889 0.115 
 (27.001) (0.121) 
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Table 5.15, continued. 
  
 Total private 
enrollment 
Private schools within 
district 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
2007-2008 31.995 0.026 
 (27.013) (0.121) 
2008-2009 33.999 0.036 
 (27.021) (0.121) 
2009-2010 35.327 0.117 
 (27.028) (0.121) 
Constant 961.773*** 2.497*** 
 (41.319) (0.184) 
   
Observations 73,725 73,725 
R-squared 0.811 0.783 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5.1, Differences between states that count charter schools within districts 
versus states that consider charter schools as their own district  
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Figure 5.2, Quadratic fit plot of per-pupil revenues across years 
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Figure 5.3, Quadratic fit plot of per-pupil revenues across years, shown for 
individual states 
 
 
 
0
50
00
10
00
0
0
50
00
10
00
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Alabama Arizona Arkansas California Colorado
Delaware Florida Georgia Idaho Illinois
Local State Federal
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
ev
en
ue
s
SY 1994-2010
Local School District Revenues by Source
0
50
00
10
00
0
0
50
00
10
00
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana
Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota
Local State Federal
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
ev
en
ue
s
SY 1994-2010
Local School District Revenues by Source
 
113 
 
Figure 5.4, Quadratic fit plot of per-pupil revenues across years, districts with 
charter schools versus districts without charter schools 
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Figure 5.5, No difference in per-pupil revenue between districts in states that count 
charter schools within districts and districts in states that consider charter schools 
their own districts 
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Figure 5.6, Number of charter schools within each state compared to the average 
state 
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Figure 5.6, continued. 
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Figure 5.6, continued. 
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Figure 5.7, Pictorial example of how distance metrics were calculated 
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Figure 5.8, Pictorial example of how density metrics were calculated 
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Chapter Six 
The effect of charter school presence on public school district revenues 
Introduction  
In Chapter Five, I introduced a model to examine how local school district 
revenues changed with the presence of charter schools.  Public school revenues come 
from local, state and federal sources, and while I could examine the effect of charter 
schools on revenues from the three sources combined, it will be more informative to 
examine each separately.  After all, charter schools are situated in a policy environment 
that involves all three levels of government.  In testing the response of each revenue 
source, I now have to contend with the joint determination of local and state revenues.  
Local revenues depend on, in part, how much money the state will send to the school 
district.  Likewise, state revenues are determined, in part, by how much the school district 
chooses to spend.  Empirically, the joint determination of local and state revenues creates 
endogeneity in the model.  
All three dependent variables—local, state and federal revenues—may determine 
charter location, instead of the opposite direction.  Charter operators may want to locate 
in high-spending districts since they receive per-pupil revenues equal to those of the local 
school district (Bifulco and Reback Working paper).  Since the purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine the effect of charter presence on these revenue sources, the 
direction of this relationship must be addressed in the estimation.   
The following chapter will outline the empirical techniques employed to address 
the endogeneity of local and state revenues, as well as the endogeneity of charter school 
locations.  Addressing the endogeneity in the relationship between state and local 
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revenues is straightforward.  An instrumental variable technique may be employed, given 
the instruments are valid.  The second endogeneity issue is more complicated, as the 
existence of an instrument that would affect charter locations but not revenues is 
unlikely.39  I address this issue by taking advantage of the fact that levels and changes of 
a particular variable are not related.  For example, districts with high revenues do not 
consistently raise revenues any more or less than districts with low revenues.  In doing 
so, the relationship between the presence of a charter school and local school district 
revenues may be estimated. 
Empirical model from Chapter Five 
From Chapter Five, I introduced the following models: 
(1) Local Revenueit =   α1Charterit + α2Ait +α3Sit + α4Yit  + α5Li + α6State Revenueit + 
α7Local Revenueit-1 +γt  + ϕ i + εit 
(2) State Revenueit =   α1Charterit + α2Ait +α3Sit + α4Yit  + α5Li + α6Local Revenueit + 
α7State Revenue it-1 + γt  + ϕ i + εit 
(3) Federal Revenueit =   α1Charterit + α2Ait +α3Sit + α4Yit  + α5Li + α6Federal 
Revenueit-1 +  γt  + ϕ i + εit 
where the dependent variables, Local Revenue, State Revenue and Federal Revenue, 
represent the various source of school district revenues.  These models were estimated 
empirically, and results are included in Appendix A.40  Again, all revenues are measured 
in 2014 dollars for district i in year t.   
                                                          
39 Winters (2012) used the distance to the nearest university as an instrument, but not every state law allows 
universities to authorize charter schools, so a nationwide dataset prevents the use of this instrument.  
40 While a full discussion of the results from this estimation is not included, I use these results as a basis for 
comparing the forthcoming estimations. 
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In Equation 1, the α’s are estimated coefficients; Charter is a vector of 
coefficients that represent the various charter presence variables41 for district i in year t.  I 
also include a dummy variable for those states that had not enacted a charter law or had 
enacted a charter law but had yet to authorize any charter schools.  A represents a 
categorical variable for the type of authorizer within the district; S is a vector of 
coefficients that represent district i’s total enrollment, student-to-teacher ratio and student 
composition in year t; Y is a vector of coefficients that represent district i’s median 
household income and the percentage of individuals in poverty; L represents district i’s 
locale, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau; State Revenue represents district i’s 
revenues from state sources in year t; lastly, I include the district’s Local Revenue from 
the previous year to capture any incremental changes.  The variable, γ, is a variable 
indicating the school year, ϕ d represents a set of unique (fixed) effects common to each 
individual district42, and εit represents the model error term. 
Equation 2 includes the same explanatory variables as Equation 1 with two 
exceptions.  In Equation 2, Local Revenue, which represents district i’s revenues from 
local sources in year t, is included, but this relationship is expected to be endogenous.  
Second, I include the district’s State Revenue for the previous year to capture any 
incremental changes.  Equation 3 has neither Local nor State revenue but includes all 
other control variables, as well as the district’s Federal Revenue from the previous year.   
It should also be noted here that federal revenues were influenced by the No Child Left 
Behind and Race to the Top federal legislations.  These legislations were enacted in 2006 
                                                          
41 These are not correlated theoretically or statistically.  Because a district has one charter does not make it 
more or less likely that there will be more or that charters will represent a larger portion of the public 
school system.  Rather, these factors depend on the state and district. 
42 And, since districts do not switch between states, ϕ d also represents a set of unique effects common to 
the state. 
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and 2009, respectively, and they influenced the amount of federal revenues that districts 
received.  Differences existed among states, but quantifying these differences would be 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  As such, year fixed effects, γt, should capture the 
effects of those legislations on federal revenues.   
Endogeneity in the empirical model 
Endogeneity of state and local revenues 
As discussed previously, state and local revenues are simultaneously determined, 
the relationship of which depends on state finance formulae.  Following Serrano v. Priest 
in 1971 (Karst 1972), many states modified their finance system to equalize spending 
across school districts.  Therefore, the level of state spending is determined, in part, by 
the local contribution to school district revenues.  Likewise, local districts respond to the 
mechanism and level of state spending.  If states offer matching grants, an increase in 
state revenue may lead to an increase in local revenues.  In contrast, a state that gives flat 
grants may offset local revenues, leading to a decrease in revenues from these sources.    
Because local and state revenues are simultaneously determined, endogeneity 
exists in any model examining responses of these two revenue sources.  I employ an 
instrumental variable strategy to address the endogeneity.  The instrument I use for local 
revenues is the percentage of the population that  was children in a given district during 
each year of the panel.  This metric is expected to be correlated with per pupil local 
revenues in a positive direction, and it is expected to be uncorrelated with per pupil state 
revenues.  Otherwise stated, the greater portion of the population that children represent 
should be associated with higher levels of spending.  This association has been examined 
previously with significant positive results (Poterba 1998; Ladd and Murray 2001).   
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I use any change in a state’s funding formula law as an instrument for state revenues.   
The Education Commission of the States (ECS) maintains a database of state law changes 
to the state’s funding formula (ECS 2014).  For each district, I collected the number of 
changes to the state’s funding formula law in each year.  Changes in state funding 
formulas are expected to affect state revenues but not local revenues; so theoretically, this 
variable should serve as a valid instrument.43 
For both local and state revenues, I regress the selected instrument on changes in 
revenues for a district during each year of the panel.  I then predict a fitted value (for each 
district-year) of changes in local and state revenues from their respective estimations.  
The fitted values represent the changes in local and state revenues independent from the 
other revenue source’s influence and  will replace the state and local revenues in 
Equations 1 and 2, respectively.44   
Endogeneity in charter school locations   
Charter schools are founded by people or organizations that choose to start them 
in a particular location at a particular time.  If charter schools must compete for students, 
operators may want to choose districts for which they have the best chance to attract a 
portion of the student population and be financially successful.  This choice is both 
intentional and a function of several factors, including the funding formula governing 
                                                          
43 It should be noted here that the ECS began collecting state law changes in 2000.  To address the missing 
data for years prior to 2000, I estimated the relationship between state law changes and years for years 
2000-2010, and I included district fixed effects.  The district fixed effects represent the state’s propensity to 
change its funding formula law from 2000 to 2010.  I use this district fixed effect as a substitute for the 
changes in a state’s funding formula.  This relies on the assumption that states exhibit some time-dependent 
behavior concerning changes in state laws—either active states from 2000-2010 were also active prior to 
2000, or active states from 2000-2010 made so many changes because they were inactive prior to 2000.  
Either way, this assumption implies that the district’s fixed effect will be related to the district’s revenues 
from state sources.   
44 Fitted values are changes and not levels, as represented in Equations 1 and 2.  This will be necessary 
following a discussion of charter location endogeneity. 
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charter schools.  Because charter schools receive per-pupil funding equal to traditional 
public school levels, these location decisions are affected by district finances, which is 
the point of this research.  In technical terms, this creates an issue of endogeneity.   
Specifically, dependent variables—local, state and federal revenues—may 
determine the presence of charter schools instead of the opposite relationship. Previous 
research has concluded that charter schools were located where populations were diverse 
in terms of race, income and adult education levels (Glomm, Harris et al. 2005, Stoddard 
and Corcoran 2007).  In New York, Bifulco and Buerger (2014) analyzed charter school 
location decisions and found charter operators were more likely to choose high-revenue 
districts in poor neighborhoods (Bifulco and Buerger 2014).  This is consistent with the 
theory above, as charter revenues depend on district spending levels.   
Standard approaches to endogeneity are unlikely to work, as every major factor 
affecting school district finances is likely to affect charter locations.  To address the 
endogeneity, this paper employs an alternative econometric methodology based on time-
series methods.  In this approach, I use a theory put forth by Hausman and Taylor (1981), 
who argued that levels and changes of variables are uncorrelated.   
Arellano and Bond (Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 1995) applied 
Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) theory to address serial correlation with lagged dependent 
variables.  Normally, the Arellano-Bond technique addresses the endogeneity of a current 
year’s level with previous years’ levels.  I follow Arellano-Bond by differencing the 
dependent variables—local, state and federal revenues—thereby assuming an incremental 
budgeting process for each of these revenue sources.  This would control for the 
association between a district’s fixed effect and the yearly changes in revenues.  With the 
 
126 
 
application of Arellano-Bond and Hausman-Taylor, Equations 1-3 change to the 
following: 
(4) ΔLocal Revenueit =   α1ΔCharterit + α2ΔAit +α3ΔSit + α4ΔYit  + α5Li +  
α6ΔState Revenueit +γt + εit 
(5) ΔState Revenueit =   α1ΔCharterit + α2ΔAit +α3ΔSit + α4ΔYit  + α5Li + 
 α6ΔLocal Revenueit + γt + εit 
(6) ΔFederal Revenueit = α1ΔCharterit + α2ΔAit +α3ΔSit + α4ΔYit  + α5Li +  γt  + εit 
If this year’s budget is incrementally influenced by last year’s budget, 
differencing the yearly levels cancels any influence of the district’s fixed effect.  
Therefore, consistent with Arellano and Bond’s theory, district i’s fixed effect, ϕ d, and 
lagged revenues drop from each equation.  Equations 4-6 set the foundation for 
addressing the endogeneity of charter locations by creating an empirical model based on 
changes and not levels. 
The next step will be to use a predicted residual value from an estimation of 
charter school locations as an instrument to address the endogeneity between changes in 
revenues and changes in charter school presence.  This technique extends Arellano and 
Bond (1991) in that I use the residual from an estimation of levels of charter schools as 
an instrument in the differenced equation, which is in line with the original Hausman and 
Taylor theory referenced by Arellano and Bond (1991).   
Empirically, the literature outlined above showed that charter schools located in 
high-revenue districts, and results from Chapter Five reaffirmed theoretical predictions.  
However, changes in revenues are related differently than revenue levels to charter 
school location decisions.  Empirically and conceptually, the literature does not address 
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whether charter schools located in districts where revenues are decreasing or increasing.  
This is where the panel dataset may be exploited to address potential endogeneity.   
In the first stage estimation, I will use yearly levels of district characteristics to 
predict the presence of charter schools within each district.  These explanatory variables 
will be lagged one year, as charter operators were likely to make their decision during 
year t-1 to open a school within a particular district in year t.  From this estimation, I will 
estimate district residuals, which are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (by 
construction) but associated with charter school location decisions.  Because the residuals 
represent unobserved characteristics associated with presence of a charter school, I can 
use them in the second stage of the estimation as an instrumental variable to control for 
charter school location decisions.   
The second-stage estimation measures both the dependent and explanatory 
variables in changes, not levels.  Levels and changes should be uncorrelated (Arellano 
and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 1995).  Therefore, levels of the dependent variables 
used in the first stage should predict charter school location decisions but be uncorrelated 
with changes in revenues.  Likewise, these levels should also be uncorrelated with the 
year changes used in the second-stage estimation (Hausman and Taylor 1981, Blundell 
and Bond 1998).   
I estimate the following model that is similar to the one specified by Hoxby 
(2006), which examined the supply of charter schools at the county level (Hoxby 2006): 
(7) Charterit =   α1Revenuesit + α2Sit + α3Yi  + α4SLi + α5Li + γt  + εt 
where the dependent variable, Charterit, represents the number of charter schools within 
district i at time t.  
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In Equation 6, the α’s are estimated coefficients; Revenue is a vector of 
coefficients that represent local, state and federal revenues for district i in year t45; S is a 
vector of coefficients that represent district i’s total enrollment and student composition 
in year t; Y is a vector of coefficients that represent district i’s median household income 
and the percentage of individuals in poverty; SLi is a vector of coefficients for the various 
charter law rankings; L represents district i’s locale, as defined by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  The variable, γ, is a variable indicating the school year and ε represents the 
model error term.  
As discussed above, charter operators are more likely to locate in districts with 
higher revenues, so the vector of revenue coefficients is expected to be positively 
associated with the number of charter schools in a district.  Results from previous studies 
indicated that more populous and racially diverse districts were more likely to have 
charter schools, so total enrollment and racial heterogeneity should both be positively 
associated with the number of charter schools.   
It should be noted here that I do not include the student-to-teacher ratio.  The 
previous literature has not indicated that this as a relevant factor, and no theoretical 
justification exists to warrant these in the estimation.  As previously discussed, charter 
operators were more likely to locate in poorer neighborhoods, so median income should 
be negatively associated with the number of charter schools.  Likewise, the percentage of 
people in poverty within a district should be positively associated with the number of 
charter schools, a priori. 
Charter laws vary across states in their permissiveness of charter school openings.  
The Center for Education Reform (CER) surveys the state laws and ranks each on 10 
                                                          
45 Again, all revenues are measured in 2014 dollars. 
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criteria.  These criteria were discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.  Higher scores 
are awarded to states which are more “accommodating” to charter schools, so these 
charter rankings should be positively associated with the number of charter schools.   
CER first published scores in 1996 and updates are available through CER’s 
website for 1998, 2003, 2004 and 2010.  For each district-year observation, scores are 
equal to the last published year score.  For example, if a district in Florida received a 
score of 4 on one criterion in school year 1998-1999, that district will retain that score for 
school year 1999-2000 to school year 2002-2003.  CER published a new round of 
rankings in school year 2003-2004, for which that district receives the school year 2003-
2004 ranking.    Finally, charter schools more often located in urban areas, so more rural 
locales should be negatively associated with the presence of a charter school.46         
Results from first stage estimations that address endogeneity 
Table 6.1 presents the results from the empirical estimation that models the 
simultaneous relationship between state and local revenue sources.  A change in a state’s 
law pertaining to the funding formula was positively associated with changes in state 
revenues.  Likewise, an increase in the district’s child population as a percentage of total 
population was negatively associated with changes in local revenues.  Because state law 
changes were significantly related to changes in state revenues and not local revenues, 
state law changes serve as a valid instrument empirically.  The same is true for the child 
population as a percentage of the total population.  Because it was significantly related to 
local revenue changes and not state revenue changes, it meets the criteria for a valid 
instrument, given the empirical assumptions of the model.   
                                                          
46 Charter laws could serve as an instrument for charter locations, which would negate the need for the 
empirical techniques outlined above.  However, charter laws do not address charter location differences 
between districts within the same states, making the more robust first-stage estimation necessary. 
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Table 6.2 presents the results from the empirical specification of the model of 
charter school location decisions.  Hoxby (2006) used the log form of the number of 
charter schools as her dependent variable.  I do not use the log form because I want to 
model the number of charter schools in districts with and without charter schools.  If I did 
not, I would not have a residual term for districts without charter schools.  As it is 
typically used, the log form might be more efficient because it reduces skewness in the 
data (charter school counts are skewed right), but the reduction in skewness would be 
offset by the loss of sample.  Because minimal skewness is not, in any case, required in 
regression estimation, I will not use the log form and retain the larger sample size. 
Federal per-pupil revenues were the only revenue source that was significantly 
related to the number of charter schools within a district, but the magnitude was marginal.  
For each $1,000 increase in federal per-pupil revenues, the number of charter schools 
increased by 0.033.  Ceteris paribus, an increase in the percentages of Hispanic students 
was positively associated with the number of charter schools, although the effect size is 
again marginal (a ten percent increase in Hispanic students was associated with 0.28 
more charter schools, on average). 
The percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch was negatively 
related to the number of charter schools, but the effect size was again marginal.  Lastly, 
the median household income was positively associated with the number of charter 
schools, as expected.   
The majority of state charter law rankings were independently and significantly 
associated with the number of charter schools, but not all were associated in the expected 
direction.  The higher the state ranked on allowing unlimited charter schools was 
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positively associated with the number of charter schools.  Additionally, allowing a variety 
of applicants, granting legal and operational autonomy, guaranteed full funding and 
exempting charter schools from collective bargaining were all positively associated with 
the number of charter schools.  In contrast, districts in states where laws ranked higher on 
allowing multiple authorizers, not requiring formal evidence of local support, 
automatically waiving charter schools from laws and regulations and guaranteeing fiscal 
autonomy were negatively associated with the number of charter schools.  It should be 
noted here that the fraction of variance attributed to the within district fixed effects was 
83.8%, indicating again that fixed attributes of the district and state not controlled for 
explicitly in the model explain more than four-fifths of the variance in the model.   
This dissertation does not intend to draw any formal conclusions from the results 
of this model, as that would be beyond the scope of the research.  However, the 
significance of most variables in the first stage model implies that this instrumental 
variable model is valid.  In line with Durbin-Wu-Hausman (Davidson and MacKinnon 
1993), I use the estimated residual term from this equation in the second stage regression 
as an instrumental variable.  This residual term is uncorrelated with predetermined levels 
that predict charter school location decisions, and it represents unobserved factors that 
influence those decisions.  Theoretically, if the first stage accurately predicts charter 
location decision, then including the residual in the second stage regression should 
identify and correct for any endogeneity in the model, as endogeneity is the correlation of 
disturbances, estimated as residuals.   
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Second stage empirical model  
Again, the purpose of this dissertation is to model the response of school district 
revenues to the presence of a charter school.  To address the potential endogeneity 
between revenues and charter locations, I include a residual term and predicted state and 
local revenues from the first stage models (predicted terms indicated by italics in 
Equations 8-10 below).  Additionally, each of the variables included in the following 
models is now a yearly change, not a level. By adding the residual term from the 
estimation of charter locations as an instrument, I change Equations 4-6 to the following:   
(8) ∆Local Revenueit =   α1∆Charterit + α2Ait + α3∆Sit + α4∆Yit  + α5∆State Revenueit  
+ α6Li + γt  + εt 
(9) ∆State Revenueit =   α1∆Charterit + α2Ait + α3∆Sit + α4∆Yit  + α5∆Local Revenueit 
+ α6Li + γt  + εt 
(10) ∆Federal Revenueit =   α1∆Charterit + α2Ait + α3∆Sit + α4∆Yit  + α5Li + γt  + εt 
In Equations 8-10, the relationships between changes in the dependent variable 
and changes in explanatory variables should be identical to the relationships between 
levels in the dependent variable and levels in the same explanatory variables, a priori.  
As such, relationships discussed in Chapter Five stand and need not be discussed in this 
chapter.  Few characteristics of schools are fixed, so most explanatory variables remain 
after differencing, unlike the case of individual data. 
However, I also estimated the residuals from the empirical estimation that 
modeled charter school locations and included these residual terms in this model.  Again, 
the residual terms represent the unobserved district characteristics associated with the 
number of charter schools within the district.  Because they are unobserved, the 
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relationship between local, state and federal revenues and this residual term is 
ambiguous, a priori.  I also include predicted values of state and local revenues, which 
control for the simultaneous determination of these two revenue sources.  When states 
increase their funding to local school districts, local revenues may decease if the school 
districts substitute local contributions with state funds; however, local revenues may 
increase if the state requires the local school district to match additional revenues or if the 
local school district chooses to do so.  Likewise, when a local school district increases its 
contribution, the state could decrease its contribution in order to equalize spending across 
districts, but certain state laws require localities to contribute a minimum amount.  
Therefore, an increase in state aid may be associated with an increase in local revenues.   
Results from the second stage empirical model 
Table 6.3 presents the results from the specifications of the models represented by 
Equations 8-10.  As indicated above, the dependent variables are yearly changes in local, 
state and federal revenues.  Coefficients in this model reflect the change in local, state 
and federal revenues with the change in various measures of charter school presence, 
controlling for the non-random charter school locations.47  Because the model is 
estimated as yearly changes, the first year of the sample (school year 1995-1996) was 
dropped, and all year fixed effects should be interpreted as a comparison between year t 
and school year 1996-1997. 
Most importantly, the residual from the charter location estimation was 
statistically significant for local and federal revenues, indicating that the endogeneity of 
charter location was addressed in the model.  This is true even though the residual term 
was not statistically significant in the model for state revenues, as charter operators are 
                                                          
47 This assumes the technical assumptions for the empirical techniques employed have been met. 
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unlikely to consider level of funding from each source separately.  In other words, since 
the residual term, on net, is statistically significant, then all three models are valid, given 
that they control for the residual.   
Interestingly, the residual was negatively associated with decreases in per-pupil 
revenues from local sources, and it was positively associated with increases in per-pupil 
revenues from federal sources.  This would indicate that charter operators were locating 
in districts where per-pupil revenues from local sources were decreasing, and per-pupil 
revenues from federal sources were increasing.  The total change in revenues (local, state 
and federal combined) was negative, indicating that unobserved characteristics of the 
district related to charter location were also negatively related at a magnitude of $2.17.  
In other words, charter operators were locating in districts where per-pupil revenues had 
been falling by over two dollars each year. 
The change in the number of charter schools and the change in the percentage of 
public schools that were charter schools were not significantly related to any of the 
revenue sources.  This result differs from the initial estimations that had not addressed the 
two sources of endogeneity.48  In that estimation, the number of charter schools was 
positively associated with revenues from local and federal sources.  This difference in 
estimations suggests that both charter school location decisions and the relationship 
between local and state sources were important issues to deal with empirically.   
Changes in distance were positively associated with per-pupil revenues from local 
sources and negatively associated with per-pupil revenues from federal sources.  As the 
variable is constructed, this should be interpreted inversely when considering charter 
presence.  Districts with closer charter schools would have smaller distance 
                                                          
48 Results for this estimation are included in Appendix A 
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measurements, so a positive coefficient should be interpreted to mean that revenues 
increased with the decreased presence (or closeness) of a charter school.  In other words, 
as the distance to the nearest charter school increased by one mile, per-pupil revenues 
from local sources increased by $0.26 and per-pupil revenues from federal sources 
decreased by $0.19.  Combined, as the distance to the nearest charter school increased by 
one mile, per-pupil revenues increased by $0.07, which is the opposite effect when 
compared to the first specification.   
Compared to districts in states with charter schools, districts in states where a 
charter law had not been enacted or had a charter law but had not authorized a charter 
school had lower changes in per-pupil revenues from local and state sources and higher 
changes to revenues from federal sources, on average.  Districts in states without a 
charter law or charter schools had yearly changes in per-pupil revenues from local 
sources that were $16.27 lower than those states that had charter schools (note that the 
variable construct denotes those states without charters as a one and those with charter 
schools as a zero).  Likewise, per-pupil revenues from state sources decreased $94.13 for 
states without a charter law or charter schools, and they increased $12.12 from federal 
sources when compared to those states with charter schools.  The net effect for districts 
was $98.28 with the majority of decreased revenue coming from state sources.   
I also controlled for the first year a state had a charter school.  This was necessary 
because distance measurements were changes, not levels.  Therefore, the first year a state 
had charter schools, distance measurements for districts changed from having no 
measurement to the initial distance measurement.  The effect of this change in distance 
may have been biased because of the bigger magnitude or the fact that a state had just 
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authorized its first charter school, so a control dummy variable for the first year a charter 
school was established in the state was necessary.  On average, school districts 
experienced a $175.13 decrease in local revenues during the first year a charter school 
was authorized, compared to all other years.  They also experienced a $90.67 increase in 
state revenues and a $15.17 decrease in federal revenues, compared to all other years.  
Given that most states enacted their state law and authorized a charter school in the 
1990’s, these coefficients reflect a large revenue response from the creation of charter 
schools within a state. 
The majority of significant effects of the density measures were disaffirmed in 
this specification when compared to the estimation with no corrections for endogeneity.  
For local sources, an additional charter school farther than 5 miles but within 7.5 miles 
was associated with $11.63 decrease.  Likewise, an additional charter school 7.5 miles 
but within 10 miles was associated with a $9.74 decrease in per-pupil revenue from local 
sources; a $12.26 decrease from state sources; and a $6.05 increase from federal sources.  
As for state revenues, an additional charter school farther than 15 miles but within 20 
miles was associated with a $5.27 decrease in per-pupil revenue for the district.   
The coefficients for the different authorizers represent the yearly changes in 
revenues for a district with a particular authorizer, compared to having no charter 
schools.  The majority of authorizers were associated with negative revenue changes.  For 
local revenues, the district acting as the authorizer was associated with revenue changes 
that were $45.83 less districts without charter schools.  When a state education agency 
was the authorizer in a district, that district experienced revenue changes that were 
$73.60 less than districts without charter schools, on average—a magnitude of $27.77 
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worse than if the district had authorized.  When a non-educational government entity 
authorized the charter schools, the district had revenues $343.24 less than districts 
without a charter school.  Districts with universities as their authorizer experienced local 
revenues that were $139.90 less than districts without charter schools.   
Non-profits were the only authorizer associated with higher local revenue 
changes.  When a non-profit authorized within a district, the district had yearly revenue 
changes that were $283.60 higher than having no charter schools.  Lastly, when a district 
had multiple authorizers, it experienced yearly local revenue changes that were $89.72 
less than districts without a charter—again, this was $43.89 worse than when the district 
authorized itself.  
Fewer authorizers were significantly related to changes in state revenues.  When a 
university authorized a district’s charter schools, the district had $92.37 higher revenues 
than districts without charter schools.  Districts with a non-profit authorizer experienced 
changes that were $164.76 less than the yearly changes of districts without charter 
schools.  Lastly, when a district had multiple authorizers, it experienced yearly local 
revenue changes that were $87.43 less than districts without a charter. 
Authorizers also mattered for federal revenues.  When a district authorized charter 
schools, it had yearly revenue changes that were $18.56 less than districts without charter 
schools.  Similarly, when a district’s charter schools were authorized by a state education 
agency, it had yearly revenue changes that were $19.89 less than districts without charter 
schools.  When a non-educational government entity authorized the charter schools, the 
district had revenues $80.31 more than districts without a charter school.  Districts with 
universities as their authorizer experienced local revenues that were $18.25 less than 
 
138 
 
districts without charter schools.  Districts with non-profits and multiple authorizers were 
nearly identical, experiencing yearly revenue changes from federal sources that were 
$49.14 and $49.03 less, respectively, than districts without charter schools. 
Again, the majority of district characteristics were statistically significant.  
Changes in total enrollment exhibited a quadratic relationship with per-pupil revenues 
from all three sources.  Increasing the percentage of African-American students was 
associated with an $8.01 increase in per-pupil revenues from state sources.  Changes in 
the percentages of special education students and students eligible for free or reduced 
lunch were positively associated with changes in all revenue sources.  
Positive changes in the student-to-teacher ratio were negatively related to per-
pupil revenues from all sources.  Combined, the effect of increasing the student-to-
teacher ratio by 1 decreased per-pupil revenues by $197.03, indicating that school 
districts capture economies of scale by increasing the number of students a teacher has in 
his or her classroom.  The percentage of individuals within the district that were in 
poverty was positively associated with per-pupil revenues from state sources.  With each 
percentage point increase, per-pupil revenues increased by $3.50 from state sources.  As 
expected, median household income was positively associated with per-pupil revenues 
from all three revenue sources, but the effect was marginal. 
Lastly, instrumented state revenues were positively associated with local revenues 
in the estimation of Equation 7, but instrumented local revenues were not significantly 
related to state revenues.  This result suggests that localities immediately respond to 
change in state sources, but the state may take more than one fiscal year to respond to 
changes in local revenues.  It may also indicate the relative nature of state support in that 
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states change funding when localities change in relative support.  If all districts in a state 
increased their local support, state support should not change because the districts remain 
in the same relative order—poor districts remain poor and rich districts remain rich. 
None of the urban-centric designations were statistically significant; however, the 
district fixed effects may have captured these effects.  While urban-centric designations 
were expected to be related to revenue levels, the same may not be true for changes.  In 
other words, urban and rural districts may not differ much in how revenues change from 
year to year.   
Results from sample restricted by certain states49 
Certain states categorize charter schools as their own district.  In these cases, the 
NCES may collect revenue data on the specific charter school, thereby leaving out the 
revenues of charter schools when calculating traditional public school district revenues.  
Theoretically, the effect of charter existence on per-pupil district revenues should not be 
influenced by the classification of charter schools as districts.  However, because the 
accounting discrepancy exists, I have included an additional estimation of the model 
above. 
Table 6.4 shows the estimations from Equations 7-9, but the sample is restricted 
to states that categorized charter schools as their own districts.  For the explanatory 
variables of interest, a few changes from the full sample estimation should be noted.  
First, changes in charter schools as a percentage of the total schools were associated with 
a $306.96 increase in state funds and not significant for local and state revenue sources.  
                                                          
49 States in this estimation include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin 
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However, the p-value associated with this coefficient was 0.07.  With such a large sample 
of district-years, a p-value of such magnitude may not be compelling enough to reject the 
null hypothesis that the change in percentage of charter schools is not related to revenue 
changes. 
Again, change in the distance to the nearest charter school was significantly 
related to local and federal revenues, but in this estimation, it is also significantly related 
to state revenues.  A one mile increase in distance to the nearest charter school was 
associated with a $0.41 increase in local revenues, a $0.40 increase in state revenues, and 
a $0.15 decrease in federal revenues, suggesting that as charter schools move closer to a 
school district, revenues decreased by $0.66 per-pupil, on average. 
States without a charter school also experienced lower revenues from all sources 
(federal was positive in the full sample).  The magnitude also increased when compared 
to the full sample estimation, as districts in states without charter schools experienced 
yearly changes that were $195.74 lower than states with charter schools.  Again, most of 
this effect came from changes in state revenues.  On average, school districts experienced 
a $202.58 decrease in local revenues during the first year a charter school was authorized, 
compared to all other years.  The effect on state revenues dropped from a $90.67 increase 
to a $22.31 increase and the effect on federal revenues nearly double from a $15.17 
decrease to a $27.12 decrease in federal revenues, compared to all other years.   
Results for the density metrics were similar to the full-sample estimation.  For 
local sources, an additional charter school farther than 5 miles but within 7.5 miles was 
associated with $11.31 decrease ($11.63 in full sample).  Likewise, an additional charter 
school more than 7.5 miles but within 10 miles was associated with a $10.10 decrease in 
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per-pupil revenue from local sources ($9.74 in full sample); a $11.92 decrease from state 
sources ($12.26 in full sample); and a $6.03 increase from federal sources ($6.05 in full 
sample).  As for state revenues, an additional charter school farther than 15 miles but 
within 20 miles was associated with a $4.36 decrease in per-pupil revenue for the district 
($5.27 in full sample). 
The results for authorizers were also consistent with the first estimations.  
Districts that authorized charter schools had yearly revenue changes that were $41.41 less 
than districts without charter schools.  Districts with charter schools authorized by a state 
education agency had yearly revenue changes that were $61.74 less than districts without 
charter schools.  Again, the magnitude for non-educational government entities was the 
largest.  Districts with that authorizer experienced local revenue changes that were 
$317.99 less than districts without a charter.  When a university authorized charter 
schools, the district had yearly revenue changes that were $126.93 less than districts 
without charter schools.  Again, non-profits were the only authorizer associated with 
higher local revenue changes.  When a non-profit authorized within a district, the district 
had yearly revenue changes that were $283.60 higher than having no charter schools.  
Finally, when a district had multiple authorizers, it had yearly revenue changes that were 
$56.56 less than districts without authorizers.   
Only university and non-profit authorizers mattered for revenues from state 
sources.  A district with charter schools authorized by universities had yearly revenue 
changes that were $119.27 more than a district without charter schools, on average.  
Unlike local revenues, state revenues for districts with charter schools authorized by a 
non-profit were $143.69 less than state revenue for districts without charter schools. 
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Again, authorizers also mattered for federal revenues.  When a district authorized 
charter schools, it had yearly revenue changes that were $13.98 less than districts without 
charter schools.  Similarly, when a district’s charter schools were authorized by a state 
education agency, it had yearly revenue changes that were $19.23 less than districts 
without charter schools.  When a non-educational government entity authorized the 
charter schools, the district had revenues $70.68 more than districts without a charter 
school.  Districts with non-profit authorizers experienced yearly revenue changes from 
federal sources that were $52.64 less than districts without charter schools.  Lastly, a 
district with multiple authorizers experienced changes in federal revenues that were 
$42.38 less than a district without charter schools. 
The majority of district characteristics were statistically significant.  Like the full 
sample, changes in total enrollment exhibited a quadratic relationship with per-pupil 
revenues from all three sources.  Increasing the percentage of African-American students 
was associated with a $6.20 increase in per-pupil revenues from state sources, which was 
similar to the full sample results.  Changes in the percentages of special education 
students and students eligible for free or reduced lunch were also positively associated 
with changes in all revenue sources in this restricted sample as well.  
Positive changes in the student-to-teacher ratio were negatively related to per-
pupil revenues from all sources.  The percentage of individuals within the district that 
were in poverty was positively associated with per-pupil revenues from local sources (in 
the full sample, it was positively associated with revenues from state sources).  Again, 
median household income was positively associated with per-pupil revenues from all 
three revenue sources, but the effect was marginal. 
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Lastly, instrumented state revenues were again positively associated with local 
revenues in the estimation of Equation 7, and in the restricted sample, instrumented local 
revenues were significantly related to state revenues in the estimation of Equation 8.  As 
expected, state revenues decreased when local revenues increased.  Again, none of the 
urban-centric designations were statistically significant.   
While this restricted sample estimation suggests a difference in states that count 
charter as districts, it may reflect another relationship.  The states included in this 
estimation were also the states that authorized significantly more charter schools than the 
states that were not included in the sample.  Therefore, it may not be the case that 
differences in the results from each estimation were caused by the fact that states counted 
charter schools as their own district; instead, it may be that the effect of charter schools 
was different for states that were more active in charter authorizing.  Whatever the 
reason, differences in the full and restricted samples reinforce the fact that charter policy 
environments differ across states.   
Results from sample restricted to school year 2000-2001 to school year 2010-2011 
While charter schools were first established in the early 1990’s, they did not 
increase in significance until a decade later after the majority of the states had enacted a 
charter law.  Therefore, I also estimate Equations 7-9 with a sample restricted to school 
year 2000-2001 through school year 2010-2011.  Estimated coefficients are shown in 
Table 6.5. 
Like the full sample, changes in the number of charter schools and the percentage 
of public schools that were charter were not significantly related to any of the revenue 
sources.  Additionally, changes in distance were positively associated with per-pupil 
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revenues from local sources and negatively associated with per-pupil revenues from 
federal sources, but in this restricted sample, changes in distance to the nearest charter 
school were also negatively associated with state revenues.  Magnitudes for the 
coefficients on local and federal sources remained similar.  As the distance to the nearest 
charter school increased by one mile, per-pupil revenues from local sources increased by 
$0.37 and per-pupil revenues from federal sources decreased by $0.16.  However, now a 
one mile increase in distance was associated with a $1.05 decrease in revenues from the 
state, suggesting that states began to decrease their funding to districts as charter schools 
were farther away.  Combined, as the distance to the nearest charter school increased by 
one mile, per-pupil revenues now decreased by $0.52, which was the opposite effect 
when compared to the full sample estimation. 
In this restricted sample, districts in states where a charter law had not been 
enacted or had a charter law but had not authorized a charter school had higher per-pupil 
revenue changes from local and federal sources and lower per-pupil revenue changes 
from state sources, when compared to districts in charter states.  This differed from the 
full sample, as states without a charter school had lower per-pupil revenue changes from 
local and state sources and higher per-pupil revenue changes from state sources, when 
compared to districts in charter states. 
On average, districts in states without a charter law or charter schools had yearly 
changes in per-pupil revenues from local sources that were $23.85 higher than those 
states that had charter schools (again, note that the variable construct denotes those states 
without charter schools as a one and those with charter schools as a zero).  Likewise, per-
pupil revenues from state sources were $206.81 less for states without a charter law or 
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charter schools, and they were $50.56 higher from federal sources when compared to 
those states with charter schools.  In summary, districts in states without charter schools 
had yearly revenue changes that were $132.40 less than states with charter schools, with 
the majority of the effect coming from state sources.  This was similar to the full sample 
estimation, but the magnitude increased by over $30 when only these school years were 
considered. 
Again, I also controlled for the first year a state had a charter school.  On average, 
school districts experienced a $350.94 decrease in local revenues during the first year a 
charter school was enacted in the state, compared to all other years.  They also 
experienced a $15.71 decrease in federal revenues, compared to all other years.  On net, 
in the first year a state had a charter law, districts experienced a $366.65 decrease in 
revenue, when compared to all other years.   
Results for the density metrics were similar to the full-sample estimation.  For 
local sources, an additional charter school farther than 5 miles but within 7.5 miles was 
associated with $13.05 decrease ($11.63 in full sample).  Likewise, an additional charter 
school farther than 7.5 miles but within 10 miles was associated with a $11.13 decrease 
in per-pupil revenue from local sources ($9.74 in full sample); a $15.45 decrease from 
state sources ($12.26 in full sample); and a $6.25 increase from federal sources ($6.05 in 
full sample).  Unlike the full sample, an additional charter school farther than 15 miles 
but within 20 miles was associated with a $7.24 decrease in local revenues, on average.  
As for state revenues, an additional charter school farther than 15 miles but within 20 
miles was associated with a $6.67 decrease in per-pupil revenue for the district ($5.27 in 
full sample). 
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The results for authorizers were also fairly consistent with the first estimations.  
For local revenues, districts with state education agencies and non-education government 
entities were no longer statistically significant.  Districts that authorized charter schools 
had yearly revenue changes that were $58.29 less than districts without charter schools.  
When a university authorized charter schools, the district had yearly revenue changes that 
were $159.69 less than districts without charter schools.  Again, non-profits were the only 
authorizer associated with higher local revenue changes.  When a non-profit authorized 
within a district, the district had yearly revenue changes that were $370.93 higher than 
having no charter schools.  Finally, when a district had multiple authorizers, it had yearly 
revenue changes that were $67.80 less than districts without authorizers.   
Only non-profit and multiple authorizers mattered for revenues from state 
sources.  A district with charter schools authorized by a non-profit had yearly revenue 
changes that were $223.34 less than a district without charter schools, on average.  State 
revenues for districts with multiple authorizers were $106.02 less than state revenue for 
districts without charter schools. 
All of the authorizers, except independent charter boards and universities, 
mattered for federal revenues.  When a district authorized charter schools, it had yearly 
revenue changes that were $18.13 less than districts without charter schools.  Similarly, 
when a district’s charter schools were authorized by a state education agency, it had 
yearly revenue changes that were $26.01 less than districts without charter schools.  
When a non-educational government entity authorized the charter schools, the district had 
revenues $112.42 more than districts without a charter school.  Districts with non-profit 
authorizers experienced yearly revenue changes from federal sources that were $71.56 
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less than districts without charter schools.  Lastly, a district with multiple authorizers 
experienced changes in federal revenues that were $73.13 less than a district without 
charter schools. 
The majority of district characteristics were statistically significant.  Like the full 
sample, changes in total enrollment exhibited a quadratic relationship with per-pupil 
revenues from all three sources.  Increasing the percentage of African-American students 
was associated with an $8.73 increase in per-pupil revenues from state sources, which 
was similar to the full sample results.  Changes in the percentages of special education 
students and students eligible for free or reduced lunch were also positively associated 
with changes in all revenue sources in this restricted sample as well.  
Positive changes in the student-to-teacher ratio were negatively related to per-
pupil revenues from all sources.  The percentage of individuals within the district that 
were in poverty was positively associated with per-pupil revenues from local sources (in 
the full sample, it was positively associated with revenues from state sources).  Again, 
median household income was positively associated with per-pupil revenues from all 
three revenue sources, but the effect was marginal. 
Lastly, instrumented state revenues were again positively associated with local 
revenues in the estimation of Equation 7, and in this restricted sample, the instrumented 
local revenues were not significantly related to state revenues in the estimation of 
Equation 8.  Again, none of the urban-centric designations were statistically significant.  
Results from estimation with interaction term 
As discussed previously, one of the unique characteristics of charter schools is 
that they do not adhere to district boundaries like traditional public schools.  Given this, a 
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charter school should influence a district in which the students of that district could 
reasonably travel to the charter school, regardless of geographic district boundaries.  
Therefore, a district that does not have a charter school but is located close to a charter 
school should still respond to the presence of a charter school.   
Even more importantly, districts without charter schools that lose students to 
charter schools in other districts also lose money.  This is a subtle difference from 
districts with charter schools.  In districts with charter schools, the students who switch to 
charter schools are still considered part of the public school system, and the district still 
receives public funds.  Districts without charter schools within their geographic 
boundaries lose the revenues; similar to if that student had left the public school to attend 
a private school.   
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the relationship between school district 
revenues and the presence of charter schools in districts with and without charter schools.  
In the following section, I discuss results from an estimation in which I interact the 
distance measurement with a dummy variable that represents the existence of a charter 
school.  In doing so, I am measuring the effect of distance on districts with and without 
charter schools.   
Table 6.6 presents the results from the empirical specifications of Equations 7-9 
with the interaction terms.  Interestingly, the magnitude and direction on the effect of 
distance to the nearest charter school remains the same, but the results are only 
significant for districts without charter schools.  With every additional mile a charter 
school located away from a district without charter schools, that district had local 
revenues increase by $0.26 and federal revenues decrease by $0.20.  Otherwise stated, the 
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district without charter schools loses $0.06 in revenue as a charter school moves closer to 
that district.  Because the rest of the model remains unchanged, I will not discuss those 
results.   
Table 6.7 presents the results from the empirical specifications of Equations 7-9, 
but in these results, the sample was restricted to states that consider charter schools their 
own districts.  Again, the magnitude and direction of the distance coefficients for districts 
without charter schools were nearly identical to the estimation without interactions.  
When a charter school located an additional mile away from the district, local revenues 
increased by $0.41; state revenues increased by $0.37; and federal revenues decreased by 
$0.16.   
Interestingly, distance was associated with charter revenues for districts with 
charter schools as well.  When a charter school located an additional mile away from the 
district, local revenues increased by $0.39 and state revenues increased by $0.79.  
Distance was not significantly related to federal revenues in this estimation.   
Lastly, Table 6.8 presents the results from the estimation of the same model with 
the sample restricted to school year 2000-2001 through school year 2010-2011.  Like the 
previous estimations, the magnitude and direction of the distance variable coefficients for 
districts without charter schools were identical to the  restricted year sample without 
interactions.  For districts without charter schools, an additional mile that a charter 
located away from the district was associated with a $0.35 increase in local revenues, a 
$1.09 decrease in state revenues and a $0.15 decrease in federal revenues.  Conversely, 
for districts with a charter school, distance was significantly related to federal revenues 
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only.  When a charter school was located an additional mile away from district with 
charter schools, that district’s federal revenues decreased by $0.52, on average. 
Discussion 
In the full sample, district revenues from local sources were decreasing as charter 
schools moved closer to the district, on average.  If the public did not fully understand the 
funding mechanisms of charter schools, they may have withdrawn support for traditional 
public school funding as more of the school-aged population chose charter schools.  They 
may have done this thinking that their withdrawn support would hurt traditional public 
schools and not charter schools.  It may also be the case that charter schools increased 
economies of scale for the district, causing local funding sources to drop.  In other words, 
a charter school may have allowed the district to more accurately allocate education 
services across students.  This would be consistent with the literature examining charter 
school competition (Welsch 2011, Cordes 2014).   
Conversely, district revenues from federal sources increased as charter schools 
moved closer.  This may reflect the additional federal funds for charter schools, or it may 
reflect a change in the student demographics.  As discussed in Chapter Four, if a student 
who had previously received a voucher to attend a private school switched to charter 
schools, the average student attending public schools may have been poorer post-
authorization of the charter school.  In this sense, the district would have received more 
federal funds.  
When the sample was restricted to states that considered charter schools their own 
districts (coincidentally, these were also the states with higher proportions of charter 
schools), the same relationship emerged between local and federal revenues and the 
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distance to the nearest charter school.  However, in the estimation that considered only 
certain states, revenues from state sources were also positively associated with distance.   
As a charter school was closer to a district, state revenues were decreasing.  The same 
explanation may apply to the results for state funding.  When charter schools were closer, 
the districts may have responded by increasing efficiency, thereby decreasing revenues.   
Interestingly, when the sample was restricted to school year 2000-2001 through 
school year 2010-2011, the sign on the coefficient for distance flipped for state revenues, 
and the magnitude more than doubled.  On net, as charter schools moved closer to the 
school district, revenues increased, on average.  In this decade of the sample, charter 
schools increased in number and relevancy, as most of the states had enacted charter 
legislation by school year 2000-2001.  Given the low numbers of charter schools prior to 
school year 2000-2001, states may have increased funding for charter schools to 
incentivize charter creation.     
Lastly, I interacted the distance variable with a dummy variable for whether the 
district had at least one charter school or not.  Results indicated that the distance to the 
nearest charter significantly predicted revenue changes for districts without charter 
schools and not for districts with charter schools.  Revenues, on net, decreased for 
districts without charter schools as charter schools moved closer in proximity.  This may 
reflect the loss or demographic change in enrollment for the district that had yet to have a 
charter school open within its boundaries.   
It may also be indicative of charter school competition.  Consider a district with 
no charter schools where a neighboring district just authorized a charter school.  This 
may send a signal that charter schools have become more of a possibility.  In response to 
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the increased likelihood, the district increases efficiency in an effort to resist charter 
authorization.   
Summary 
In this chapter, I addressed the empirical issues that resulted from modeling the 
relationship between charter locations and public school district revenues.  First, I 
employed an instrumental variables technique to confront the joint determination of local 
and state revenues.  Second, I exploited the disconnection between levels and changes to 
deal with the non-randomness of charter location decisions.  This technique is consistent 
with Arellano and Bond (1991) and was necessary because variables that were associated 
with revenues were likely to affect the decision of charter operators to locate within 
particular districts.  These two empirical techniques yielded the specification discussed 
earlier in the chapter.    
Results from the estimation Chapter Six confirm the endogeneity issues 
discussed, a priori.  Given the estimation without corrections for endogeneity, the 
number of charter schools was positively associated with local and federal revenues.  On 
net, one additional charter school increased total revenues by nearly $28.  When charter 
locations and the co-dependence of local and state revenues were addressed, the 
relationship between the number of charter schools and revenues was not statistically 
significant.   
Additionally, the distance variable changed once the endogeneity issues were 
addressed.  A negative sign on the distance to the nearest charter school would suggest 
that revenues increase as charter school move closer (since distance decreases as they 
moved closer).  In the estimations with correction for endogeneity, local revenues 
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increased and state revenues decreased as charter schools moved closer to the district.  
On net, charter schools seemed to have a positive influence on public school revenues.  
However, results from the estimations in Chapter Six revealed an opposite relationship.  
Local revenues decreased as charter schools moved closer, and federal revenues 
increased.  On net, however, charter schools seemed to negatively influence revenues.  
The difference in results makes sense in that charter school operators were likely to select 
higher-revenue districts.  Without controlling for charter locations, an additional charter 
school seemed to raise revenues, but this direction of causality was false.   
Broadly, Chapter Six has reaffirmed the need to control for charter locations 
before estimating the effect of charter schools on any output.  Results from the chapter 
showed a consistent negative relationship between how close a charter school was to the 
district and revenues from local sources.  Likewise, federal sources consistently increased 
as charter schools moved closer to the district.  The relationship between revenues from 
state sources and the distance to the nearest charter school changed with different 
specifications, but it appears funding depended both on time and the states included in the 
estimation.      
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Table 6.1 Relationship between state and local revenue 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
   
State law change 1.141 8.348*** 
 (1.124) (1.316) 
 % Pop Children -6.230*** 0.550 
 (0.493) (0.484) 
School year   
1996-1997 81.330*** 49.764*** 
 (8.901) (7.781) 
1997-1998 141.507*** 56.930*** 
 (8.520) (7.608) 
1998-1999 165.476*** 158.839*** 
 (8.582) (7.985) 
1999-2000 119.967*** 119.200*** 
 (8.822) (8.132) 
2000-2001 192.924*** 136.662*** 
 (8.718) (8.294) 
2001-2002 82.833*** -91.885*** 
 (9.009) (8.629) 
2002-2003 154.390*** -28.463*** 
 (9.444) (8.960) 
2003-2004 262.406*** -156.360*** 
 (9.298) (8.743) 
2004-2005 211.481*** 0.628 
 (9.493) (8.785) 
2005-2006 223.578*** -45.716*** 
 (9.342) (8.493) 
2006-2007 174.507*** 163.622*** 
 (9.234) (8.759) 
2007-2008 116.272*** 160.019*** 
 (9.372) (8.970) 
2008-2009 6.067 -302.647*** 
 (9.145) (9.153) 
2009-2010 79.400*** -389.234*** 
 (9.540) (10.174) 
2010-2011 94.636*** -51.286*** 
 (9.576) (9.086) 
Constant 74.897*** 78.439*** 
 (11.444) (10.631) 
Observations 212,970 213,035 
R-squared 0.010 0.039 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
school years compared to base school year 1995-1996 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.2 Charter location determinants 
 Number of charter schools 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) 
  
District characteristics  
Local Revenue <0.001 
 (<0.001) 
State Revenue <-0.001 
 (<0.001) 
Fed Revenue <0.001*** 
 (<0.001) 
Total enrollment <-0.001 
 (<0.001) 
Total enrollment (sq.) <0.001** 
 (<0.001) 
Black (%) -0.010 
 (0.006) 
Hispanic (%) 0.028*** 
 (0.004) 
Asian (%) 0.005 
 (0.012) 
IEP (%) 0.001 
 (0.001) 
FRL (%) -0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
% Pop in poverty 0.007 
 (0.007) 
Median HH Income <0.001** 
 (<0.001) 
Charter law characteristics  
Caps on charter schools (CS) 0.029** 
 (0.012) 
Multiple Authorizers -0.051*** 
 (0.018) 
Variety of Applicants 0.031*** 
 (0.008) 
Allows startups 0.015 
 (0.011) 
No evidence of local support -0.065*** 
 (0.017) 
Waiver from regulations -0.044*** 
 (0.013) 
Legal/Oper. Autonomy 0.057*** 
 (0.015) 
Full funding 0.108*** 
 (0.023) 
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Table 6.2, continued.  
 Number of charter schools 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) 
Fiscal autonomy -0.058*** 
 (0.015) 
Exempt from coll. bargain 0.049*** 
 (0.016) 
Charter law not evaluated 0.115 
 (0.071) 
Urban-centric designation  
Midsize city 0.710 
 (0.453) 
Urban fringe of large city 0.866* 
 (0.458) 
Urban fringe of midsize city 0.869* 
 (0.455) 
Large town 0.872* 
 (0.454) 
Small town 0.903** 
 (0.455) 
Rural (outside CBSA) 0.884* 
 (0.453) 
Rural (inside CBSA) 0.770* 
 (0.449) 
School year  
1996-1997 0.002 
 (0.004) 
1997-1998 0.011 
 (0.008) 
1998-1999 0.025** 
 (0.011) 
1999-2000 -0.039** 
 (0.016) 
2000-2001 -0.022 
 (0.022) 
2001-2002 -0.015 
 (0.029) 
2002-2003 0.017 
 (0.025) 
2003-2004 0.028 
 (0.025) 
2004-2005 0.031 
 (0.028) 
2005-2006 0.063** 
 (0.030) 
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Table 6.2, continued.  
 Number of charter schools 
VARIABLES   (Std. Error) 
2006-2007 0.052 
 (0.032) 
2007-2008 0.069* 
 (0.036) 
2008-2009 0.078* 
 (0.042) 
2009-2010 0.069 
 (0.048) 
2010-2011 0.070 
 (0.046) 
Constant -0.991** 
 (0.403) 
  
Observations 185,642 
Number of schools districts 14,499 
R-squared 0.034 
  
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; urban-centric designations compared to “Large 
metropolitan area”; school years compared to base year school year 1995-1996 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.3 Revenue response to charter presence, full sample 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter Presence    
∆ Number of CS 7.847 7.561 -5.827 
 (7.577) (9.096) (4.196) 
∆ % CS 87.582 249.514 105.580 
 (162.655) (176.441) (82.093) 
∆ Distance to nearest CS 0.258*** -0.020 -0.186*** 
 (0.082) (0.110) (0.044) 
No CS in state -16.274** -94.130*** 12.120*** 
 (7.667) (6.979) (3.385) 
First year state had CS -175.127*** 90.669*** -15.165*** 
 (11.426) (9.066) (4.011) 
∆ Number CS within    
1 mile 8.997 -19.640 6.919 
 (14.281) (16.546) (8.150) 
1 to 2.5 miles 5.933 6.544 -3.337 
 (11.893) (13.418) (6.143) 
2.5 to 5 miles -7.146 0.430 -5.614 
 (6.229) (7.407) (3.572) 
5 to 7.5 miles -11.627** 4.504 0.196 
 (4.690) (5.752) (2.549) 
7.5 to 10 miles -9.741** -12.262** 6.052** 
 (4.383) (4.965) (2.686) 
10 to 15 miles 0.533 -2.331 1.055 
 (2.637) (2.724) (1.171) 
15 to 20 miles -3.700 -5.273** -1.206 
 (2.461) (2.523) (1.168) 
Authorizer type    
Local Education Agency -45.827*** -21.183 -18.562** 
 (15.383) (18.414) (7.606) 
State Education Agency -73.595*** 15.574 -19.887** 
 (22.232) (21.805) (7.736) 
Independent Charter Boards 26.950 -60.584 -41.454 
 (48.793) (67.302) (27.721) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity -343.243*** -235.962 80.309** 
 (130.372) (215.835) (33.707) 
University -139.895*** 92.370*** -18.251* 
 (38.399) (29.750) (10.525) 
Non-profit 283.601*** -164.760** -49.139** 
 (66.059) (75.131) (22.192) 
Multiple authorizers -89.718*** -87.428*** -49.029** 
 (32.441) (31.323) (21.243) 
Unknown authorizer 27.219 -47.215 -12.968 
 (34.057) (32.685) (15.723) 
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Table 6.3, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
District characteristics    
∆ Total enrollment -0.155*** -0.115*** -0.029*** 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.010) 
∆ Total enrollment (sq.) <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
∆ African-American (%) -0.342 8.011*** 2.855 
 (2.325) (2.780) (1.747) 
∆ Hispanic (%) -1.284 -3.236 0.930 
 (1.897) (2.003) (1.193) 
∆ Asian (%) -4.329 2.314 -2.384 
 (4.028) (4.498) (2.164) 
∆ IEP (%) 9.812*** 5.225*** 4.166*** 
 (1.272) (1.085) (0.659) 
∆ FRL (%) 0.872** 1.114*** 1.854*** 
 (0.422) (0.425) (0.262) 
∆ ST Ratio -74.077*** -96.462*** -26.492*** 
 (2.860) (3.057) (1.334) 
∆ % Pop in poverty 0.713 3.498* 1.208 
 (1.662) (1.846) (1.121) 
∆ Med HH Income 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Predicted state revenue 0.430***   
 (0.164)   
∆ Predicted local revenue  -0.024  
  (0.323)  
Residual from location est. -7.769** -0.409 5.604*** 
 (3.238) (1.924) (1.352) 
Urban-centric locale    
Mid-sized city -29.321 39.285 18.615 
 (49.927) (45.015) (23.791) 
Urban fringe (large city) 13.814 18.740 25.163 
 (48.192) (40.255) (23.099) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) 14.816 30.862 25.025 
 (49.458) (43.000) (23.667) 
Large town 5.472 67.178 -7.368 
 (57.813) (52.132) (28.258) 
Small town 7.074 17.197 26.338 
 (49.710) (43.371) (24.197) 
Rural, inside MSA -5.930 15.352 35.988 
 (48.896) (43.035) (23.870) 
Rural, outside MSA -10.535 27.173 29.431 
 (48.607) (42.767) (23.726) 
    
 
160 
 
Table 6.3, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
School year    
1997-1998 48.143*** 10.420 35.586*** 
 (11.376) (21.901) (3.990) 
1998-1999 66.262*** 23.743 32.177*** 
 (20.826) (29.732) (3.903) 
1999-2000 39.775** -21.017 44.759*** 
 (16.116) (17.015) (4.292) 
2000-2001 74.762*** 57.780 38.936*** 
 (18.301) (39.352) (4.463) 
2001-2002 102.426*** -192.134*** 108.111*** 
 (25.383) (11.751) (4.861) 
2002-2003 147.157*** -106.540*** 139.756*** 
 (17.285) (28.770) (5.098) 
2003-2004 312.135*** -227.664*** 84.738*** 
 (35.164) (63.609) (5.381) 
2004-2005 172.110*** -120.375** 49.577*** 
 (14.449) (47.934) (5.531) 
2005-2006 207.891*** -159.884*** 7.959 
 (17.767) (51.483) (5.502) 
2006-2007 57.688** 47.036 -31.183*** 
 (23.437) (36.768) (4.830) 
2007-2008 14.724 56.370*** 1.218 
 (21.969) (20.428) (4.858) 
2008-2009 138.598** -477.391*** 222.630*** 
 (58.532) (22.463) (6.086) 
2009-2010 245.874*** -448.979*** 463.970*** 
 (70.624) (14.272) (6.916) 
2010-2011 150.870*** -79.576*** -88.679*** 
 (19.224) (14.884) (6.503) 
Constant -51.661 173.644*** -46.743** 
 (53.030) (43.834) (23.572) 
    
Observations 155,383 155,240 158,416 
R-squared 0.033 0.080 0.117 
Number of school districts 13,537 13,541 13,787 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; urban-centric designations compared to “Large 
metropolitan area”; school years compared to base year school year 1996-1997 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.4 Revenue response, sample restricted to states with charter districts 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter Presence    
∆ Number of CS 3.033 -0.229 -7.228 
 (8.361) (9.085) (4.638) 
∆ % CS 91.652 306.964* 118.720 
 (172.681) (178.800) (78.837) 
∆ Distance to nearest CS 0.407*** 0.398*** -0.148*** 
 (0.091) (0.117) (0.049) 
No CS in state -17.947** -160.754*** -17.034*** 
 (8.725) (8.520) (3.285) 
First year state had CS -202.578*** 22.312** -27.117*** 
 (13.161) (10.308) (4.181) 
∆ Number CS within    
1 mile 8.160 -19.620 6.810 
 (14.672) (16.871) (8.204) 
1 to 2.5 miles 6.383 3.731 -1.603 
 (12.142) (13.612) (6.366) 
2.5 to 5 miles -9.023 2.634 -5.342 
 (6.297) (7.488) (3.622) 
5 to 7.5 miles -11.306** 5.063 0.058 
 (4.732) (5.785) (2.566) 
7.5 to 10 miles -10.098** -11.920** 6.037** 
 (4.383) (4.961) (2.701) 
10 to 15 miles 0.202 -1.805 1.098 
 (2.651) (2.730) (1.176) 
15 to 20 miles -3.760 -4.359* -1.222 
 (2.473) (2.531) (1.170) 
Authorizer type    
Local Education Agency -41.409** 5.672 -13.976* 
 (16.860) (20.552) (7.887) 
State Education Agency -61.744*** 36.309 -19.234** 
 (22.381) (22.175) (7.695) 
Independent Charter Boards 41.297 -48.043 -42.442 
 (48.863) (67.618) (28.498) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity -317.991*** -225.396 70.682** 
 (123.038) (210.399) (31.572) 
University -126.934*** 119.272*** -16.774 
 (38.454) (29.091) (10.380) 
Non-profit 300.534*** -143.690* -52.644** 
 (66.366) (73.351) (22.296) 
Multiple authorizers -56.575* -45.969 -42.378* 
 (32.436) (32.041) (21.977) 
Unknown authorizer 16.946 -43.033 -10.917 
 (34.649) (33.892) (17.486) 
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Table 6.4, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
District characteristics    
∆ Total enrollment -0.166*** -0.117*** -0.031** 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.012) 
∆ Total enrollment (sq.) <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
∆ African-American (%) 0.359 6.195** 5.486*** 
 (2.294) (2.891) (1.855) 
∆ Hispanic (%) 0.073 1.636 0.735 
 (2.083) (2.370) (1.335) 
∆ Asian (%) 1.070 3.076 -3.019 
 (4.645) (4.363) (2.644) 
∆ IEP (%) 8.146*** -0.106 1.957*** 
 (1.376) (1.232) (0.678) 
∆ FRL (%) 1.756*** 1.554*** 1.765*** 
 (0.467) (0.499) (0.275) 
∆ ST Ratio -58.824*** -79.712*** -24.184*** 
 (2.789) (3.093) (1.400) 
∆ % Pop in poverty 4.740** 1.004 0.489 
 (1.941) (2.201) (1.226) 
∆ Med HH Income 0.008*** 0.004** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Predicted state revenue 0.650***   
 (0.174)   
∆ Predicted local revenue  -1.430***  
  (0.374)  
Residual from location est. -7.309** -0.656 4.899*** 
 (3.517) (2.147) (1.394) 
Urban-centric locale    
Mid-sized city -23.318 39.200 25.346 
 (52.078) (47.741) (25.086) 
Urban fringe (large city) 28.833 9.821 26.747 
 (50.248) (42.631) (24.556) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) 30.296 33.967 31.650 
 (51.580) (45.599) (25.097) 
Large town 2.118 78.560 16.882 
 (59.062) (60.529) (28.011) 
Small town 12.327 31.830 31.141 
 (51.823) (46.127) (25.841) 
Rural, inside MSA 19.331 0.293 30.414 
 (50.973) (45.725) (25.319) 
Rural, outside MSA 5.422 22.497 29.558 
 (50.547) (45.313) (25.157) 
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Table 6.4, continued    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
School year    
1997-1998 41.947*** 69.008*** 36.598*** 
 (12.578) (25.112) (4.556) 
1998-1999 84.143*** 72.025** 26.182*** 
 (22.013) (34.418) (4.236) 
1999-2000 53.339*** -5.778 31.972*** 
 (17.117) (19.878) (4.711) 
2000-2001 68.095*** 204.271*** 29.011*** 
 (19.288) (45.269) (4.819) 
2001-2002 132.309*** -283.843*** 97.962*** 
 (26.969) (14.121) (5.424) 
2002-2003 120.308*** -89.986*** 109.971*** 
 (19.115) (33.143) (5.278) 
2003-2004 339.751*** -43.046 67.448*** 
 (37.710) (73.372) (5.673) 
2004-2005 190.269*** -17.878 28.915*** 
 (15.779) (54.878) (5.551) 
2005-2006 204.627*** -56.946 -11.279** 
 (19.181) (59.295) (5.513) 
2006-2007 4.414 100.676** -44.641*** 
 (25.122) (42.423) (5.121) 
2007-2008 -3.176 -5.496 -10.311* 
 (23.399) (23.580) (5.320) 
2008-2009 185.480*** -683.459*** 250.797*** 
 (62.433) (26.419) (6.670) 
2009-2010 320.739*** -523.563*** 433.553*** 
 (74.636) (16.151) (7.684) 
2010-2011 141.972*** -109.787*** -106.398*** 
 (20.977) (17.414) (7.124) 
Constant -99.265* 302.172*** -29.622 
 (55.173) (46.399) (24.876) 
    
Observations 117,138 116,642 119,026 
R-squared 0.029 0.077 0.133 
Number of school districts 10,119 10,122 10,310 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; school years compared to base year school year 
1995-1996 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.5 Revenue response, sample restricted to SY 2000-2001 to SY 2010-2011 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter Presence    
∆ Number of CS 8.220 12.601 -4.509 
 (8.657) (9.607) (4.872) 
∆ % CS 41.972 177.694 120.772 
 (183.807) (199.821) (95.238) 
∆ Distance to nearest CS 0.365*** -1.047*** -0.160*** 
 (0.119) (0.154) (0.058) 
No CS in state 23.853* -206.814*** 50.559*** 
 (13.952) (10.936) (6.812) 
First year state had CS -350.941*** 4.689 -15.707* 
 (27.218) (17.036) (8.715) 
∆ Number CS within    
Within 1 mile 18.993 -28.541* 4.111 
 (15.130) (17.168) (8.891) 
1 to 2.5 miles 3.946 3.739 -9.899 
 (12.809) (14.801) (6.979) 
2.5 to 5 miles -8.114 -5.432 -7.801* 
 (6.806) (8.137) (4.108) 
5 to 7.5 miles -13.045*** -0.054 -0.287 
 (4.884) (6.477) (2.980) 
7.5 to 10 miles -11.129** -15.451*** 6.245** 
 (4.879) (5.520) (2.847) 
10 to 15 miles -2.134 -2.770 1.542 
 (2.967) (3.134) (1.352) 
15 to 20 miles -7.242*** -6.673** -1.364 
 (2.809) (3.029) (1.392) 
Authorizer type    
Local Education Agency -58.285*** 14.242 -18.127* 
 (20.767) (24.538) (10.642) 
State Education Agency -51.613 -16.712 -26.014* 
 (34.076) (32.480) (13.454) 
Independent Charter Boards 24.213 -98.930 -43.683 
 (63.536) (94.395) (37.426) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity -169.614 -313.962 112.418** 
 (222.155) (240.402) (44.907) 
University -159.694** 40.487 31.951 
 (72.680) (59.547) (19.686) 
Non-profit 370.934*** -223.335** -71.559** 
 (67.785) (88.108) (28.208) 
Multiple authorizers -67.795* -106.022*** -73.125** 
 (38.744) (39.695) (28.819) 
Unknown authorizer 0.942 -19.223 -12.679 
 (40.429) (40.289) (20.736) 
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Table 6.5, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
District characteristics    
∆ Total enrollment -0.161*** -0.131*** -0.036*** 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.013) 
∆ Total enrollment (sq.) >0.001*** >0.001*** >0.001*** 
 (>0.001) (>0.001) (>0.001) 
∆ African-American (%) 2.224 8.726** 3.855 
 (2.726) (3.483) (2.372) 
∆ Hispanic (%) -1.328 -3.325 1.545 
 (2.146) (2.193) (1.422) 
∆ Asian (%) -3.733 3.165 -3.756 
 (4.715) (5.121) (2.737) 
∆ IEP (%) 12.194*** 3.991*** 5.649*** 
 (1.487) (1.325) (0.871) 
∆ FRL (%) 0.841* 1.819*** 2.250*** 
 (0.488) (0.534) (0.358) 
∆ ST Ratio -68.820*** -94.209*** -29.665*** 
 (3.194) (3.505) (1.688) 
∆ % Pop in poverty 6.352*** -0.261 0.214 
 (1.775) (2.020) (1.345) 
∆ Med HH Income 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Predicted state revenue 0.468***   
 (0.165)   
∆ Predicted local revenue  0.352  
  (0.571)  
Residual from location est. -4.826 2.791 7.681*** 
 (3.471) (2.383) (2.160) 
Urban-centric locale    
Mid-sized city 14.731 8.104 -11.487 
 (107.334) (115.824) (44.183) 
Urban fringe (large city) 62.105 -57.191 -9.226 
 (108.218) (112.688) (44.864) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) 59.061 -15.947 -2.159 
 (107.585) (114.802) (43.821) 
Large town 43.899 22.600 -57.707 
 (113.766) (121.269) (49.963) 
Small town 47.516 -14.207 -5.624 
 (107.520) (114.958) (44.066) 
Rural, inside MSA 57.129 -26.002 1.700 
 (107.307) (115.173) (43.845) 
Rural, outside MSA 19.835 -21.168 -6.341 
 (106.515) (115.006) (43.155) 
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Table 6.5, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
School year    
2001-2002 34.962 -205.574*** 72.323*** 
 (38.711) (63.072) (5.151) 
2002-2003 74.050*** -148.451*** 107.464*** 
 (28.728) (22.704) (4.948) 
2003-2004 244.061*** -316.198*** 51.553*** 
 (48.792) (44.817) (5.485) 
2004-2005 111.835*** -190.989*** 15.755*** 
 (24.714) (18.323) (5.350) 
2005-2006 144.728*** -235.684*** -22.896*** 
 (29.251) (24.301) (5.324) 
2006-2007 -18.948* -4.367 -62.233*** 
 (11.494) (11.922) (4.562) 
2007-2008 -53.857*** 21.013 -27.633*** 
 (11.472) (40.345) (4.923) 
2008-2009 84.770 -469.773*** 194.145*** 
 (72.724) (100.783) (5.986) 
2009-2010 178.198** -465.482*** 437.483*** 
 (84.951) (59.884) (7.233) 
2010-2011 77.133** -101.789** -115.967*** 
 (30.886) (51.196) (6.494) 
Constant -41.599 240.667* 8.865 
 (111.819) (142.700) (43.060) 
    
Observations 115,649 115,291 117,653 
R-squared 0.034 0.080 0.132 
Number of school districts 13,400 13,416 13,511 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; urban-centric designations compared to “Large 
metropolitan area”; school years compared to base year school year 2000-2001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.6 Revenue response with the interaction effects of districts with and without 
charter schools, full sample 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter School Presence    
∆ Number of CS 7.863 7.999 -5.660 
 (7.581) (9.127) (4.201) 
∆ % CS 88.595 280.605 116.833 
 (163.787) (177.443) (83.095) 
No CS in district X Distance 0.257*** -0.055 -0.199*** 
 (0.087) (0.115) (0.047) 
CS in district X Distance 0.272 0.409 -0.026 
 (0.177) (0.262) (0.080) 
No CS in state -16.259** -93.697*** 12.279*** 
 (7.679) (6.990) (3.389) 
First year state had CS -175.121*** 90.853*** -15.099*** 
 (11.427) (9.067) (4.011) 
∆ Number of CS within    
Within 1 mile 9.033 -18.530 7.320 
 (14.277) (16.581) (8.158) 
1 to 2.5 miles 5.941 6.795 -3.240 
 (11.898) (13.430) (6.143) 
2.5 to 5 miles -7.144 0.498 -5.588 
 (6.229) (7.410) (3.571) 
5 to 7.5 miles -11.630** 4.436 0.171 
 (4.690) (5.751) (2.548) 
7.5 to 10 miles -9.743** -12.327** 6.029** 
 (4.383) (4.966) (2.687) 
10 to 15 miles 0.532 -2.343 1.050 
 (2.637) (2.725) (1.171) 
15 to 20 miles -3.701 -5.313** -1.221 
 (2.461) (2.524) (1.169) 
Authorizer type    
Local Education Agency -45.787*** -20.006 -18.124** 
 (15.398) (18.439) (7.595) 
State Education Agency -73.548*** 16.964 -19.364** 
 (22.240) (21.839) (7.760) 
Independent Charter Boards 26.976 -59.825 -41.155 
 (48.808) (67.275) (27.743) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity -343.262*** -236.654 80.063** 
 (130.381) (216.004) (33.758) 
University -139.871*** 93.060*** -17.986* 
 (38.396) (29.765) (10.509) 
    
    
    
 
168 
 
Table 6.6, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Non-profit 283.612*** -164.459** -49.007** 
 (66.052) (75.204) (22.183) 
Multiple authorizers -89.710*** -87.239*** -48.937** 
 (32.448) (31.347) (21.234) 
Unknown authorizer 27.303 -44.593 -12.032 
 (34.094) (32.691) (15.805) 
District characteristics    
∆ Total enrollment -0.155*** -0.115*** -0.029*** 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.010) 
∆ Total enrollment (sq.) >0.001*** >0.001*** >0.001*** 
 (>0.001) (>0.001) (>0.001) 
∆ African-American (%) -0.342 8.012*** 2.856 
 (2.325) (2.780) (1.747) 
∆ Hispanic (%) -1.284 -3.233 0.931 
 (1.897) (2.003) (1.193) 
∆ Asian (%) -4.329 2.312 -2.385 
 (4.028) (4.497) (2.164) 
∆ IEP (%) 9.812*** 5.224*** 4.166*** 
 (1.272) (1.085) (0.659) 
∆ FRL (%) 0.871** 1.112*** 1.853*** 
 (0.422) (0.425) (0.262) 
∆ ST Ratio -74.078*** -96.476*** -26.497*** 
 (2.860) (3.058) (1.334) 
∆ % Pop in poverty 0.714 3.504* 1.210 
 (1.662) (1.846) (1.121) 
∆ Med HH Income 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Predicted state revenue 0.430***   
 (0.164)   
∆ Predicted local revenue  -0.025  
  (0.323)  
Residual from location est. -7.776** -0.618 5.525*** 
 (3.250) (1.924) (1.343) 
Urban-centric locale    
Mid-sized city -29.318 39.408 18.657 
 (49.928) (45.066) (23.813) 
Urban fringe (large city) 13.797 18.236 24.975 
 (48.196) (40.312) (23.129) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) 14.793 30.184 24.775 
 (49.465) (43.055) (23.698) 
Large town 5.464 66.945 -7.456 
 (57.815) (52.174) (28.284) 
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Table 6.6, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Small town 7.054 16.613 26.124 
 (49.715) (43.424) (24.226) 
Rural, inside MSA -5.950 14.759 35.768 
 (48.901) (43.090) (23.901) 
Rural, outside MSA -10.551 26.686 29.250 
 (48.612) (42.821) (23.754) 
School year    
1997-1998 48.162*** 11.052 35.798*** 
 (11.388) (21.897) (4.008) 
1998-1999 66.279*** 24.343 32.368*** 
 (20.830) (29.727) (3.916) 
1999-2000 39.792** -20.477 44.943*** 
 (16.122) (17.016) (4.300) 
2000-2001 74.771*** 58.147 39.032*** 
 (18.301) (39.345) (4.467) 
2001-2002 102.442*** -191.619*** 108.295*** 
 (25.393) (11.760) (4.868) 
2002-2003 147.176*** -105.882*** 139.970*** 
 (17.302) (28.766) (5.108) 
2003-2004 312.154*** -226.917*** 84.948*** 
 (35.175) (63.598) (5.391) 
2004-2005 172.127*** -119.718** 49.768*** 
 (14.460) (47.928) (5.539) 
2005-2006 207.908*** -159.214*** 8.152 
 (17.780) (51.474) (5.511) 
2006-2007 57.709** 47.766 -30.952*** 
 (23.441) (36.761) (4.845) 
2007-2008 14.744 57.004*** 1.434 
 (21.973) (20.430) (4.867) 
2008-2009 138.616** -476.876*** 222.836*** 
 (58.540) (22.470) (6.095) 
2009-2010 245.894*** -448.303*** 464.211*** 
 (70.634) (14.286) (6.921) 
2010-2011 150.890*** -78.929*** -88.453*** 
 (19.240) (14.885) (6.513) 
Constant -51.668 173.419*** -46.836** 
 (53.032) (43.886) (23.593) 
Observations 155,383 155,240 158,416 
R-squared 0.033 0.080 0.117 
Number of school districts 13,537 13,541 13,787 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; urban-centric designations compared to “Large 
metropolitan area”; school years compared to base year school year 1996-1997 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.7 Revenue response with the interaction effects of districts with and without 
charter schools, sample restricted to states with charter districts 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter School Presence    
∆ Number of CS 3.015 0.087 -7.060 
 (8.363) (9.107) (4.639) 
∆ % CS 90.135 335.129* 132.940* 
 (174.720) (180.162) (80.019) 
No CS in district X Distance 0.408*** 0.370*** -0.162*** 
 (0.096) (0.122) (0.053) 
CS in district X Distance 0.385* 0.794*** 0.058 
 (0.204) (0.250) (0.082) 
No CS in state -17.976** -160.213*** -16.757*** 
 (8.747) (8.546) (3.303) 
First year state had CS -202.589*** 22.525** -27.008*** 
 (13.163) (10.313) (4.181) 
∆ Number of CS within    
Within 1 mile 8.115 -18.786 7.229 
 (14.663) (16.898) (8.211) 
1 to 2.5 miles 6.369 3.964 -1.478 
 (12.148) (13.622) (6.366) 
2.5 to 5 miles -9.024 2.656 -5.330 
 (6.297) (7.491) (3.620) 
5 to 7.5 miles -11.304** 5.018 0.035 
 (4.732) (5.784) (2.565) 
7.5 to 10 miles -10.095** -11.975** 6.009** 
 (4.383) (4.961) (2.702) 
10 to 15 miles 0.203 -1.823 1.089 
 (2.651) (2.730) (1.176) 
15 to 20 miles -3.758 -4.388* -1.237 
 (2.473) (2.532) (1.171) 
Authorizer type    
Local Education Agency -41.442** 6.257 -13.673* 
 (16.853) (20.551) (7.861) 
State Education Agency -61.808*** 37.455* -18.633** 
 (22.377) (22.192) (7.720) 
Independent Charter Boards 41.263 -47.457 -42.119 
 (48.859) (67.599) (28.527) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity -317.963*** -226.018 70.377** 
 (123.021) (210.569) (31.627) 
University -126.963*** 119.769*** -16.506 
 (38.451) (29.101) (10.357) 
    
    
    
 
171 
 
Table 6.7, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Non-profit 300.521*** -143.468* -52.503** 
 (66.366) (73.420) (22.285) 
Multiple authorizers -56.578* -45.998 -42.364* 
 (32.436) (32.073) (21.971) 
Unknown authorizer 16.862 -41.454 -10.139 
 (34.654) (33.829) (17.544) 
District characteristics    
∆ Total enrollment -0.166*** -0.117*** -0.031** 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.012) 
∆ Total enrollment (sq.) >0.001*** >0.001*** >0.001*** 
 (>0.001) (>0.001) (>0.001) 
∆ African-American (%) 0.359 6.196** 5.487*** 
 (2.294) (2.891) (1.856) 
∆ Hispanic (%) 0.073 1.638 0.736 
 (2.083) (2.370) (1.335) 
∆ Asian (%) 1.070 3.076 -3.019 
 (4.645) (4.363) (2.644) 
∆ IEP (%) 8.146*** -0.108 1.956*** 
 (1.376) (1.232) (0.678) 
∆ FRL (%) 1.756*** 1.552*** 1.763*** 
 (0.467) (0.499) (0.276) 
∆ ST Ratio -58.823*** -79.730*** -24.193*** 
 (2.789) (3.094) (1.400) 
∆ % Pop in poverty 4.740** 1.006 0.491 
 (1.941) (2.201) (1.226) 
∆ Med HH Income 0.008*** 0.004** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Predicted state revenue 0.650***   
 (0.174)   
∆ Predicted local revenue  -1.431***  
  (0.374)  
Residual from location est. -7.302** -0.780 4.834*** 
 (3.520) (2.143) (1.383) 
Urban-centric locale    
Mid-sized city -23.331 39.445 25.468 
 (52.078) (47.749) (25.094) 
Urban fringe (large city) 28.826 9.946 26.806 
 (50.249) (42.638) (24.565) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) 30.292 34.047 31.688 
 (51.580) (45.605) (25.106) 
Large town 2.099 78.922 17.065 
 (59.063) (60.537) (28.019) 
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Table 6.7, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Small town 12.324 31.898 31.176 
 (51.823) (46.134) (25.850) 
Rural, inside MSA 19.329 0.354 30.441 
 (50.974) (45.732) (25.328) 
Rural, outside MSA 5.416 22.623 29.618 
 (50.547) (45.321) (25.166) 
School year    
1997-1998 41.919*** 69.607*** 36.858*** 
 (12.588) (25.107) (4.577) 
1998-1999 84.109*** 72.756** 26.489*** 
 (22.022) (34.417) (4.257) 
1999-2000 53.305*** -5.103 32.286*** 
 (17.132) (19.885) (4.725) 
2000-2001 68.075*** 204.806*** 29.196*** 
 (19.289) (45.264) (4.829) 
2001-2002 132.276*** -283.184*** 98.291*** 
 (26.983) (14.143) (5.439) 
2002-2003 120.270*** -89.139*** 110.341*** 
 (19.139) (33.143) (5.299) 
2003-2004 339.715*** -42.036 67.816*** 
 (37.724) (73.367) (5.693) 
2004-2005 190.235*** -17.002 29.252*** 
 (15.796) (54.876) (5.568) 
2005-2006 204.591*** -56.010 -10.923** 
 (19.202) (59.290) (5.536) 
2006-2007 4.372 101.589** -44.257*** 
 (25.132) (42.421) (5.152) 
2007-2008 -3.216 -4.704 -9.944* 
 (23.412) (23.589) (5.340) 
2008-2009 185.449*** -682.883*** 251.136*** 
 (62.441) (26.433) (6.686) 
2009-2010 320.703*** -522.772*** 433.944*** 
 (74.647) (16.179) (7.694) 
2010-2011 141.934*** -109.011*** -106.024*** 
 (20.998) (17.424) (7.142) 
Constant -99.217* 301.316*** -30.086 
 (55.183) (46.419) (24.883) 
Observations 117,138 116,642 119,026 
R-squared 0.029 0.077 0.133 
Number of ncesid 10,119 10,122 10,310 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; urban-centric designations compared to “Large 
metropolitan area”; school years compared to base year school year 2000-2001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.8 Revenue response with the interaction effects of districts with and without 
charter schools, sample restricted to SY 2000-2001 through SY 2010-2011 
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter School Presence    
∆ Number of CS 8.252 12.669 -4.537 
 (8.661) (9.625) (4.880) 
∆ % CS 65.272 241.904 100.334 
 (187.457) (205.621) (97.595) 
No CS in district X Distance 0.350*** -1.087*** -0.147** 
 (0.122) (0.158) (0.059) 
CS in district X Distance 0.771 0.043 -0.515* 
 (0.557) (0.531) (0.278) 
No CS in state 23.887* -206.716*** 50.529*** 
 (13.953) (10.935) (6.808) 
First year state had CS -350.955*** 4.650 -15.692* 
 (27.219) (17.037) (8.715) 
∆ Number of CS within    
Within 1 mile 19.778 -26.411 3.438 
 (15.135) (17.359) (8.881) 
1 to 2.5 miles 4.276 4.588 -10.179 
 (12.834) (14.825) (6.979) 
2.5 to 5 miles -8.085 -5.362 -7.826* 
 (6.808) (8.140) (4.111) 
5 to 7.5 miles -13.068*** -0.114 -0.267 
 (4.884) (6.476) (2.979) 
7.5 to 10 miles -11.163** -15.551*** 6.276** 
 (4.880) (5.523) (2.847) 
10 to 15 miles -2.136 -2.775 1.544 
 (2.968) (3.134) (1.351) 
15 to 20 miles -7.263*** -6.729** -1.346 
 (2.809) (3.031) (1.392) 
Authorizer type    
Local Education Agency -57.544*** 16.259 -18.798* 
 (20.743) (24.539) (10.745) 
State Education Agency -50.855 -14.724 -26.689** 
 (34.064) (32.427) (13.472) 
Independent Charter Boards 24.792 -97.457 -44.198 
 (63.738) (94.271) (37.405) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity -170.174 -315.771 112.973** 
 (222.411) (240.646) (44.888) 
University -158.471** 43.750 30.878 
 (72.589) (59.648) (19.773) 
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Table 6.8, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Non-profit 371.102*** -222.942** -71.746** 
 (67.740) (88.259) (28.251) 
Multiple authorizers -67.980* -106.736*** -72.968** 
 (38.749) (39.758) (28.840) 
Unknown authorizer 2.456 -14.951 -13.991 
 (40.443) (40.395) (21.004) 
District characteristics    
∆ Total enrollment -0.161*** -0.131*** -0.036*** 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.013) 
∆ Total enrollment (sq.) >0.001*** >0.001*** >0.001*** 
 (>0.001) (>0.001) (>0.001) 
∆ African-American (%) 2.228 8.736** 3.852 
 (2.726) (3.484) (2.371) 
∆ Hispanic (%) -1.326 -3.323 1.544 
 (2.146) (2.194) (1.422) 
∆ Asian (%) -3.733 3.168 -3.756 
 (4.715) (5.121) (2.736) 
∆ IEP (%) 12.194*** 3.993*** 5.648*** 
 (1.487) (1.325) (0.871) 
∆ FRL (%) 0.840* 1.816*** 2.251*** 
 (0.488) (0.534) (0.358) 
∆ ST Ratio -68.827*** -94.229*** -29.659*** 
 (3.194) (3.505) (1.688) 
∆ % Pop in poverty 6.351*** -0.263 0.214 
 (1.775) (2.020) (1.345) 
∆ Med HH Income 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Predicted state revenue 0.468***   
 (0.165)   
∆ Predicted local revenue  0.354  
  (0.571)  
Residual from location 
estimation 
-4.885 2.639 7.732*** 
 (3.488) (2.360) (2.181) 
Urban-centric locale 14.648 7.892 -11.413 
Mid-sized city (107.326) (115.815) (44.184) 
 62.022 -57.406 -9.149 
Urban fringe (large city) (108.210) (112.678) (44.865) 
 58.971 -16.180 -2.078 
Urban fringe (midsize city) (107.577) (114.792) (43.822) 
 43.963 22.775 -57.759 
Large town (113.759) (121.264) (49.961) 
 47.472 -14.330 -5.582 
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Table 6.8, continued.    
 ∆Local Rev ∆State Rev ∆Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Small town (107.512) (114.948) (44.067) 
 57.092 -26.105 1.737 
Rural, inside MSA (107.299) (115.164) (43.846) 
 19.753 -21.378 -6.267 
Rural, outside MSA (106.507) (114.997) (43.156) 
    
School year    
2001-2002 35.064 -205.195*** 72.253*** 
 (38.715) (63.069) (5.155) 
2002-2003 74.162*** -148.135*** 107.382*** 
 (28.733) (22.704) (4.951) 
2003-2004 244.160*** -316.100*** 51.490*** 
 (48.796) (44.812) (5.487) 
2004-2005 111.917*** -190.828*** 15.698*** 
 (24.717) (18.322) (5.351) 
2005-2006 144.814*** -235.544*** -22.956*** 
 (29.255) (24.299) (5.324) 
2006-2007 -18.862 -4.115 -62.304*** 
 (11.495) (11.925) (4.562) 
2007-2008 -53.791*** 21.288 -27.687*** 
 (11.472) (40.343) (4.924) 
2008-2009 84.852 -469.390*** 194.107*** 
 (72.726) (100.776) (5.986) 
2009-2010 178.348** -465.023*** 437.388*** 
 (84.957) (59.883) (7.235) 
2010-2011 77.234** -101.424** -116.040*** 
 (30.890) (51.194) (6.495) 
Constant -41.698 -75.546 8.929 
 (111.813) (279.210) (43.060) 
    
Observations 115,649 115,291 117,653 
R-squared 0.034 0.080 0.132 
Number of school districts 13,400 13,416 13,511 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; urban-centric designations compared to “Large 
metropolitan area”; school years compared to base year school year 2000-2001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the association between revenue 
changes in public school districts and the presence of charter schools.  Charter schools 
rest within a multi-level policy environment that integrates local public school districts, 
state education agencies, state legislatures and the federal government.  Chapter Two 
provided an institutional description of these policy environments, highlighting the fact 
that states vary in their legislation, authorization and management of charter schools.   
Charter schools remain a small part of the public education system, and much of 
the recent studies have examined their influence on local school districts.  I have added to 
this literature by examining the school district’s revenue response to charter schools.  
Chapter Three provided a review of existing studies, most of which examined how the 
achievement scores of students in public schools changed when charter schools were 
present.  A few studies examined school district expenditure changes, and to date, this 
author is not aware of any other scholarly investigation that considers public school 
revenues.  Therefore, one of the contributions of this dissertation was its consideration of 
revenues.   
As discussed in Chapter Three, many of the authors discussed the relationship of 
charter schools and their encompassing local school district as a competitive one.  In 
Chapter Four, I offered an alternative view in that charter schools may increase local 
school revenues because they attracted more students away from private schools and into 
the public education sector.  In this situation, it is possible that local school district and 
charter schools cooperate instead of compete.   
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In Chapter Five, I outlined issues with the current collection of charter school 
location databases.  While the NCES and national charter organizations do well in 
monitoring charter schools, there has been much confusion in how to place a charter 
school within a local school district.  The autonomy of charter schools differs across 
states, and this was reflected in the different reporting practices.  In some states or 
regions, charter schools were considered their own district; in others, the local school 
district counts them.  I use ArcGIS software to map charter school locations within public 
school districts in the U.S.  By doing so, I provided various measures of charter school 
presence that include the number of charter schools, the percentage of schools within a 
district that were charter schools, the distance to the nearest charter school and various 
density measures (the number of charter schools within a particular radii of the district’s 
centroid).  This alternative measure more accurately reflects the presence of charter 
schools within local public school districts, and, therefore, makes a contribution to the 
literature. 
Lastly, Chapter Six outlined the various empirical issues associated with 
modeling the influence of charter schools on local public school revenues.  I employed 
two empirical techniques—instrumental variables and Arellano-Bond (1991)—to deal 
with joint dependence of state and local revenues and the endogeneity associated with 
charter school locations, respectively.  Empirical results from Chapter Six suggested that 
district revenues changed with the increased presence of charter schools.  Consistently, 
local revenues decreased and federal revenues increased as charter school moved closer.  
On net, total per-pupil revenues decreased as charter schools moved closer to the district.  
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The relationship between state revenues and charter school depended on time and the 
state in which one chooses to focus.  
It seemed, too, that the type of authorizer present within a district mattered.  
Relative to districts without charter schools, revenues were lower in districts with charter 
schools, on average.  But within the districts that had charter schools, this decrease was 
smallest when the local public school district authorized the charter schools located 
within it.  Districts with charter schools authorized by universities, state education 
agencies and non-educational government organizations (mayors) experienced much 
larger drops in revenue.   
Policy implications 
From a policy perspective, this dissertation reiterated previous findings that 
charter schools differ within and across state policy environments.  A sweeping 
generalization about charter school effectiveness or the relationship between charter 
schools and their encompassing districts would be unwise, given the differences in 
revenue changes over time and in different states.  In other words, one could not say that 
a charter school in Miami would have the same influence on its accommodating district 
as a charter school in New York City.   
It can be claimed, given the results presented in this dissertation, that charter 
schools have been influential and that local school district revenues have changed with 
the presence of charter schools.  The policy implications of this are not clear yet, though.  
Decreasing revenues for the district may be beneficial for taxpayers, especially if the 
district maintains or increasing student achievement outcomes (thereby increasing 
efficiency).  In contrast, falling revenues may restrict district officials from providing 
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adequate education services.  The opposite scenarios may also be relevant.  Taxpayers 
may welcome increases in revenues if they receive services from the public education 
sector, but additional funds do not guarantee increased outputs.    
In summary, charter schools play an important role in the public education 
system.  There has been much debate over the efficacy of charter schools and how they 
affect outputs like student test scores.  However, this dissertation submits that it is 
important to consider how the inputs have changed with charter schools as well.  With a 
better understanding of how local public school revenues from local, state and federal 
sources change when charter schools   are present, district officials, state legislatures and 
federal agencies may be able to more efficiently allocate funds.    
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A, Local school district revenue response to charter schools 
 Local Rev State Rev Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Charter Presence    
Number of CS 8.421** -3.004 4.768*** 
 (3.772) (3.961) (1.520) 
% CS within district 210.310 -282.188 45.883 
 (243.159) (261.358) (115.100) 
Distance to nearest CS -0.793*** 0.158* 0.037 
 (0.087) (0.094) (0.056) 
No CS within state -58.849*** -45.076*** 37.892*** 
 (15.143) (15.977) (7.572) 
Number of CS within    
1 mile -34.035* 14.355 5.840 
 (18.913) (21.180) (7.573) 
1 to 2.5 miles -14.147 36.234** 6.106* 
 (14.120) (16.626) (3.593) 
2.5 to 5 miles -12.637*** -8.611 0.882 
 (4.676) (6.080) (2.251) 
5 to 7.5 miles -3.893 2.397 -0.132 
 (4.317) (4.406) (1.428) 
7.5 to 10 miles 2.588 3.160 1.266 
 (3.604) (4.147) (2.240) 
10 to 15 miles -4.453*** -7.040*** -1.771* 
 (1.716) (1.626) (1.005) 
15 to 20 miles -1.545 -1.837 -0.843* 
 (1.263) (1.167) (0.451) 
Authorizer type    
LEA -111.603*** -31.927 -15.987 
 (29.254) (36.008) (13.326) 
SEA -23.202 53.087 28.046 
 (38.079) (40.056) (18.665) 
Independent Charter Boards 23.747 -360.302*** -31.776 
 (83.120) (108.966) (52.221) 
Non-Ed Gov. Entity 72.724 -238.003 4.987 
 (473.414) (231.294) (55.172) 
University -259.585*** -311.338*** -81.893*** 
 (53.816) (67.316) (22.074) 
Non-profit -194.947** 214.015** -86.752*** 
 (80.400) (89.041) (21.567) 
Multiple authorizers -170.111*** 8.759 -7.011 
 (44.665) (70.497) (20.174) 
Unknown authorizer -65.601 215.806*** -18.972 
 (48.959) (74.693) (23.613) 
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Appendix A, continued.    
 Local Rev State Rev Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
    
District characteristics    
Total enrollment -0.046*** -0.023*** -0.014*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) 
Total enrollment (sq.) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
African-American (%) -0.028 7.792*** 0.231 
 (2.234) (2.230) (1.039) 
Hispanic (%) -2.563* -5.262*** 1.282 
 (1.526) (1.442) (0.803) 
Asian (%) 9.494** 4.671 -11.136** 
 (4.311) (6.274) (4.778) 
IEP (%) 21.125*** 19.437*** 3.198*** 
 (1.551) (1.650) (0.839) 
FRL (%) -2.153*** 3.277*** 3.104*** 
 (0.653) (0.661) (0.477) 
Student-teacher ratio -147.576*** -154.322*** -33.699*** 
 (4.308) (4.407) (1.727) 
Population in poverty (%) 4.168* -14.090*** -14.253*** 
 (2.346) (2.412) (1.428) 
Median HH income 0.039*** 0.017*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
State revenue (per-pupil) -0.093***   
 (0.007)   
Local revenue (per-pupil)  -0.108***  
  (0.007)  
Urban-centric designation    
Mid-sized city 149.983* 61.376 -5.391 
 (83.541) (65.222) (20.315) 
Urban fringe (large city) 163.172** 37.882 -16.946 
 (79.619) (60.879) (18.904) 
Urban fringe (midsize city) 173.091** 66.430 -32.977 
 (83.809) (65.196) (20.477) 
Large town 169.213* 191.960*** -13.772 
 (91.017) (72.458) (23.564) 
Small town 143.118* 95.642 -17.330 
 (84.893) (66.493) (21.061) 
Rural, inside MSA 186.135** 97.209 0.472 
 (83.637) (64.972) (20.492) 
Rural, outside MSA 169.764** 25.005 -27.590 
 (83.737) (64.191) (20.458) 
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Appendix A, continued.    
 Local Rev State Rev Federal Rev 
VARIABLES (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Lagged Revenues    
Local revenue (per-pupil) 0.595***   
 (0.007)   
State revenue (per-pupil)  0.555***  
  (0.008)  
Federal revenue (per-pupil)   0.459*** 
   (0.014) 
School year 1996-1997 -27.188* 67.273*** 27.164*** 
 (14.875) (12.464) (3.985) 
1997-1998 -49.439*** 97.380*** 67.021*** 
 (14.448) (11.806) (4.989) 
1998-1999 -156.145*** 252.767*** 93.298*** 
 (19.139) (17.205) (6.435) 
1999-2000 -226.990*** 254.095*** 106.046*** 
 (20.229) (17.867) (6.924) 
2000-2001 -98.818*** 326.220*** 132.717*** 
 (21.210) (20.752) (8.036) 
2001-2002 -175.037*** 136.655*** 211.501*** 
 (21.868) (20.936) (8.512) 
2002-2003 -74.365*** 243.478*** 302.737*** 
 (22.479) (22.522) (9.924) 
2003-2004 98.595*** 147.271*** 320.463*** 
 (23.503) (23.813) (10.862) 
2004-2005 37.105 302.255*** 349.923*** 
 (26.341) (27.194) (12.412) 
2005-2006 96.764*** 292.913*** 361.958*** 
 (26.482) (27.076) (13.818) 
2006-2007 54.594* 513.644*** 322.769*** 
 (28.361) (29.120) (14.761) 
2007-2008 -35.833 516.114*** 344.202*** 
 (30.735) (30.854) (15.732) 
2008-2009 -143.613*** 143.942*** 553.964*** 
 (33.752) (33.774) (17.209) 
2009-2010 -90.578*** -10.931 886.276*** 
 (33.226) (33.942) (19.216) 
2010-2011 32.132 321.145*** 568.684*** 
 (33.389) (33.329) (22.906) 
Constant 3,280.450*** 4,476.951*** 1,355.033*** 
 (149.091) (130.103) (59.289) 
Observations 186,405 186,405 187,833 
R-squared 0.211 0.207 0.261 
Number of school districts 14,492 14,492 14,541 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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